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EDITORIAL COMMENT 
This report is one of a series produced by the Industrial Strategy Project. 
The ISP has its origins in the Economic Trends Research Group, a collective of economists 
and other social scientists convened by the Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1986. 
COSATU, under attack for its support for sanctions, initially asked these researchers to 
examine the impact of enforced isolation on the South African economy. It soon became clear 
that sanctions were a small aspect of the problems besetting the South African economy, and 
the work of the Economic Trends Research Group expanded into a full-blown analysis of 
South Africa's economic crisis. 
The poor performance of South Africa's manufacturing sector loomed large in the litany of 
problems bedeviling the South African economy. The 1980s had been, in economic terms, 
something of a lost decade. The manufacturing sector was particularly conspicuous by its 
inability to create jobs, and to produce commodities that satisfied the divergent requirements 
pf the domestic and international markets. A range of factors contributed to this malaise — 
apartheid's impact on the skills profile of the workforce, repressive and outmoded industrial 
relations systems and work organisation, a highly concentrated industrial structure and a 
concomitantly weak and repressed SME and micro-enterprise sector, and a highly inward 
oriented trade regime, were the most obvious sources of the crisis in manufacturing. 
However, the solutions were less obvious than the problems, and in 1990, again at COSATU's 
initiation, the ISP was conceived. From the outset, the political environment ensured that the 
ISP would not be an ordinary research project. The unbanning of the ANC and the certainty of 
the immediate accession to power of COSATU's political ally, coupled with the union 
federation's increasingly direct role in policy formulation, ensured that the ISP focus closely 
on policy, contributing to the development of the industrial policy that would address the poor 
performance of South African manufacturing. 
To this end, the ISP engaged a range of researchers with the purpose of undertaking detailed 
examinations of the key sub-sectors of South African manufacturing. The fruits of the ISP are 
to be found in the reports, such as this one, most of which are to be published by the UCT 
Press. The authors of the reports were assigned, generally for a period of 14 months, to the 
study of a particular sector. The researchers were required to study the local sector and the 
factors promoting and restraining its development. They were required to assess its prospects 
in the light of the likely global trajectory of the industry. Detailed examination of local firms 
were complemented by international visits that enabled the researchers to consult with 
international experts and visit factories to enable them to situate South African firms in a 
comparative perspective. 
In addition to the sectoral studies, the ISP also engaged researchers to examine key cross- 
cutting issues. Those selected for study were human resource development and industrial 
relations, technology development, market and ownership structures, trade performance and 
policies, and regional industrial strategies. 
Industrial policy is not a plan easily contained between the covers of a single document. It is a 
process, a process of engagement between the key industrial stakeholders. South Africa's 
peculiar transition has given concrete expression to this credo, with the tripartite National 
Economic Forum and the various sectoral task groups the key institutions and processes within 
which an evolving industrial policy is being developed. COSATU has played the leading role 
in this process. The ISP has, in turn, made a significant contribution to COSATU's capacities. 
It has done this by constant dialogue between the ISP and the COSATU leadership, and by a 
traineeship programme which saw a number of union leaders seconded to the ISP for its 
duration. 
In addition the research process has engaged a range of key actors. Individual researchers have 
engaged with union and business leaders and experts within government. The ISP was 
punctuated by a series of intensive workshop attended by the researchers, COSATU and ANC 
leaders, and other local and international experts. The work-in-progress was thoroughly 
discussed and critiqued at these workshops and it is appropriate to see each report as owing a 
great deal to the ISP collective. 
A number of researchers are continuing their work from within the industry task forces, the 
unions, and the structures of the new government. The ISP itself is moving into a second 
phase, taking up questions still unanswered, re-examining conclusions of the first phase and 
continuing the unending process of developing industrial policy. It is in this spirit that these 
reports should be read: they are not final plans, but simply attempts to start a vital process, one 
that will of necessity be taken forward by all of the major industry participants. 
The Industrial Strategy Project was funded by generous grants from the Humanistisch Instituut 
Voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (HIVOS) of The Netherlands, the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and the Olof Palme International 
Centre of Sweden. We benefitted not only from the financial resources of these institutions, 
but also from the wide-ranging experience of their staff members and their deep and abiding 
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FOREWORD 
In the late eighties COSATIJ commissioned a group of economists to prepare a report 
analysing the impact of sanctions on the South African economy. We commissioned this work 
in response to criticism in the media and elsewhere that held us — through our support for 
sanctions — responsible for the sorry state of the South African economy, including the 
miserable conditions of our members and others whose interests and aspirations we 
represented. 
The research revealed that the crisis of the South African economy was rooted in the policies 
of the apartheid era and our commission to the economists was transformed into a full-scale 
critique of the economics of apartheid. A key consequence of the failures of apartheid's social 
and economic policies was its unproductive manufacturing sector. It was unable to produce 
basic goods of a suitable quality and at an affordable price; it was unable to produce goods that 
successfully penetrated international markets; it relied on low paid, poorly trained workers, 
and harsh, authoritarian shop floor supervision; above all, it proved incapable of generating 
desperately needed employment. While manufacturing's contribution to the global economy 
escalated, South Africa relied increasingly on its natural resource base and the cheap labour 
that mined and farmed it. 
Appreciation of these problems inspired COSATtJ to request its research collective to 
undertake research in support of our attempt to formulate a new industrial policy. This request 
flowered into the Industrial Strategy Project whose output is represented in these reports. 
The research process has been characterised by considerable dialogue between COSATU, its 
affiliates and the researchers. We have learnt much from this interaction; we are confident that 
we have taught the researchers much. However this work is the output of an independent 
research collective. As is to be expected in an arms length relationship of this kind, we do not 
agree with every line of each report, we do not accept every recommendation. But with regard 
to its major findings, we do agree that there is a real potential for building an efficient 
manufacturing base, rooted in well paid, productive workers. Above all we believe, and this is 
endorsed by the ISP, that an independent trade union movement actively and aggressively 
pursuing its interests is not merely compatible with rapid and sustainable industrial 
development — it is a precondition. 
John Gomomo 
President, Congress of South African Trade Unions 
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Executive summary 
This report constitutes a policy oriented analysis of the South African motor vehicle and 
component manufacturing sector. The central concern is the question of whether a large, 
dynamic and internationally competitive industry is viable in South Africa and the policy 
requirements to achieve this. This is the question posed in the first introductory section 
where it is argued also that the research undertaken demonstrates that with an appropriate 
policy framework the South African industry is potentially well placed to become a 
significant producer of vehicles and components. 
Chapter one: Global trends — implications for 
developing countries 
Markets 
In spite of the current global recession the longer term trend has been a rapid increase in 
production accompanied by increased internationalisation of investment and the 
emergence of new production locations. 
These processes are creating new opportunities for certain developing country industries 
but are also sidelining others from access to new technology and investment. 
Successful exporting is essential in order to generate foreign exchange, smooth production 
levels and achieve economies of scale. Long distances from markets, although a 
disadvantage, are by no means an overriding constraint. The growing application of just- 
in-time supply and resulting pressures to locate close to assembly plants are significant for 
some types of components but not for others. 
Competition on world markets is severe and there is currently considerable overcapacity 
particularly in assembly. In order to compete, component suppliers have to be able to offer 
ongoing price reductions. 
Outsourcing by the principal producers is increasing and most assemblers and first tier 
component producers are looking to lower wage countries for at least some components. 
There exists, therefore, a large variety of niche markets which are accessible to a wide 
range of developing country capabilities. 
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Supply side factors 
The cases of Korea, Mexico and Taiwan illustrate that developing countries can compete 
effectively in highly competitive advanced country markets for fully built up vehicles and 
major components both in terms of quality and productivity. 
New forms of production organisation can be successfully implemented in developing 
countries as long as due regard is given to the specific social context and training 
requirements. 
Assembly only accounts for 15—20% of the total value of motor vehicle production and 
competitively priced and high quality component supply is critical for a competitive 
assembly operation. 
Although labour costs are failing as a proportion of direct costs they remain highly 
significant. High labour costs are leading to a relative increase in outsourcing and 
production relocation from the three major producing countries — Germany, Japan and the 
USA. 
There is little evidence pointing to a significant decline in minimum efficient plant scale 
although a single plant can now produce a wider variety of products. 
Strategic issues 
The global industry is becoming more integrated and the locational decisions of the 
multinational producers are critical for aspiring developing country industries. 
Many developed and developing countries are trying to encourage vehicle exports to earn 
foreign exchange and to improve capacity utilisation. This means that competition is 
severe both to attract new investment and in the international market itself. For the most 
part, the major producers have established their strategic locations mainly in countries 
with large populations and are unlikely to expand these significantly. 
It is therefore essential for aspiring developing country producers to secure for themselves 
some favourable linkage into these global networks. This requires a stable and effective 
policy regime and bargaining by host country industries and governments. 
Chapter Two: The development of the South African 
industry 
The South African industry has performed extremely poorly in terms of output levels since 
the early 1980s but problems such as a lack of international competitiveness go back much 
further. 
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Past policies of protection and local content requirements have been the key factors which 
have led to the proliferation of low volume assemblers supplied by low volume, high 
variety component producers. 
The current local content programme (Phase VI) introduced in 1989 sought to address the 
problems of a low volume, high cost production structure by encouraging specialisation 
through allowing exports to be counted as local content. 
Phase VI has had a number of effects: 
— it encouraged a rapid growth in exports of both components and built up vehicles. 
— it led to a rapid shift in component sourcing arrangements putting many traditional 
component suppliers under extreme pressure from imports. 
— it led to a further increase in proliferation due to the fact that protection of 
components was reduced while rates of protection on built up vehicles were 
maintained thus raising the effective rate of protection. 
Chapter Three: Competitiveness in the South African 
automotive industry 
While the industry is currently generally uncompetitive there are important areas of 
competitive strength. 
The industry is extremely reliant on foreign technology which is expensive and more 
importantly has led to restrictions on exports (through restrictive licence agreements). 
However there is a basic level of technological competence and a clear capacity to 
introduce productivity enhancing technological adaptations. 
The assembly industry is uncompetitive due to: 
— the high cost of locally produced components which have historically received 
substantial protection via the local content programme. 
— a lack of economies of scale due to the inordinate number of models which are 
produced in the local market. Average annual production per model is much lower 
even than in low volume producers such as Brazil and Australia. 
— low capacity utilisation. 
— the fact that the industry trails world best practice by a substantial margin in terms of 
productivity and lean manufacturing benchmarks such as quality and inventory levels. 
Very limited progress has been made in mobilising the workforce in pursuit of 
productivity objectives and training of new production workers is very limited by 
world standards. 
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The component industry is uncompetitive as a result of: 
— the impact of previous local content programme and the low volume, high variety 
requirements of the domestic market. 
— a lack of economies of scale. Minimum efficient scale is greater in components 
production than in assembly and South African firms generally produce an unusually 
wide range of components at exceptionally low volumes by world standards. 
— high costs for raw materials such as steel and aluminium. 
However, the industry has developed certain areas of competitive strength. Because of its 
focus on high variety and low volume components, producers have developed 
considerable expertise in this area and can compete in niche markets such as the 
international aftermarket or low volume original equipment. Another area of emerging 
competitiveness is in components which have a high raw material content and where 
licencing does not present a constraint (eg. aluminium wheels). 
Chapter Four: Case studies of firm level restructuring 
Under Phase VI of the local content programme, the industry is becoming increasingly 
integrated into global trade. This has posed challenges and opportunities for assemblers 
and component producers. 
The supply response by firms to greater international integration is what will determine the 
success of a restructuring programme. Firms have responded in various ways and 
productivity has improved but at great cost in terms of employment. 
Gabriel SA, a foreign owned shock absorber producer has achieved large productivity 
gains through reorganising production on the basis of JIT manufacturing cells. While this 
demonstrates the potential effectiveness of Japanese style production methods, there have 
been severe employment losses. This is a major reason why workers have historically 
regarded productivity initiatives with suspicion. 
However the Gabriel experience illustrates that improving flexibility offers considerable 
scope for productivity improvement in South Africa's high variety, low volume industry. 
Atlantis Diesel Engines is indicative of the problems faced by major component producers 
resulting from the small size of the South African market and dependence on foreign 
technology. 
The standardisation of diesel engine manufacture has led to considerable advantages but 
also illustrates that standardisation is only a partial solution to the problems of 
proliferation because the South African market is so small that in certain product lines it 
cannot even support one world scale producer. 
The case of BMW illustrates that South Africa may have greater potential as a car 
producer than is generally realised. 
VIII 
The company is considering expanding production in South Africa and exporting vehicles 
on a significant scale on the grounds that: 
— labour costs are considerably lower than in Germany 
— they have an existing production facility in South Africa 
— South Africa has an advantage in raw materials and also certain components. 
Chapter Five: Which way forward for the South 
African motor industry? 
Past policy has seriously impeded the development of a viable motor industry in South 
Africa mainly because it encouraged the unrestrained proliferation of makes and models 
being assembled in South Africa thus creating problems also in the component sector. 
Phase VI has increased competitive pressure on components producers but not on 
assemblers. 
The underlying conditions exist in South Africa for very significant expansion in the 
industry. These include: 
— the large potential for market growth both in South Africa and Southern Africa. 
— the advantage of being an intermediate economy. The percentage share of world 
production in middle income countries is rising. 
— natural and human resources and infrastructure are all at a reasonable level of 
development. The emergence of tripartite policy making offers considerable potential 
benefits in terms of more stable industrial relations as well as drawing labour into the 
process of setting a new direction for the industry. 
There is scope for improving competitiveness both in areas such as niche market 
production where the industry is already strong but also in areas where the industry is 
weaker such as in the production of major components. 
There are three possible growth paths open to the industry: 
— rapid liberalisation 
— further import substitution 
— guided integration into the world market 
Rapid liberalisation has little to recommend it and policy needs to aim at maximising the 
benefits and minimising the costs of a guided integration strategy with elements of 
selective import substitution. 
ix 
The trade regime is an important policy instrument but it needs to be complemented by 
supply side policies in areas such as training and R&D. 
Trade policy should aim at encouraging structural changes and export growth before 
exposing the local industry to excessive foreign competition. 
Establishing an efficient structure for the industry is also an important policy objective and 
should precede any further significant liberalisation of trade barriers. The problem of 
proliferation can be dealt with by a combination of the following strategies. 
— a reduction of models and makes being produced in South Africa. 
— standardisation in selected areas. 
— specialisation and the expansion of exports. 
— greater flexibility. 
The above policy measures need to be complemented by supply side policies which: 
— encourage greater investment in R&D. 
— significantly expand and reorientate training. 
— accelerate the adoption of new forms of work organisation. 
— encourage new investment. 
— build the institutional structure which supports the industry. 
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Introduction 
The objective of this report is to provide a policy oriented analysis of the South African 
motor vehicle assembly and component industry.1 The industry has long been a problem 
sector in South African manufacturing and current development policy is now under 
review following the appointment in late 1992 of the Motor Industry Task Group whose 
brief is to make recommendations about policies to promote the future development of the 
industry. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the industry is at the crossroads. What is at stake is no less 
than the type of motor industry with which South Africa will enter the 21st century. What 
happens in this industry, furthennore, will have important ramifications for other 
manufacturing sectors and for the economy as a whole. While the performance of the 
broader economy will have an important bearing on how the sector develops, the course of 
events will also be crucially shaped by actors within the industry — the companies 
themselves, the trade unions and govermnental agencies. 
Appropriate policy and a wide mobilisation of support for this policy is essential if the 
industry is to survive and grow. For its part, government needs to exercise leadership by 
establishing, in cooperation with other players, a clear and consistent set of polices and by 
putting in place a set of 'enabling mechanisms' such as appropriate support for the 
upgrading of the skill and technological infrastructure of the industry. It will be necessary 
that firms respond positively, for example, by making appropriate investments, in support 
of this long term vision. The unions also have an important role in driving the process. 
They realise perhaps more clearly than anyone else the stark consequences of further 
decline and the need for a proactive strategy. NUMSA, by far the most important union in 
the industry, is already involved in major initiatives in this regard. 
At first glance, it may appear that the South African motor industry has very limited 
prospects. Highly protected and inefficient according to most international standards, far 
from major markets and mired in long term decline, it clearly lacks competitive advantage. 
However, at the outset of a policy oriented study, it may be more appropriate to ask why a 
country with a long history of automotive production, an accumulation of skills at all 
levels, an abundance of the neccessary raw materials, a market which is not insignificant 
and which has huge potential, a highly developed technological capacity in certain areas 
and excellent infrastructure has not been able to develop a larger and more competitive 
industry? 
1. The focus is on production and little attention is devoted to the service sector side of the industry such as 
the distribution system. Assembly of heavy vehicles is excluded although component production for 
heavy vehicles is covered to some extent. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
It is the contention of this report that South Africa, in terms of its level of development, its 
existing capabilities and resources and the potential in the longer term of its domestic and 
regional markets is potentially well placed to emerge as a significant vehicle producer by 
the year 2005. 
In the opening chapter, we examine global trends in production and trade and their 
implications for developing country automotive industries. The report also assesses the 
diffusion of best practice techniques in manufacturing. Japanese production techniques are 
proving highly transferable not only to developed countries but also, in certain instances, 
to middle income countries. One result of these trends is that the global share of 
developing countries in world automotive production is rising significantly while that of 
existng major producers is likely to fall. The reasons for this are simple. Making cars and 
components (as opposed to designing them) is essentially not very complicated — it is an 
industrial activity in which middle income countries (which have a lower cost structure) 
can attain productivity levels which approach those of the advanced countries. 
The chapters on the South African industry deal, firstly, with why the industry is so 
fragmented and uncompetitive. This can be traced directly back to the policy of 
indiscriminate protection that has been applied over the last few decades. The Phase VI 
local content programme was an important turning point but has introduced further 
difficulties. 
Chapter Three examines the weaknesses and strengths of the South African industry. 
Weaknesses include high raw material and component costs and outdated work 
organisation. Nevertheless, some firms have reacted dynamically to growing domestic and 
international competitive pressure by introducing far reaching shifts in strategy and 
reorganising production. 
Although the industry is uncompetitive in many areas, it has developed very important 
capabilities, for example, in low volume, high variety production. Most importantly, it is 
also clear that the opportunities for productivity growth are enormous. Improvements in 
any one of the following areas could generate significant productivity gains, together they 
would transform the industry: 
• Rationalisation of the industry to generate higher volume production and improve 
capacity utihisation. While the flexibility and small scale capabilities of the industry 
are an important strength, there are many areas where higher volumes would greatly 
reduce unit costs. 
• New investment into the industry can play a major role in improving productivity by 
modernising equipment, introducing greater levels of automation and by adding to 
capacity with the focus on export markets. 
• Significant productivity gains can also be made in terms of the organisation of 
production and the upgrading of skills of all sectors of the workforce. 
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There are many international examples of automotive industries with seemingly good 
prospects which have gone into serious decline. There are other cases where industries 
facing major problems have been turned around. Many things will have to happen if a new 
virtuous circle of investment and expansion in the South African automotive indusiry is to 
be established. The challenge to policy is to bring about these conditions. 
Chapter One: Global trends — Implications for 
developing countries 
1. Introduction 
The production of motor vehicles is one of the world's largest industries. It is also an 
industry in which major international shifts in the location of production are occurring as 
transnational corporations seek to globalise their production and markets. The industry is 
at the cutting edge of new technology and product development and especially of new 
forms of production organisation. It is within this fast changing system that many 
developing countries with relatively small markets and weak technological capabilities 
have sought to create for themselves a role as producers of vehicles and components. In 
many instances, the automotive industry has been considered to be especially deserving of 
various forms of state support and has played an important role in the successful national 
development of some countries while in others it has imposed a severe burden on 
economic development. 
Many factors will impact on the future of the automotive industry in developing countries. 
The critical factor will be the development of their own industrial and technological 
capabilities. But the expansion of the industry will also be subject to strong pressures 
exerted by global trends and structural shifts in competitiveness, technology, investment 
and trade. This chapter traces the key international developments in the automotive and 
components industries focusing on the implications for developing country production in 
general and for the South African industry in particular. The central question being 
addressed, therefore, is whether international developments pose opportunities or 
constraints for automotive industries in developing countries such as South Africa. 
There is a view which emerged in the mid-eighties (Jones and Womack, 1985; Altshuler et 
al, 1984; Hoffman and Kaplinsky, 1988) that argued that new developments in production 
organisation and technology such as flexible automation were likely to impact negatively 
on the prospects of developing countries as competitive suppliers to major world markets. 
Jones and Womack (1985) argued, for example, that the conventional view that lower 
wages would mean that the world automobile industry (starting with labour intensive 
components) would start to go the way of the textile industry and increasingly relocate in 
developing countries, was flawed. This was because the revolution in production 
organisation pioneered in Japan more than compensated for any low wage advantage that 
developing countries may have. Also, greater levels of automation were reducing the 
amount of direct labour in assembly and component manufacture thus undermining the 
advantage of lower wage countries. Secondly, it was argued that innovations such as just- 
in-time (JIT) were leading assemblers to source their components from nearby locations 
reducing opportunities for far flung sources of component supply. The implications for 
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aspirant developing country producers were highly significant. It meant the demise of the 
'world car' and limited opportunities for component export except for the more labour 
intensive, basic items. These authors highlighted the existence of important new trends 
and quite correctly pointed out the pitfalls of competitive strategies based on relocation to 
low wage countries. However, it is argued in this chapter that some of the pessimistic 
conclusions (from the point of view of developing country producers) have not been fully 
borne out b' the actual development of world investment, production and trade during the 
last decade.' 
It is true that direct labour costs are falling as a proportion of total production costs. 
However, certain developing countries have been able to attain high productivity levels 
through the adoption of best practice techniques which means that they can retain their 
labour cost advantage. Secondly, the picture with regard to component supply is more 
complicated than suggested by the view that new forms of production organization require 
component suppliers to locate close to assemblers. International trade in components is 
growing rapidly and much of this is over long distances. Middle income developing 
countries account for a growing slice of this expansion. 
We argue that the opportunities emerging in domestic and international markets together 
with the location of international investment and new developments in production 
organization and technology create substantial opportunities for developing countries 
which are able to implement appropriate policies. 
2. Markets and production 
2.1 Global demand 
The extremely severe recession that has afflicted the world's major vehicle markets over 
the past two years has tended to overshadow the rapid increase in demand for vehicles that 
has occurred during the past decade. As Table 1.1 indicates, vehicle ownership is highly 
concentrated in North America, Europe and Japan. Growth has, however, been uneven 
across regions with Asia registering the most rapid expansion with exceptionally high 
rates of growth in Korea, China, Taiwan and Thailand. Interestingly, from the point of 
view of the South African industry, Africa has been the second fastest growing region 
although this is off an extremely low base. Most of this expansion took place in South 
Africa and north Africa but there has been a reasonable increase in vehicle ownership even 
in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa in spite of extreme economic difficulties 
experienced during the 1980s. 
1. The positions of some of these analystshave been somewhat modified in theft more recent publication 
(Womack et al, 1990) 
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A return to growth could lead to very rapid expansion in this market albeit off a low base, 
with important implications for the South African industry. Latin American vehicle 
ownership has grown at well below the world average as a result of the economic 
difficulties of that region. 
Developing countries clearly represent a huge potential market and although the vast 
majority of new cars will be sold in OECD countries during the next decade the rate of 
expansion will be much higher in developing countries. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, the share of developing country passenger car sales will rise from 9.6% 
in 1990 to 14.6% by the year 2000 (O'Brien, 1990). A number of significant new markets 
are likely to emerge from within the ranks of the developing countries and rapidly rising 
incomes in Asia and elsewhere could mean that the above projection is an underestimate. 
South Korea with car sales in 1992 of 850 000 is already in the top ten of the world's car 
markets.2 As average national incomes in middle income countries rise, the proportion of 
those with incomes allowing them to purchase vehicles rises far more quickly. For 
example, average per capita income in Malaysia rose from $1 900 in 1987 to $2 700 in 
1991, an increase of 40%, but the proportion of people with incomes above $4000 (the 
threshold for buying cars) increased much more rapidly. Thus car sales in Malaysia 
increased by 290% over this period (Economist, 23 January, 1993). Other fast growing 
Asian countries will also become significant markets. China with its burgeoning growth 
and exceptionally low current rates of vehicle ownership will be one of the fastest growing 
markets but from a very low base. 
As Figure 1.1 indicates, car ownership is closely correlated with per capita income levels 
but there are significant variations resulting from taxation levels, controls on imports, the 
availability of credit and the level of development of infrastructure. Income distribution 
also plays a role. In middle income countries, increased income inequality produces a 
greater demand for cars while conversely a more progressive distribution of income would 
tend to limit the demand for cars (Jenkins, 1987:106). 
2. 'World car Industry', Financial Times Survey, 20 October, 1992. 
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Table 1.1 
Vehicles in use by region (thousands) 
1990 % 1990: 
PASSENGER PERSONS 
REGION 1982 1990 %CIIANGE CARS PER VEHICLE 
Argentina 4550 5680 24.8 73.7 5.6 
Brazil 10401 12650 21.6 81.0 11.4 
Canada 13850 16774 21.1 78.8 1.5 
Mexico 6390 7825 22.5 69.3 10.6 
USA 160443 192000 19.7 76.6 1.2 
Total America 204018 244834 20.0 763 2.8 
Angola 100 167 67.0 74.9 60.0 
Egypt 555 1548 178.9 75.5 33.5 
Kenya 252 300 19.0 50.0 80.0 
Nigeria 1150 1410 22.6 55.7 75.0 
South Africa 3600 4798 33.3 70.4 7.0 
Zambia 136 165 21.3 60.6 45.0 
Zimbabwe 220 285 29.5 73.7 32.0 
Total Africa 10122 14106 39.4 65.5 43.2 
China 970 4776 392.4 25.9 245.0 
India 1649 3972 140.9 62.5 200.0 
Indonesia 1880 2772 47.4 46.7 63.1 
Japan 41346 57698 39.5 60.5 2.1 
Korea, Repof 610 3395 456.6 61.1 12.4 
Malaysia 985 1585 60.9 77.3 10.7 
Taiwan 790 2115 167.7 74.9 9.4 
Thailand 925 2250 143.2 36.7 25.0 
Total Asia 58535 92595 58.2 58.9 31.1 
France 23190 28460 22.7 82.7 2.0 
Germany West 25684 32698 27.3 93.9 1.9 
Italy 21015 29929 42.4 91.9 1.9 
Spain 9859 14374 45.8 83.5 2.7 
United Ki9dom 17924 26412 47.4 87.5 2.2 Total EEC 111835 149686 33.8 88.1 2.2 
Germany East 3222 4349 35.0 89.7 3.8 
Poland 4102 6304 53.7 83.4 6.0 
Soviet Union 17500 25500 45.7 62.7 11.0 
Total Europe 157930 215540 36.5 84.4 3.8 
Australia 7955 9777 22.9 78.5 1.7 
Total Oceania 9868 12030 21.9 78.6 2.1 
Grand Total 440473 579104 31.5 763 8.7 
* 
Portugal and Spain included in EEC figure for 1982 
Source: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd, 1983,1990. 
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Figure 1.1 
Cars owned in relation to GNP per capita 





















2.2 Global supply 
International developments in the global auto industry have been overshadowed by severe 
recession which has produced massive worldwide overcapacity and is leading to extensive 
restructuring particularly by American and European producers. Nevertheless, a number of 
underlying trends are evident with important implications for developing country 
industries. 
The first major trend is the increased globalization and international integration of the 
industry as the major producers develop multiple bases and become involved in corporate 
tie-ups and joint ventures with foreign finns. Secondly, important shifts are taking place in 
the location of new investment as finns seek footholds in new markets, establish capacity 
behind protectionist barriers or seek lower cost production sites. The third important 
change concerns the production process. The system of 'lean production' pioneered by 
Toyota and other Japanese companies has given them an important competitive advantage. 
American and European finns are now responding to this challenge and have been rapidly 
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World vehicle production has increased from 28 million units in 1970 to 48.6 million in 
1990 of which car production accounts for 36.2 million units (VDA, 1991). The most 
striking feature has been the growing share of Japan which in 1991 was the world's largest 
producer accounting for 28.1% of global output. This expansion has been accompanied by 
an equally dramatic decline in the world market share of the United States (Figure 1.2). 
Global production of cars fell by 4.1% in 1991 to 34.7 million units and fell further in 
1992. The major producing countries are indicated in Table 1.2. 
The US market has become increasingly penetrated by Japanese imports leading to a 
massive trade imbalance in autos.3 Resulting trade friction led to voluntary export 
restraints being imposed against Japan. This has led Japanese finns to establish plants 
within the US which by 1992 had already taken a share of close to 20% of the American 
car and light truck market (Economist, 28, November, 1992), up from 6% in 1986. These 
plants have for the most part been extremely successful, matching Japanese levels of 
productivity and quality. This coupled with the strengthening of the yen against the dollar 
since the mid eighties means that Japanese firms can now build cars more cheaply in 
America than in Japan.4 
Table 1.2 
World car production: major producing countries, 1991 










(South Africa) 0.6 
World production 34.7 million cars 
Source: Adapted from Financial Times Survey, World Car Industry, 9 September, 
1993. 
3. The US trade deficit with Japan in vehicles reached a high point of $25.9 billion in 1986 declining to 
$20.6bn in 1990. However, increasing components imports have meant that the total deficit is virtually 
unchanged. 
4. 'Impact of strong yen depends on its stability', Automotive News, 1 March, 1993. 
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Japanese exports into the more protected European market have been at lower levels but 
newly established transplant facilities will be producing an estimated 1.2 million vehicles 
in Europe by the year 2000 (Financial Times, 3 September, 1992). The focus of this 
investment has been in the United Kingdom where new Japanese plants have led to the 
resurrection of the industry. Nissan plan to produce 270 000 cars from their Northern 
England plant in 1993 and both Toyota and Honda opened assembly plants in the UK 
during 1992. As has been the case in North America, earlier concerns that these would be 
'screwdriver' plants using imported components have proved exaggerated. Nissan, for 
example, is already meeting UK requirements of 80% local (European Community) 
content. 
Germany, the world's third largest producer, has seen output rising over the last decade 
with reunification providing a powerful boost. But by late 1992 the industry was in a 
severe slump in the face of weak export and domestic demand. The productivity gap with 
other European countries has been closing as the German industry managed only a 2% 
productivity growth rate during the 1980s. Unit labour costs have been rising at nearly 
2.5% per annum during the 1980s compared to 0.5% in the UK. German 1991 
compensation costs for production workers ($28.06) are the highest in the world and 
compare to $24.31 in the US, $18.16 in Japan and $15.14 in the UK (see Appendix 2). 
Opel, GM' s European subsidiary, claim that it costs an additional DM750 to make the 
Vectra in Russeisheim than it costs for Vauxhall to make the same vehicle at Luton in 
England in spite of lower productivity in the UK. (Financial Times, 23 June, 1992). 
Figure 1.2 
Shares of world motor vehicle production by region 
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One result is that all the Gennan producers including Opel are planning to cut jobs by 
5—20% over the next five years in their domestic operations. German carmakers are also 
looking at leaner production systems — reducing inventories and introducing team-work to 
achieve continuous improvement but this will be much easier to achieve at new lean plants 
such as Opel's Eisenach factory in eastern Germany than in existing plants with 
entrenched employment hierarchies and working practices. 
The major producers 
General Motors remains the world's largest auto firm and although it has recently returned 
to profitability is closing down plants and retrenching staff as part of an unprecedented 
rationalization programme following record losses in excess of $4 billion in 1991. It has 
announced the closure of 21 North American plants — six vehicle assembly plants, four 
engine and transmission plants and 11 component plants and a reduction of the workforce 
by 74000 by the mid-1990s.5 Apart from cutting back production in its loss making North 
American operations, GM has adopted a range of strategies including the shaking up of its 
supplier network with increased use of worldwide sourcing and reduced dependence on 
GM subsidiaries. This is coupled with the introduction of long term contracts and support 
from GM for chosen suppliers.6 
Ford also sustained heavy losses in 1991 but among the American car companies has so 
far responded most effectively to the Japanese challenge by implementing measures to 
reorganize production. The Big Three US auto companies see Mexico as a growing part of 
their North American operations. The advantages are high productivity in their custom- 
built export plants in North and Central Mexico coupled with wages that are 
approximately one fifth of the US level. Vehicle production in North America is becoming 
increasingly integrated ahead of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) which will create a free trade area of 360 million people. Vehicles built in any 
one of the NAFTA countries (Mexico, USA and Canada) but sold in any of the other two 
will eventually require 62.5% North American component content to avoid duty. 
Seven Japanese firms now rank among the world's 18 major producers (Table 1.3) and 
Toyota is widely regarded to be the most efficient of the volume producers. This has not 
shielded it from recession and its worldwide pre-tax profits slumped by 40% in the year 
ending June 1992. The 1990s will probably see the high point of Japanese output (at least 
in volume terms) and expansion will increasingly take place outside Japan. Japanese car 
producers have traditionally concentrated production within the home country to a far 
greater extent than American or the major European producers. This was the case 
especially for the largest producer, Toyota, which in 1988 produced 89% of its output in 
Japan. 
5. World Car Industry Survey, Financial Times, 20 October 1992. 
6. 'Detroit feels whip hand of the Lopez revolution', Financial Times, 1 October 1992. 
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Japanese firms are now rapidly globalising their activities in North America and Europe 
where not only production capacity but also design capabilities are being developed. 
Increasingly, Toyota along with other Japanese producers is also investing in developing 
countries. Another trend among the major Japanese producers is the move upmarket as 
part of a broader attempt to improve profitability rather than just gain market share. 
Table 1.3 
Leading world vehicle producers, 1992. 
Manufacturer Cars Commercial Total 
vehicles pdn. 
(millions) 
General Motors 5.0 1.9 6.9 
Ford 3.8 1.9 5.7 
Toyota 4.0 1.2 5.3 
Volkswagen 3.2 0.2 3.4 
Nissan 2.3 0.8 3.1 
Fiat 2.0 0.3 2.3 
Renault 1.8 0.3 2.1 
Chrysler 0.8 1.3 2.1 
Peugeot-Citroen 1.8 0.2 2.0 
Honda 1.7 0.1 1.8 
Mitsubishi 1.1 0.5 1.6 
Mazda 1.1 0.3 1.4 
Suzuki 0.7 0.3 1.0 
Hyundai 0.7 0.2 0.9 
Mercedes-Benz 0.5 0.3 0.8 
VAZ (Lada) 0.6 0.1 0.7 
Isuzu 0.1 0.5 0.6 
BMW 0.6 - 0.6 
Source: Financial Times Survey, The World Car Industry, 9 September 1993 
Volkswagen is the only European producer with a true multinational presence.7 Ambitious 
investment plans to raise production to 4.5 million units by 1997 (1992 was a record year 
with 3.5 million units sold) have been cut back in the face of recession and huge losses 
sustained in 1993. VW is now engaged in a campaign to reduce its high production costs. 
Labour costs, at 25% of sales, are among the highest in the industry and compare to 17% 
for the French carrnakers, the next highest cost producers. VW, very much a mass 
producer in the Fordist mould (albeit a highly efficient one) also faces the problem of 
7. This section draws partly on interviews with senior management at Volkswagen AG in Wolfsburg, 
conducted in 1992. 
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developing a viable response to the Japanese challenge of lean production, whether this be 
along the lines pioneered in Japan or a uniquely German model (Mair, 1991). 
\TW regard Germany as a high cost production centre and the only significant additions to 
domestic capacity will be in eastern Germany. New investments, albeit on a reduced scale 
compared to the grand plans of the early nineties are taking place in Mexico, Spain, China 
and the Czech Republic where the Skoda plant is being modernized. 
VW see Mexico as the most cost efficient production site followed by the Czech Republic 
and Portugal whereas Spain has become less competitive as wages have risen to 
approximately half the German level.8 South Africa was not seen as having many 
advantages as a site for new investment. Even assuming that a political settlement is 
reached, remaining problems include the uncertain policy regime, the high cost of raw 
materials, the small market in relation to the number of producers, low labour productivity 
and the high cost of local components. Labour costs are clearly an important factor in 
Volkswagen decision making and their long term strategy will see the German share of 
output falling as production moves to lower cost locations. At 59% of its global 
production, VW already has the lowest home market share of any major producer. 
The locational decisions of the multinational producers clearly have massive implications 
for developing country industries. At the same time, it is clear that one cannot generalize 
about the various strategies of the major firms. Of the principal producers, Volkswagen is 
the only one to have located over 15% of its production in developing countries. 
Japanese firms are investing heavily in the US with great success whereas VW has been 
unsuccessful and recently closed its only production facility. The other European 
producers are much more dependent on their home markets and will struggle to adapt to 
growing competition from, for example, the new UK based Japanese transplant firms.9 
Volkswagen's main assembly facilities are located in northern Germany, a substantial 
distance from the main centres of German component production. The production of 
components is being shifted increasingly onto outside suppliers. Current levels of vertical 
integration (around 40% of the production process is performed in-house) are being 
reduced to 25% in the new east German production sites (Financial Times, 23 June, 1992). 
The company also sees global sourcing growing in importance. Long distances, while a 
disadvantage are by no means an overriding obstacle. One example is the expansion of 
imports of Mexican made engines into Germany. Initially these were uncompetitive but 
are now highly competitive even taking transport costs and duties into account. Senior 
management at VWAG regard the South African components industry as generally 
uncompetitive but with some notable exceptions and it was felt that new world scale 
projects could compete effectively. The main potential strengths were seen to be in labour 
intensive components or where there was a high raw material content. 
8. Interview with PJ Weber, Executive Director of Subsidiary Companies and Projects. Volkswagen AG. 
Since the interview in April 1992 the Mexican plant has had a major strike and run into quality problems. 
9. The Nissan plant in the north of England is regarded by many observers to be the most efficient in 
Europe. 
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Even the German luxury carmakers are looking to increasing non-German production and 
sourcing in response to rising domestic costs. BMW are, for example, building a 70 000 
car a year plant in the US. The main reason is to get closer to their second largest market 
but an additional factor is that according to BMW, production costs are approximately 
30% less than in Germany (Financial Times, 24 June, 1992). They are also considering 
substantially expanding production at their South African plant (see Chapter Four). 
Mercedes also plans to build a plant in the US. 
2.3 Investment, production and policy in developing countries 
The assembly and production of cars has increased dramatically in developing countries 
during the last three decades (Table 1.4). This is likely to continue with major new 
investments under way in countries such as Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
South Africa was the leading developing country producer in 1960 but now ranks sixth. 
Both Brazil and Argentina have experienced major declines in output during the 1980s 
and the latter provides a good benchmark for a failed auto industry)-° 
As markets have grown in developing countries, many have sought to foster domestic auto 
production through implementing protectionist policies. In nearly all follower countries 
the industry goes through a series of stages (Viljoen, 1993): 
1. Infancy — assembly only 
2. Limited local content — localization of certain components such as glass, tyres, 
batteries etc is enforced through local content requirements. 
3. Higher local content — industry seen as an engine for industrial development. 
Imposition of higher local content requirements sometimes in excess of 80% and 
'people's car' initiatives in some instances. Some countries have initially tried to 
achieve high local content but have then gone straight to stage 5. 
4. Restructuring and Rationalisation — both component producers and assemblers 
become subject to criticism for being overprotective. There may be attempts to 
rationalise the industry by reducing the number of makes/models and standardizing 
certain components. 
5. Deregulation and export promotion — may result from failure of attempts to 
rationalize industry. Protection on CBUs and local content requirements are reduced. 
Exports of components and CBUs can be offset by greater imports. 
10. See Cardozo (1989) for an account of the problems in the Argentine automotive industry. 
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Table 1.4 
Production and assembly of cars in developing countries, 1960—1990 (000 units) 
LOCAL 
CONTENT % 
1%0 1970 1980 1990 1988 
LATIN AMERICA 
Brazil 62.2 343.7 977.7 682.1 >90 
Argentina 30.3 163.4 204.4 81.1 >90 
Mexico 24.8 136.7 303.0 598.1 60 
Venezuela 6.5 48.0 94.0 21.5 26 
Chile — 20.7 29.0 3.1 na 
Colombia — 7.7 43.0 31.5 45 
ASIA 
India 19.1 37.4 30.5 218.6 62 
South Korea — 14.5 57.2 986.8 95 
Philippines 2.9 7.6 26.6 na na 
Taiwan 0.4 na 132.0 277.4 50—60 
Malaysia — 7.5 81.0 44.5 18—22 
Iran 2.5 31.8 80.0 na na 
Indonesia 2.0 2.0 41.0 33.8 na 
Thailand — 6.6 25.0 28.8 54 
China — — — 15.9* 12.5 
AFRICA 
South Africa 87.4 195.0 277.0 209.6 55 
Nigeria — 7.1 151.0 na 15—30 
Notes: na indicates data not available 
* indicates 1987 figures 
Source: Jones and Womack, 1985; O'Brien, 1990; SMMT, 1990; VDA, 1990. 
South Korea 
The pace of the development of the Korean industry has been dramatic. Founded in 1962, 
it produced 1.2 million cars in 1992 and has ambitious plans to further expand production. 
The industry grew under heavy protection from imports and was export oriented from the 
early 1970s. Govermnent policy played a major role in the pursuit of a strategy which 
maximized independence from established OECD producers. Thus the first indigenous 
model, Hyundai's Pony, was introduced as early as 1975 and later versions (Pony Excel) 
were extremely successful in the US market. Hyundai is likely to join the ranks of the 
major international producers during the 1990s as it moves into the areas of design and 
automation technology and by 1989 had already opened an assembly plant in Canada. 
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Korea avoided the pitfalls of many developing country producers by specializing in a 
fairly narrow range of vehicle types and producing these in high volume (Oman, 1989). 
The state allocated certain market segments to the three major producers and new entrants 
were restricted. Production for export was focused on low cost subcompacts for the North 
American market. In the earlier stages, Korea had a major advantage in terms of labour 
costs although rapid wage increases since 1987 have reduced this advantage. Hourly 
compensation costs for production workers rose from 10% of the US level in 1987 to 26% 
by 1991 (see Appendix 1) 
Rapid productivity growth was spurred by the pace of expansion. The share of exports in 
total production reached 65.6% in 1986 (Jo. 1988:43) but the domestic market is now 
growing in importance and rapidly rising incomes and a reduction in purchase taxes which 
kept rates of car ownership low'1 have enabled domestic market expansion to cushion 
more recent problems in the export sphere. 
The most critical problem facing the Korean producers is the technical constraints that 
they face in the areas of design and production automation where they are still far behind 
their advanced country counterparts. Heavy expansion by existing producers and new 
entrants in the face of worldwide overcapacity is a further problem as is the relative 
backwardness of the components sector which is now being rationalized and consolidated 
with a rapid increase in licensing arrangements with foreign manufacturers. 
Box 1.1 
Import liberalization - Korean style 
Until recently, Korea has followed a policy of supporting exports and heavily taxing 
domestic sales. The market remained virtually closed to foreign vehicles even after the 
outright ban on imports (it still applied to Japanese cars) was lifted in July 1987. 
However, only ten foreign cars were sold in Korea during 1987 because of a web of 
taxes and other restrictions. Even with the reduction in tariffs from 60% to 30% in 
1988, a Mercury Sable with a US wholesale delivery price of $15 000 would cost a 
Korean buyer $53 700 with the price inflated by special taxes and duties such as 
defence taxes ($ 2 305), special excise tax ($6 350), acquisition taxes $4 800), value 
added tax ($4 880) and high administrative expenses. 
Potential customers not deterred by the inflated cost still had to contend with a media 
campaign suggesting that buyers of imported vehicles would be subject to income tax 
audits! 
(Ward's Automotive International, February, 1989). 
11. The Korean government has historically discouraged domestic purchases of vehicles partly through the 
imposition of high taxes. In 1986 taxes on purchases of cars were 46.5% in Korea, compared to 24.4%in 
Japan and 14.0% in W.Germany. Taxes on annual operation were also high (Jo, 1988:44) 
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Mexico 
The success of the Korean industry was to some extent predicated on rapid expansion in 
the economy allowing high rates of investment and the rapid expansion of domestic 
demand. Mexico has managed to restructure its auto industry under far more adverse 
circumstances of external indebtedness and domestic economic contraction.'2 Growth has 
depended primarily on heavy investment by lransnational rather than indigenous 
assembler firms as was the case in Korea. 
Domestic sales plummeted from 600 000 units in 1981 to 240 000 in 1987 (0, Brien, 
1990:55) but exports of vehicles increased from 14 000 to 162 000 units during this period 
rising further to 279 000 in 1990. Component exports have risen slightly less rapidly but 
still accounted for 43.5% of total automotive exports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1991 a:89). 
Starting from a position of heavy protection and controls on foreign investment in 
components the policy decrees of 1977 and 1983 established the principle of foreign 
exchange balancing allowing a lower degree of local content to be offset by greater 
exports. It also sought to rationalize the supply structure through reducing the number of 
producers and models although the latter objective has not been achieved. The Automotive 
Decree of 1989 has accelerated the process of trade liberalization and international 
integration particularly into the North American market as it freed up imports of 
components and vehicles as long as foreign exchange balancing requirements were met. 
Regulations governing entry authorizations and the restrictions on makes and models were 
eliminated. 
With wage rates that remain low, access to the North American market and impressive 
productivity levels in new plants,13 Mexico has become one of the most favoured sites for 
investment by multinational producers and component firms. The US Big Three, Nissan 
and VW are all investing heavily. To some extent the incentive structure has encouraged 
the cross-subsidisation of exports via higher domestic prices and it remains to be seen 
whether sustainable real competitiveness can be achieved. 
Brazil 
As has been the case in Mexico, the rapid expansion of the Brazilian industry during the 
1960s and 1970s was halted by macroeconomic problems and the external debt crisis 
which led to the collapse of domestic demand during the 1980s. In the Brazilian case this 
has only partly been compensated for by exports and production has only recently 
surpassed the level achieved in 1980. 
12. For a recent account of the shift from import substitution to export promotion in Mexico (and Brazil) see 
Shapiro (1993). 
13. See Shaiken (1990) for a detailed study of the impact of new technology and production reorganisation in 
Mexican assembly plants. 
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Low capacity utilization, low levels of automation and some outdated products with poor 
manufacturability contribute to low productivity (see Figure 1.3) which is only partly 
compensated for by low wages (Ferro, 1989). In some plants reasonably lean production 
has been achieved!4 but the main problem remains macroeconomic instability and decline 
which have retarded investment. 
Faced with these problems, an interesting development has been the establishment of a 
high level forum consisting of private sector, government and labour representatives to 
develop a strategy to raise the competitiveness of the country's automotive industry.15 It 
consists of a short term strategy aimed at the regeneration of domestic demand through a 
combination of reduced taxes on vehicle purchases, wage restraint and the holding down 
of prices by manufacturers to be followed by the development of a longer term strategy to 
improve competitiveness. New car taxes were recently slashed in a move which will bring 
car prices down by 10% as part of the plan to make cars more affordable for Brazilians.16 
Taiwan 
Taiwan is another country with a rapidly growing automotive industry which also faces 
the problem of a history of protection which has resulted in a proliferation of relatively 
small scale producers. In 1987, seven producers competed in a market of only 220 000 
vehicles. Cars were priced at well above international levels protected by a 55% tariff and 
a ban on Japanese imports. 
However, Taiwan did not adopt the high risk Korean strategy of promoting the rapid 
development of a few large scale export oriented producers. It has followed a policy of 
first developing the components sector to be internationally competitive and this now 
provides a viable basis for the production of built up vehicles for export. In terms of the 
six year programme introduced in 1985, the components industry was encourag,ed through 
a range of measures including export assistance, local content requirements / and tariff 
protection, support for R&D and the establishment of national standards for automotive 
components (Bosman, 1992). Under the programme, protection on CBUs was reduced 
from 65% to 30—50%. 
14. For a detailed account of new production organization in the Brazilian components industiy see 
Posthuma (1991). 
15. 'Jump-starting the Brazilian car industry', Financial Times, 6 March, 1992. 
16. 'Brazil cuts new taxes', Automotive News, 1 March, 1993. 
17. These include regulations specifying that five of the following components had to be produced in 
Taiwan: cylinder block, cylinder head, crankshaft, camshaft, piston pin and connecting rod, clutch 
system, gear for transmission, gearbox, drive axle, steering wheel and column, gear for steering, brake 
system, door, chassis or cross frame, bonnet or boot lid. 
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Box 1.2 
Sanyang - a Taiwanese assembler 
Sanyang Industry Co provides an interesting contrast to South African assemblers. It started 
production of small motor cycles and scooters in 1962 and since 1969 has been producing cars 
under licence from Honda. Annual output of approximately 60 000 vehicles is spread across 
two basic models the Sanyang Civic and Accord. There are 900 production workers involved in 
car assembly. Final assembly is fairly labour intensive with automation hindered by the 
relatively wide variety of products and the need to be highly flexible. Sanyang produces cars for 
the domestic market and due to a lack of economies of scale, the Sanyang Civic sold in Taiwan 
was approximately 50% more expensive than the Civic produced by Honda in Japan. Local 
content levels of 50% for the Accord and 70% for the Civic are also comparable to South 
African local content levels. There are three main areas of contrast with South African 
assemblers which are of a similar size and also reliant on foreign technology and components. 
Shop floor relationships 
Labour productivity in the Taiwanese plant is considerably higher based on simple comparisons 
of output per production worker and management spoke well of relationships with the 
workforce. Underlying these comparisons are a number of important differences between the 
two systems. A very striking difference is the much less hierarchical employment structure of 
the Taiwanese plant. Starting monthly salaries for production workers of NT$ 22 000 (R2 300) 
per month were only some 30% less than starting salaries for young university educated 
engineers going into management. As a matter of course, it is expected that prospective 
managers would spend time working on the production line and career opportunities for 
production workers are much greater than in South Africa. The director of the plant we visited 
had in fact started work as a production worker 30 years earlier. Thus the fact that all employees 
including senior management wear overalls is not just a window dressing gesture. The young 
workforce are highly educated and receive 40 days training before starting work. Also, there 
had never been any retrenchment from the plant. The average monthly income of production 
workers was NT$ 25 000 (R2650) and this was augmented by substantial annual bonuses which 
averaged 1.5 months salary as well as monthly production related bonuses. The bonus paid out 
in the month previous to our visit (the highest production level ever) had been equivalent to 13 
days additional pay. Wage increases for the past 5 years had exceeded 10% per annum in real 
terms. 
Links to suppliers 
Taiwanese motor firms have developed a network of centre and satellite suppliers similar to the 
Japanese system. Considerable effort is invested by assemblers in improving the capabilities of 
suppliers who are linked in through long term agreements. All suppliers were graded in terms of 
quality and 'A' level suppliers were rewarded by receiving monthly payments 30 days earlier. 
Sanyang Motor Co. dealt directly with only 170 component firms. They had benefitted from 
government assistance to component firms to locate close to the assembly plant. Nevertheless, 
the just-in-time system was not fully developed and applied only to key components with 
delivery of other components on a 2—3 day basis. The main constraints on a more developed JIT 
system were fluctuating production levels and heavy traffic congestion. Nevertheless, it 
represented a considerable advance on the South African system. 
Emphasis on R&D 
Although it relied extensively on technical support from Honda, there was a heavy emphasis on 
R&D within the firm and Sanyang had reached a level of being able to perform all its own R&D 
in the design and production of motor cycles. The R&D division included 200 specialist 
personnel out of a total staff complement of 4 000 and R&D spending accounted for 2% of 
turnover again much higher than in South African assembly plants. Sanyang was able to benefit 
from generous tax incentives for investment in R&D and also made use of the expertise of the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), Taiwan's equivalent of the CSIR. 
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Local content requirements are being further reduced and limited Japanese imports will be 
allowed in terms of the new Automobile Development Industry Plan announced in 1992 
(China News, 10 September, 1992). Improved competitiveness is now being spurred by 
reduced protection accompanied by a host of complementary measures aimed at 
increasing investment in R&D, improving links between assemblers and suppliers and also 
increasing the scale and volume of production. To some extent, Taiwan's low volume 
assemblers have been able to turn the small scale of operations into an asset by targeting 
foreign niche markets for small runs of vehicles such as Chung Hwa Motors' Wei Li small 
van which is being sold to Germany where it will be fitted with an electric motor 
(CETRA, 1992). 
There is a heavy emphasis on R&D which receives strong support from government. In 
response to rising auto imports, the Taiwan Transportation Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association has developed a 10 year plan to raise R&D expenditure from the 1990 figure 
of 1.5% of total spending to 3.25% in 1995 and 5% by the year 2000. 
Government and industry have collaborated closely in the development of the industry. 
One example is the engine development programme which aims to compensate for the 
small size of Taiwanese finns and resulting relatively limited R&D capabilities and 
reliance on Japanese design (CETRA, 1992). The common engine programme will bring 
together manufacturers and government agencies to develop three standard engines which 
are anticipated to cut production costs by 30%. 
Australia 
Australia is a developed country with a long established automotive industry. However, its 
history of protection, its limited market and its fragmented production structure give it 
much in common with developing country industries. Low volumes and multiple models 
also impact on the component industry and both South Africa and Australia suffer from 
what Lamming (1990b) terms the 'transplant/outpost' problem.18 
By the early 1960s, very high levels of local content and reasonable production volumes 
had been achieved in certain makes, in particular, the Holden which was the market 
leader. At this time the tariff on imported vehicles was 35% but pressure from imports 
(especially of smaller vehicles) and declining industry perfonnance led to the imposition 
of higher levels of protection which by 1975 reached 57.5%. An export facilitation scheme 
was also introduced for assemblers and component producers in 1982 as the industry 
sought to more closely integrate with the world industry as a way of circumventing the 
problem of the small domestic market. This allowed producers to reduce local content in 
return for automotive exports. 
18. Lamming cites the example of a car built at an annual rate of 20 000 in Australia but at a rate of 750 000 
in Japan. This puts the low volume Australian component producer in the difficult situation of competing 
with imports from the high volume Japanese supplier shipped in at marginal cost. 
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Problems of frequent changes to policy, inward orientation and the cost of protection 
remained.19 As a response to these problems the Button Car Plan was introduced in 1985. 
It had three objectives which are still regarded as guiding principles today (MA, 1992:8). 
• To increase the industry's production efficiency to allow it to compete with imports at 
lower levels of assistance. 
• To give consumers access to better quality and more affordable cars. 
• To minimize disruption to production and employment during the transition to a more 
efficient industry. 
The major strategies to achieve this are still in place with some modifications: 
— increased competition achieved through a phased reduction in tariffs to 35% in 1991 
and down to 15% by the year 2000. 
— local content requirements have been abolished. 
— improvement in plant and model volumes to be achieved by increasing specialization 
through export facilitation and penalizing low volume production. 
Directive measures to make the industry more efficient are of particular relevance to South 
Africa. A target industry structure (three manufacturing groups and a maximum of six 
models) was specified for 1992. Penalties in the form of higher duty on imported 
components were applied to low volume models (Industry Commission, 1990). Average 
production volumes per model have risen significantly since the plan was introduced. 
Australia has thus followed a route of quite rapid integration into the global industry and 
both imports and exports have risen sharply. In 1991, imports accounted for 45% of the 
total market of 511 000 cars and trucks while 27 000 cars were exported.20 Both the 
assembly and component industry have become smaller (in terms of number of firms and 
employment) but these firms are better able to cope with increased international 
competition. A number of world class component suppliers have emerged although most 
are foreign owned. 
19. Even at the end of the decade by which time substantial liberalization had taken place the Industry 
Commission reported that assistance to the industry cost the country A$ 1.6 billion per annum, an 
effective subsidy of A$25 000 for each of the 60 000 jobs in the industry. 
20. 'Australia may go down under', Automotive News, 28 Dec 1992. 
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Conclusion 
Most developing country industries were initiated by heavy protection which encouraged 
investment by multinational producers. They were characterized by high costs exacerbated 
by stringent local content programmes which met only with limited success in reducing 
trade deficits within this sector. These trends are now changing as countries try to 
integrate themselves into an increasingly internationalized system. 
In the automotive industry the adoption of independent national strategies is especially 
problematic. The industry is dominated by a handful of multinational producers whose 
size and technological lead makes the prospects for independent new entrants remote. 
Korea is the only developing country which has been able to successfully pursue a strategy 
of promoting indigenous carmakers and that was only with technological and design tie 
ups to MNCs, the massive resources of the chaebol and active state support.21 This is not 
a strategy which can be easily replicated, however, and most countries will have to deal 
with MNCs, seeking deals which try to maximize technology transfers while ensuring that 
the scope of operations of local subsidiaries are not restricted by parent company 
strategies. 
All the other major producers in developing countries have close linkages (usually as 
wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures) with OECD based MNCs. The locational 
strategies of these MNCs are, therefore, of critical importance to the future prospects of 
the various developing country industries. This is made all the more evident by the 
locational strategies of the major international component firms which in many cases tend 
to follow the assemblers to new locations. 
The way in which developing countries have managed the relationship with the major 
MNCs has been crucial. Many countries, South Africa included, initiated assembly 
governed by local content programmes and attracted foreign investment on this basis. 
MNCs were able to operate profitably as small scale assemblers for the local market using 
a certain percentage of domestically produced (high priced) components. But under this 
regime, the MNCs kept these subsidiaries isolated from their global production networks. 
For most developing producers, even those with large domestic markets, the future of the 
auto industry is to an important extent dependent on securing a growing niche within these 
global networks. 
3. Major trends in the automotive industry 
This section explores new developments in the international auto and components industry 
focusing on how they impact on the competitiveness of developing country producers. It 
also considers the reasons for the competitive strength of Japan and the implications for 
other national industries. 
21. Thejury is still out on ventures such as Malaysia's Proton. 
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3.1 'Lean production' 
Most analysts attribute Japanese success to the emergence of superior forms of production 
organization, product development and supplier co-ordination which now constitute best 
practice and are demonstrably more effective than traditional mass production. This view 
has received its most influential statement in the publication of the findings of the MIT 
based International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) which coined the term 'lean 
production' to describe the system which was pioneered by Toyota (Womack et al, 1990). 
The main elements of this system are now well known22 and can be grouped around three 
principles: continuous improvement, teamwork and flexibility. 
One or more of the above principles are contained in the various specific elements of lean 
production. For example, the just-in-time (JIT) system which enables parts to be delivered 
just as they are needed is in part a system for reducing inventories but the fine tuning it 
requires also means that bottlenecks and quality problems can be quickly identified and 
eliminated. 
Strict job demarcation has been abolished and workers are able to perform a range of tasks 
including the monitoring of product quality which eliminates the need for expensive 
quality checks at the end of the production process (total quality control). This has also 
reduced the need for specialist indirect labour such as quality controllers, supervisors and 
specialist functions such as machine setting and the changing of dies.23 
Workers are integrally involved in the continuous improvement of productivity (Kaizen) 
as illustrated by the extensive use of elaborate suggestion schemes. In 1983 Toyota 
workers submitted no less than 1.6 million suggestions (an average of 32 per worker) of 
which 96% were implemented (Hoffman and Kaplinsky, 1988). The Japanese system has 
thus been able to draw much more effectively on the accumulated shop floor experience of 
the workforce and translate this into higher productivity. 
This more cooperative relationship was also carried through to the relationship between 
assembler and supplier firms. Assembly accounts for only 15% of the total manufacturing 
process and the traditional mass production approach tended to vertically integrate 
component manufacture within the parent firm or its subsidiaries (up to the level of 70% in 
the case of General Motors) or tender out parts production on the basis of detailed 
blueprints. Suppliers were not integrally involved in the design of components for new 
models. The conventional mass producers also tended to maintain a few suppliers for each 
component playing them off against each other to bring down costs. 
22. The elements of the system are only briefly mentioned here. For comprehensive accounts see Womack et 
a!, 1990; Hoffman and Kaplinsky, 1988; Cusumano, 1985. 
23. Quick changing of dies was one of the critical early innovations introduced by Toyota. Die changing in 
dedicated high volume western press lines typically took a full day. By the late 1950s Toyota had 
reduced this to 3 minutes which not only allowed small batch production but enabled inventories to be 
reduced and defects to be discovered much more rapidly (Womack et al, 1990) 
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The typical Japanese assembler on the other hand produced a far smaller share of its own 
components and worked much more closely with primary (first tier) suppliers who had 
considerable responsibility for research and development within a set of broadly defined 
requirements. 
The above approach was carried through to product development through the integration 
of product and process engineering leading to the design of vehicles which were much 
easier to manufacture as well as reducing lead times on new models. The result was a 
much more flexible and responsive production system which allowed Japanese producers 
to change models rapidly. 
Two questions arise from this brief discussion. Firstly, what has been the productivity 
impact of lean production and, secondly, how transferable is it to other situations 
particularly in developing countries? Womack et al make bold claims on behalf of lean 
production. According to this view the system is so much more efficient that it really 
represents a new paradigm in manufacturing using: 
"less of everything compared with mass production — half the human effort in the factory, half 
the manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering hours to develop a 
new product in half the time (1990:13). 
The study's findings on assembly plant productivity are shown in Figure 1.3 but both the 
data findings and the conclusions drawn are not without their critics.24 The IMVP study 
uses physical output in final assembly as its main measure of productivity and non- 
Japanese plants are shown to be much less efficient. According to Williams et al (1992) 
the greater manufacturability of Japanese vehicles coupled with lower capacity utilization 
in non-Japanese firms account for a substantial part of the differential. This was an 
opinion echoed by the Verband der Automobilindustrie25 who argued that the 1MW study 
was over reliant on physical output measures of productivity and argued that other 
measures would have produced better results for German manufacturers which come in for 
heavy criticism in the Womack et al study. 
24. See, for example, Williams et a!, 1992. 
25. Interview with the head of research of the Verband der Automobilindustrie (German motor industry 
federation). 
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Figure 13 
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Volkswagen in Europe; and all of the companies from Japan. 
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JINA = Japanese-owned plants in North America; including joint venture 
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Source: Womack et al (1990: 85). 
The thrust of the Williams et al (1992) view is, firstly, that productivity differentials are 
far less dramatic than is claimed by Womack et al (1990), with Toyota being the important 
exception. They argue that factors such as lower wages more than 'lean production' have 
accounted for Japanese competitive success. Japanese wages in large scale automotive 
firms have now caught up with those of the US but differentials are still large in 
components because of the relative prevalence of small finns in the Japanese components 
sector as well as the exceptionally steep wage gradient between small and large firms. 
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'competition between Japan and America in car production is not a contest between systems of 
inherently different efficiency; it is more like sumo where the off balance wrestler is forced out 
of the ring". 
Other critics have argued that the Womack et a! (1990) claim that lean production requires 
less effort and leads to a greatly enhanced work environment is also exaggerated with 
studies pointing to the high intensity of work in Japanese plants whether in Toyota, Japan 
in the early 1970s (Kamata, 1982) or Japanese transplants in North America in the late 
1980s (Berggren et al, 1991). 
Nevertheless, there is by now a vast array of evidence which documents the efficiency 
enhancing characteristics of new forms of production organization pioneered mainly in 
Japan but being applied in a wide variety of ways in auto industries around the world. 
The transferability of lean production 
Japanese transplants have now been operating in North America for over 10 years. These 
plants were established with a view to incorporating the form of production organization 
used in parent plants in Japan and now account for nearly a quarter of automotive 
production in this region. According to the IMYP World Assembly Plant Survey, 
productivity in Japanese plants in North America (20.9 his/vehicle) was only slightly 
below that of Japanese plants in Japan (16.8 his/vehicle) (Figure 1.3). 
The first greenfield Japanese transplant in Europe, the Nissan plant in northern England, 
began production in 1986 and is regarded by some to be the most efficient plant in 
Europe.26 In addition, Japanese firms have established a number of joint ventures with US 
and European finns, the best known of which is the New United Motor Manufacturing 
Inc. (NUMMI) plant in California, a joint venture between General Motors and Toyota. 
This plant produces Toyota designed cars in a reopened GM facility using the Toyota 
Production System and has achieved quality levels equal to Toyota's Takaoka plant and 
productivity levels which are almost equivalent. According to an IMVP study by Krafcik 
(1986), workhours per unit were 19.6 in NUMMI, 18.0 at the Takaoka plant in contrast to 
27.6 at GM's old Framingham plant. It is also clear that American firms, particularly Ford, 
are starting to respond effectively to the Japanese challenge and as Figure 1.3 indicates, 
the best American plants now have productivity levels equivalent to average plants in 
Japan. 
Lean production and the implications for developing country producers 
As we have illustrated above, it has now been clearly established that the principles of lean 
production can be transferred to western producers. More important for the purposes of 
this report is the question of the transferability to developing country producers. It could 
26. The competitive threat posed by this and other new Japanese transplants in the UK led the Peugeot 
chairman to refer to Britain as a "Japanese aircraft carrier off the coast of Europe". 
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be argued that hierarchical forms of job grading, shop floor conflict and low educational 
levels such as in South Africa impose particularly difficult constraints on the introduction 
of a production system which is essentially dependent on a much more motivated 
workforce. 
There are, however, many examples of lean production being successfully adopted in 
developing countries. One such case is the Ford factory in Hermosillo, Mexico which 
produces a Mazda designed car and has implemented new forms of work organization 
very effectively (Shaiken, 1990). 
The New Auto Quality Study on Competitive Makes (NAQSCM) found the Mercury 
Tracer produced at Hermosillo to be the highest quality small car produced in North 
America together with the Honda Civic (Shaiken, 1990:24).27 Of the five factors cited as 
being important to the vehicle's success, three (a high quality workforce, good training 
and the emphasis on team production) were related to the organization of production. 
Management described the carefully screened workforce as highly motivated and well 
educated. Educational qualifications are exceptional for a developing country auto plant 
with 90% of the workforce having at least a high school education and one third having 
had some university or professional school education. Training levels are also high with 
all new workers receiving four months of intensive training before starting work (Shaiken, 
1990:75). 
The firm has been highly successful at adapting new forms of production organization to 
suit Mexican conditions. For instance, it maintains an adapted uT system in spite of being 
reliant on Japanese and US suppliers for the bulk of components. Japanese suppliers send 
components to a consolidation centre in Japan which collects parts into daily production 
packs which are then shipped to the Mexican plant (Shaiken, 1990:38-39). The Hermosillo 
plant operates with a very flat hierarchy of skill categories with a heavy emphasis on team 
work. Multiskilling allows for flexibility to the extent of rotating workers through 
production and skilled (eg. maintenance) jobs. 
One detailed comparison of Ford plants in Sao Bernado (Brazil) and Dagenham (UK) 
argued that reorganisation may in fact be easier in the developing country context because 
plant demarcation lines did not exist in Brazil as indicated by the existence of a single 
union (Silva, 1992). Brazilian workers also had a tradition of more flexible working 
patterns than was the case in British plants. The study found that productivity levels in the 
three assembly processes (body construction, painting and final assembly) were very 
similar in spite of the fact that the Dagenhem plant was more highiy mechanized. Quality 
levels were slightly higher in the Brazilian plant. These differences were attributed to 
improved work organization which has been more rapidly introduced in the Brazilian 
plant. It also concluded that automation without the requisite changes in work organization 
would achieve little. 
27. This finding on quality is supported by the IMVP. 
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If developing countries are able to narrow or eliminate the technological and productivity 
gap with advanced country producers the implications are, of course, extremely important 
for the location of investment in sophisticated manufacturing processes. 
Automation 
Vehicle assembly is a complex process. It involves three basic processes — welding the 
body, painting and final assembly. The process has become increasingly complicated 
given the growing variety of major and minor model variations that are produced in a 
modern plant. The latest Ford Escort being built in the UK, for instance, has more than a 
hundred variations in the bumper fitted to the car depending on colour and specification 
(Financial Times Survey: Vehicle Manufacturing Technology, 5 June, 1992) 
In the typical European plant, it takes 15 hours of direct labour time for final assembly, 
four hours for painting and five hours for constructing the body. Automation is one 
important way in which labour productivity can be improved but as Krafcik (1989:3) 
argues "a high level of automation may be a necessary condition for very high productivity 
performance but it is not a sufficient condition". 
In lower wage countries such as South Africa and Brazil, automation may be introduced 
more for reasons of improving quality than to lower costs (Krafcik, 1989). A key finding 
of the MIT study was that the marginal gains of additional automation are limited unless 
the technology is combined with policies which create both high levels of training 
(multiskilling) and commitment from the workforce. 
The IMVP study uncovered significant regional variations in levels of automation, the 
way automation was applied and in its effectiveness. Typically, Japanese plants are 
amongst the most highly automated especially in the area of welding and painting but this 
in itself is not a major factor explaining higher productivity levels in Japan. Japanese 
automation tends to be much more flexible and allows for workers to introduce 
improvements in the way machinery is used (Krafcik, 1989). The more automated 
European plants tend to rely on dedicated automation equipment perfonning complex 
assembly processes. Thus, sophisticated machinery has been used to provide a high level 
of automation in the final assembly of the VW Golf in Wolfsburg. This requires vast 
initial investments and maintenance problems testing even for German engineering 
capabilities.28 In spite of high levels of automation the Wolfsburg plant did not receive a 
high productivity rating in the IMVP international assembly plant survey.29 Such plants 
are only cost effective if run at full capacity and may require an additional less automated 
plant to deal with fluctuating demand. 
28. Plant visit, HaIl 54 (Golf assembly), Wolfsburg. 
29. The problems that VW has encountered as it hesitantly attempts to reorganise production are graphically 
described by Mair (1991). 
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There are numerous other examples in Europe and the US where high levels of automation 
have not brought corresponding improvements in assembly plant productivity. On the 
other hand, plants run on lean production principles have achieved high productivity 
levels, a case in point being the Nissan plant in north England which relatively has low 
levels of automation but is widely regarded as being one of the most efficient assembly 
plants in Europe. 
3.2 Product changes 
New product development is taking place at an increasing pace with new models being 
introduced more quickly and in greater variety. Two major trends are the greater use of 
electronics and changes in material content. By the year 2000, electronic items will 
account for an estimated 20% of the value of a passenger car (Karmokolias, 1990:14) 
playing a part in every aspect of the driving process and may even include gadgetry such 
as electronic 'shells' which allow cars to communicate with each other and holographic 
windscreen displays capable of presenting essential information and potential obstacles 
ahead.3° The vast increase in componentry required will open a wide range of 
opportunities for developing countries. 
One emerging area where South Africa has developed some technological capability is in 
the advanced battery systems required for electrically powered cars, the importance of 
which will grow rapidly in the next decade. Regulations introduced in 1990 in California 
require that at least 10% of all the vehicles sold in the state by each manufacturer by the 
year 2003 be zero emission vehicles. Japan will have an estimated 200 000 electric cars by 
the year 2000. Worldwide annual expenditure on electric cars already exceeds R23 
billion.31 All the major carmakers are developing electric cars, either individually or as 
joint ventures with other producers. 
Eskom is quite far advanced in its work on an electric car and is negotiating with local 
manufacturers about bringing it into production. Anglo American, together with Daimler 
Beur subsidiary AEG, has developed the high density Zebra battery as a power unit for 
electric cars and limited production will begin this year — in Germany. 32 
3.3 New materials 
Shifts in material usage and the introduction of new composites also have implications for 
developing country producers. New materials are being introduced because they offer 
possibilities for product differentiation and flexible manufacturing as well as bringing 
down costs and reducing vehicle weight in accordance with fuel economy and 
environmental considerations (Graves, 1992). New materials include advanced metals and 
alloys, fine ceramics, plastics and polymers and a variety of composite materials. 
30. 'Battlefield wizardry takes to the roads', The Independent, 11 May, 1992. 
31. 'Electric cars hit the roads', Engineering News, 4 December, 1992 
32. 'SA battery to be made in Germany', Engineering News, 26 March, 1993. 
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The overall impact on the usage of metals is of potential importance for mineral rich South 
Africa's component sector. One expected development with important implications for 
South Africa is that aluminium usage in cars is rising rapidly. One estimate is that the 
average car is expected to contain 30% more aluminium by l997—1998. Reynolds 
Metal, the second largest US aluminium company expects aluminium usage per vehicle to 
double by the year 2000 and to increase far more rapidly if aluminium frames and body 
panels become widely used.34 Plastics may account for as much as 17% of body weight 
by the year 2000 while iron/steel usage is set to decline to 60% from its current level of 
65%. 
3.4 The scale of production 
Most developing country industries including South Africa have grown on the basis of a 
protected domestic market and because these markets are relatively small, the issue of 
minimum efficient scale is critical. This problem has been exacerbated by the resultant 
tendency to attract a large number of firms which engage in final assembly but are 
producing at very low and inefficient volumes. It is widely acknowledged that this is a 
critical problem in the South African industry which has seven producers, some of which 
produce more than one make apart from a wide range of models. This is a very high 
degree of fragmentation for an industry which produced approximately 300 000 vehicles 
last year. 
Two questions are important here. The first is the issue of minimum efficient scale in 
assembly and components production and the extent of cost penalties incurred if these are 
not achieved. The term minimum efficient scale refers to the scale of production at which 
virtually all available scale economies have been exhausted. The second issue is whether 
new technologies and related changes in production organization are leading to a decline 
in the optimal size of plant and firm as has been argued in a number of stuthes.35 This 
section investigates these issues in relation to both assembly and the production of 
components. 
Scale economies arise in a number of ways. Firstly, more efficient methods and advanced 
machinery have been developed for large scale production. For instance, a high degree of 
automation may only be appropriate if total output is at a high level. Secondly, unit costs 
can be reduced through spreading the high cost of product design and development over 
large production volumes. Thirdly, high production volumes facilitate greater 
specialization of labour and management functions which also can increase productivity. 
Of great importance in the South African industry is product scale. 
33. 'Car manufacturers forecast to use 40 percent more aluminium', Financial Times, 27 March 1992. With 
the construction of the new Alusaf smelter South Africa will be the world's 5th largest producer of 
aluminium by that time. 
34. 'Aluminium producer sees its future in cars', Financial Times, 1 December, 1992. 
35. See Alcorta (1992) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
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This takes into account batch or lot size, in other words the length of the production run. 
Longer runs minimize machine changes and costs can be reduced by minimizing down 
time (Alcorta, 1992) Important savings can also be made from higher levels of capacity 
utilisation in existing facilities but this should not be confused with economies of scale 
Economies of scale in assembly 
Most estimates put minimum efficient scale in assembly at 200 000—250 000 units per 
annum (Lucke, 1988; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1988) usually spread over no more 
than two basic models. New state of the art assembly plants such as those being 
established by Japanese producers in the United States have a capacity of 150 000—300 
000 units per annum. It has been argued that minimum efficient scale could decline to 
around 150 000 units during the 1990s as a result of changes in technology, production 
processes and product mix (Womack et al, 1990; Industry Commission, 1990). The 
optimal scale of production tends to be smaller in speciality or luxury cars. For example, 
the new BMW plant in the US will have a capacity of 70000 units per year. 
Flexible machinery and production organisation is having more of an impact on the variety 
of models and derivatives that can be efficiently produced in one plant rather than on the 
optimal scale of total plant output. Thus the trend in the US and Japan (but not Europe) 
has been towards a gradual decline in average annual production volumes per model. An 
extreme example is Mazda's plant at Hofu, near Hiroshima which has been designed to 
make up to 18 different body types (Economist Survey: The Car Industry, 17 October 
1992) 
All South African producers operate at well below these levels with the largest, Toyota, 
producing fewer than 80 000 units last year even though its capacity is substantially 
higher. Furthermore, this production is spread across a wide variety of models. It should 
be noted, however, that South Africa is not alone in producing at levels which are well 
below minimum efficient scale. All developing country producers as well as the majority 
of developed country plants operate at below minimum efficient scale. 36 
36. See Lucke (1988: Table 5) for international comparisons of production volumes by firm and model. 
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Figure 1.4 
Scale of operation of international assembly plants (daily production rates) 
There is less consensus on the cost penalties resulting from low volume production but it 
is accepted that these are much lower than in component manufacture. An Australian 
Industry Commission report cited a study by Mitsubishi which indicated that increasing 
production from 50 000 to 100 000 units per annum by introducing double shifting and 
greater levels of automation would reduce total assembly costs by 7.5% per vehicle, 
equivalent to just 1% of the total cost of the car. This small cost saving results from the 
premium applying to second shift wages and illustrates the fact that assembly costs 
represent only approximately 20% of total vehicle costs (Industry Commission, 1990:200). 
An older study by White (cited in Lucke, 1987) found that reducing the scale of 
production of one model from 100 000 to 50 000 would result in a cost penalty of between 
4% and 9% being incurred in the assembly process. 
Economies of scale in component manufacture 
Given that materials and components account for the remaining 80% of total cost and that 
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increasing the scale of assembly generates greater economies external to the assembly 
process than internally. This has important policy implications for the South African 
indusiry as the main benefit resulting from rationalization of assemblers would be through 
creating opportunities for longer runs and hence reduced costs for component producers. 
As Table 1.6 indicates, estimates vary widely regarding niinimum efficient scale in the 
production of major components but are generally much higher than in vehicle assembly. 
These estimates refer to annual plant output rather than production runs for a single 
component so do not take into account the variety of products produced which is the major 
issue in the South African industry. Cost penalties are also difficult to determine. Studies 
carried out in Australia (Industry Commission, 1990) indicated that significant scale 
economies could be achieved by higher volume output. For instance, doubling output of 
engines could result in cost reductions per unit of 11—12.5%. In the case of body panels, 
where economies of scale are extremely important, doubling output was estimated to 
reduce unit costs by as much as 21% in the case of medium sized cars. 
Table 1.6 
Estimates of minimum efficient scale in components production 
Component/process Minimum efficient 
scale/output per annum 
Engine block castings 260 000—im 
Engine block machining 150 000—600 000 
Engine assembly 100 000—500 000 
Transmissions/gearboxes 260 000—500 000 
Stampings 100 000—several millions 
Body unit 200 000—400 000 
Frame 200 000—206 000 
Note: Above table is a summarised estimate of a large number of studies. 
*Could be much less in the case of low volume dies 
Source: Derived from Bureau of Industry Economics (1988) 
If the greater flexibility of new technologies allows for descaling as has been argued this 
would have very positive implications for low volume producers like South Africa. 
Unfortunately there appears to be little foundation for the more optimistic proponents of 
this view as far as optimal plant size is concerned although, as in assembly, it has become 
possible for a single plant to efficiently produce a larger range of models and components 
(Alcorta, 1992). 
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4. Components 
Some 80% of the value added in automotive manufacturing arises out of the production of 
the approximately 10 000 parts that are used to make a vehicle. The total volumes 
involved are enormous — Ford, the world's second largest manufacturer, alone purchased 
nearly $53 billion of components in 1990. 
The total value of international trade in components has been estimated at $57 billion in 
1988 accounting for just over 15% of global production (Bowring, 1990). Because 
component production is so varied in terms of its capital and technological requirements, 
virtually all countries can find appropriate niches. The result is that there are twice as 
many developing countries (approximately 60) involved in component production as in 
assembly (Karmokolias, 1990). This section outlines the major trends taking place in 
component production and supply and analyses the implications for developing country 
producers. 
Currently, the bulk of world components production is carried out in a couple of hundred 
components firms in each major producing region. In the EC, for example, there were an 
estimated 3250 components firms but the 138 large firms (more than 1000 workers) 
accounted for nearly 50% of total employment and a larger proportion of output (Boston 
Consulting Group, 1991:7). 
As is the case in assembly, the components industry is undergoing major structural 
changes and new forms of relationships between assemblers and component suppliers are 
developing with important implications for developing country producers.38 
The American and European mass producers have traditionally dealt with between 1 000 
and 2 500 suppliers whereas Japanese assemblers generally have less than 300 direct (first 
tier) suppliers even though they outsource a larger proportion of components. In the 
Japanese system, these first tier suppliers carry a far greater responsibility for the design 
and development of an entire sub-assembly such as the braking system, and in turn draw 
on a range of second and third tier suppliers for individual components. The relationship 
between Japanese assemblers and suppliers is far less adversarial with relationships being 
developed over a long period and component suppliers being closely involved in the 
development of new models from the initial stages. American and European firms are now 
rapidly adopting elements of this system with the number of direct suppliers being reduced 
and key firms being required to take greater responsibility for research and development. 
37. World Automotive Components, Financial Times Survey, 14 July, 1992. 
38. See for example Lamming, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1993. 
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Table: 1.7 
Rank Company Sales($bn) Home 
Country 
1 GM Automotive Comp. 29.0 US 
2 Ford Automotive Comp. 13.5 US 
3 Bosch 10.6 Germany 
4 Nippon Denso 9.1 Japan 
5 Dana 4.9 US 
6 Philips 4.8 Netherlands 
7 Valeo 3.9 France 
8 Allied signal Automotive 3.8 Us 
9 GM Hughes 3.5 Us 
10 Cummins Engine Co 3.5 US 
11 Magneti Marelli 3.4 Italy 
12 TRW Automotive 3.4 US 
13 Acustar 3.4 U5 
14 ZF 3.1 Germany 
15 BA5F 3.1 Germany 
16 Sumitomo Metal 3.0 Japan 
17 IT1' Automotive 2.9 US 
18 Aisin Seiki 2.9 Japan 
19 GKN 2.8 UK 
20 Lucas 2.4 UK 
Note: Turnover for European companies indicates European sales only 
5ource: Adapted from, World Automotive Components, Financial Times Survey, 
14 July 1992 
Changes are being forced through by competitive pressure on the assemblers who are in 
turn demanding price cuts and improved service from suppliers. Also, European and 
American suppliers are now competing directly with Japanese component producers who 
are establishing production facilities in the wake of transplant assemblers. One example is 
the highly publicised move by General Motors to shake up its supply network. General 
Motors is renegotiating supply contracts and demanding price cuts and quality 
improvements while offering the carrot of long term supply contracts. In-house purchasing 
will be reduced, global sourcing will be expanded and GM will in future seek to deal with 
fewer selected suppliers with whom it wishes to cooperate more closely.39 Ford has 
already cut its number of world wide suppliers by over 50% since 1980. 
39. World Automotive Components, Financial Times Survey, 14 July 1992. 
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These developments draw on the Japanese system with modifications according to the 
strengths of the local industry. Taken together they amount to a new modus operandi, 
what Lamming (1990) calls the 'post Japanese model' of component supply. According to 
Lamming the major elements of this evolving model are: 
— fewer, larger component suppliers with greater technological capability. 
— a supplier industry increasingly structured into tiers dependent on the capabilities of 
firms and the nature of their links to assemblers. First tier suppliers will supply whole 
sub-assemblies directly to assemblers and will have extensive R&D capabilities. They 
will in turn draw on second and third tier suppliers for more minor components. 
— stronger and more cooperative vertical relationships between companies in the 
various tiers and between first tier suppliers and the assemblers. 
— more developed horizontal relationships with an expansion in various forms of 
partnership such as joint ventures and technology and supply agreements. 
— major suppliers will have to accompany assemblers to new locations. 
— first tier suppliers rather than assemblers will increasingly undertake sourcing from 
low wage countries. 
— attaining competitive advantage will require the adoption of best practice in terms of 
working practices and technology. 
4.1 Implications for developing country suppliers 
These changes have important implications for the location of production and especially 
for developing country suppliers seeking to break into the major markets. Certain factors 
are negative for far flung sources of supply and have led some analysts to argue that 
prospects for developing country component exports are gloomy as assemblers and 
component suppliers increasingly locate within their major (developed country) markets. 
There is no doubt that the increasing use of JIT supply does impose a constraint on 
prospective exporters because of their physical distance from the market. Major suppliers 
are following assemblers to new locations and establishing their own networks of 
subcomponent suppliers in reasonably close proximity. 
However, a number of caveats can be raised. The logic of just-in-time does not necessarily 
require close physical proximity. The JIT system can in fact operate across continents, the 
main requirements being regular delivery and short lead times. Shaiken (1990) for 
instance, cites the example of CKD packs being imported into Mexico from Japan on a 
specially adapted JIT basis. 
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Component plants are in any event not usually established to serve a single assembly plant 
although they may have one principal customer. The more likely scenario is that a 
component plant will be set up in a location appropriate to serve a range of assemblers. 
There are also indications that the extreme form of JIT, with delivery several times a day 
as in Japan, is itself coming under pressure as certain problems manifest themselves. One 
problem is the shortage of industrial land and labour in locations close to assembly plants. 
This is forcing suppliers to move further afield. In the context of the environmental and 
congestion problems of modem Japan, the system has serious negative externalities. As 
Nieuwenhuis (1992) has shown, the roadspace used and emissions of dozens of light 
delivery vehicles far exceed those of a single heavy goods vehicle which could carry an 
equivalent load. Delays caused by congestion can mean that buffer stocks are required or 
that stocks end up being held in the most irrational form of all — in a goods vehicle on the 
highway! 
Assemblers increasingly require that first tier suppliers will locate close to assembly plants 
especially if they are producing bulky components such as seats. However, a nearby 
physical location is much less necessary for second and third tier suppliers or for high 
value major components and sub assemblies. 
While the advanced R&D capabilities which assemblers increasingly require from first tier 
suppliers rule out most indigenous developing country suppliers, there is still plenty of 
scope for major components such as engines to be produced in these countries although 
the bulk of design and development work will continue to be performed in advanced 
countries. There is also considerable scope for developing countries as second and third 
tier suppliers. If Lamming's model of the evolution of the component supply system is 
correct it may become important for the more advanced developing country suppliers to 
internationalise production. Second and third tier suppliers in developing countries will 
increasingly have to establish links with major component producers in the major markets 
rather than supplying assemblers directly as was the case in the past. 
4.2 Trends in component production and trade 
Major locational shifts in the production of components are taking place. Component 
suppliers are becoming more internationalised, following assemblers to new locations and 
establishing networks of second and third tier suppliers within these locations. In the 
advanced countries, Japanese component firms are following the transplants first to North 
America and more recently to Europe, especially the United Kingdom. 
Developing country component exports have, with some exceptions, been growing 
extremely rapidly (see Table 1.8) and account for over 10% of world exports of 
components. The top three developing country component exporters (Mexico, Brazil and 
Taiwan) accounted for only 1.6% of world component exports in 1980. By 1988 their 
share had risen to 3.8% of total world component exports which had themselves almost 
doubled over this period. 
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The US remains by far the largest importer of automotive parts and imports grew at a 
compounded annual rate of 4.1% from 1985—1989. Much of this increase was accounted 
for by Japanese imports which grew at a compounded annual rate of 14.7% over this 
period mainly to supply the growing production of Japanese transplants being established 
in the US. This rate of increase is likely to fall as Japanese suppliers locate in the US, but 
imports of automotive components have been growing even more rapidly from other East 
Asian suppliers as Figure 1.5 illustrates. Import growth rates from the Asian group have 
also outstripped that of imports from neighbouring locations in Canada and Mexico 
although the establishment of NAFTA will give the latter group an added advantage. 
The use of imported components in the European industry has traditionally been at a lower 
level than for the US. But the Gennan industry, in particular, is looking to increase 
international outsourcing. This is the case both among volume producers (YW) and 
speciality finns such as Mercedes and BMW. Mercedes, which has traditionally purchased 
90% of its components from German companies, is planning to reduce this to 75%. 
According to industry estimates, the average foreign content of all cars produced in 
Germany has risen to 30% in 1993 from 25% in l992. The major reason cited is the 
high cost of labour in Germany.41 Most of this growth in outsourcing will be in lower 
wage countries of the EC such as Spain and the UK and from Eastern Europe but imports 
from developing countries are also increasing. 
Germany is already by far the most important foreign market for South African component 
suppliers and represents a major growth opportunity. An important factor has been the 
strong ties established through the three main German car producers all having assembly 
plants in South Africa. 
40. World Car Industry Survey, Financial Times, 9 September 1993. 
41. Interviews with PJ Weber, Director of Subsidiary Companies, Volkswagen AG and E Papke, Manager- 
Corporate Planning, BMW (SA). 
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Table 1.8 
Component exports from developing countries, 1980—1988 (current US$ millions) 
% Change 
1980 1985 1988 1980—1988 
Argentina 63.3 62.9 67.2 6 
Brazil 243.6 424.6 1500.0 516 
Colombia 20.6 6.0 2.7 -86 
Hong Kong 0.8 1.8 2.2 175 
India 72.1 48.7 29.4 -59 
Korea 20.5 93.0 181.0 783 
Malaysia 2.7 3.7 5.7 111 
Mexico 900a 499.0 1970.0 2089 
Morocco 7.4 10.0 15.9 115 
Philippines 30.3 20.9 11.8 -61 
Portugal 6.6 66.0 130.4 1876 
Singapore 82.6 78.5 98.4 19 
South Africa 4.2 7.5 780b 1757 
Taiwan 94.7 354.6 618.3 553 
Thailand 9.3 11.4 21.3 129 
Tunisia 0.3 4.4 19.1 6267 
Turkey 43.0 65.5 71.6 67 
a. Unofficial estimates 
b. South Africa's component exports totalled nearly $400 million in 1991. 
Source: Karmokolias, 1990; Economist Intelligence Unit (1991a, 1991b), Bowring, 
1990; NAACAM. 
With the recent establishment of Nissan, Toyota and Honda assembly plants, the UK now 
has the fastest growing indusiry of all the major European producing countries. 
Component imports have been growing much faster than vehicle production and the 
fastest growing component exporters to the UK are developing countries with many 
exporting over long distances (Table 1.9). Many of these are Asian developing countries 
in spite of their long distance from the UK market. It would be speculative to predict 
future trends in component imports into the UK as the industry increasingly takes on the 
trappings of lean production, but there clearly exist opportunities for far flung developing 
country suppliers. 
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Figure 1.5 


























Japan has historically relied less than any other country on component imports and in the 
early 1980s it imported negligible quantities of components (Hoffman and Kaplinsky, 
1988:291). Imports have expanded mainly as a result of pressure from trade partners and 
also as Japanese plants established overseas export back to Japan. But imports from 
developing countries especially in Asia are also increasing. These have frequently resulted 
from foreign exchange balancing requirements in the new entrant countries but the 
strength of the yen over the past decade makes such arrangements increasingly attractive 
from an economic point of view. One important area of outsourcing from the Japanese 
industry is in the production of castings due to environmental problems and the reluctance of Japanese workers to perform foundry work. An indication of the difficulties of 
recruiting labour into Japan's automotive foundries is that the average age of the 
workforce is now 4742 
42. Interview with directors of Murray and Roberts Foundries, South Africa's largest producer of automotive 
castings. The managing director argued that foreign component producers 'never had the opportunity of 
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Table 1.9 
Imports of parts and accessories into the UK constant 1990 Sterling (million) 
Source % Increase 
Country 1990 1982 1982—1990 
1 W. Germany 2 060.5 564.6 264 
2 France 879.3 281.85 212 
3 Belgium & Lux. 424.9 202.05 110 
4 Japan 404.4 119.1 240 
5 Spain 365.0 86.25 323 
6 Italy 88.7 91.05 -3 
7 Netherlands 207.8 55.5 274 
8 USA 163.5 107.7 52 
9 Sweden 120.4 46.05 162 
10 Austria 72.6 8.4 764 
11 Brazil 63.3 1.8 3417 
12 S.Korea 57.1 3.3 1630 
13 Portugal 41.0 3.45 1071 
14 Denmark 39.4 23.1 71 
15 Australia 33.1 10.65 201 
16 Ireland 29.8 30.45 -2 
17 Taiwan 17.8 7.95 124 
18 Turkey 13.7 0.15 6750 
19 Yugoslavia 12.2 4.2 190 
20 Singapore 10.9 4.05 169 
31 South Africa 6.0 1.1 445 
TOTAL (All Countries) 5434.9 1730.8 214 
No. of vehicles 
produced (000)* 1565 1156 35 
Source: SMMT, 1991; 1993 
It is therefore clear that while there are important forces pulling component suppliers and 
assemblers close to their major markets, developing countries are growing in significance 
not just as markets in their own right but as exporters of components to the major 
advanced country production centres. Developing country firms face substantial 
difficulties in achieving recognition with regard to quality and reliability let alone as first 
tier suppliers. Nevertheless, there are a range of routes into these markets depending on 
the capabilities of the particular developing country supplier. 
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• Original Equipment 
New entrants are unlikely to be able to target the original equipment market especially 
for major components. An easier entry route is as second or third tier suppliers. 
Increasingly, they will therefore be supplying first tier component suppliers rather 
than the assemblers themselves. 
• The Aftennarket 
The aftermarket consists of replacement parts and accessories and offers a relatively 
easy point of entry for developing country suppliers because quality and delivery 
standards, while important, are less exacting than for OE supply. Also, volumes are 
generally considerably lower than for OE supply although the aftennarket as a whole 
is very large. The US aftermarket for replacement parts, chemicals, tyres, batteries 
and accessories was worth an estimated $62.7bn in 1988, slightly higher than total 
international trade in components at that time. There is also the possibility of moving 
into OE supply after having established oneself as an aftermarket supplier. A number 
of South African firms have followed this route. One problem is that certain 
components are seldom replaced and therefore, by definition, do not have an 
aftermarket. 
• Niche Markets 
There is a growing market for suppliers who are able to produce a wide variety of low 
volume components either for original equipment or the aftermarket. In the case of 
original equipment, this may refer to low volume or old models. The proliferation of 
models and frequent model changes has led to a major increase in the variety of parts 
required in both the OE and aftermarket. Margins in niche markets are generally 
better than in high volume OE supply. Domestic producers in the advanced countries 
prefer large volumes and a recent World Bank study of the US aftermarket (Bowring, 
1990:42) indicated that this applies also to overseas suppliers. Many importers and 
manufacturers complained that developing country suppliers would not deal with 
them because orders were insufficient to make production feasible. The reason cited 
was that the production capabilities of many developing country suppliers were 
geared to high volume production. This represents a major opportunity for fragmented 
developing country industries such as South Africa which lack economies of scale but 
have developed significant capability in low volume production. 
5. Conclusion 
Internationally the motor industry is experiencing a very difficult phase of recession and 
adjustment. Overcapacity, structural changes and major shifts in relative competitive 
advantage are now impacting on some of the most established production regions. Turmoil 
in the major producing countries is in turn impacting on developing country industries, 
many of which are reducing protection and seeking export expansion. Among developing 
countries, substantial inter-country differences in performance are apparent — in some 
there has been drastic decline, while others have enjoyed rapid expansion. It has been 
argued in this chapter that the prospects for middle income country industries are, on 
balance, reasonably favourable. The reasons are as follows: 
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— their markets are generally growing far more rapidly than in the advanced countries. 
— the potential for export to the developed countries is substantial. The rapid diffusion 
of practices such as JIT require close physical proximity for certain types of 
component suppliers but there is also evidence of greater international outsourcing 
from major producing countries. 
— improved forms of production organisation originating in Japan are quite clearly 
transferable to developing countries. As a result middle income countries are able, in 
certain cases, to match the productivity of developed countries and their lower labour 
costs then give them a cost advantage. 
Many middle income countries, including South Africa, currently face a window of 
opportunity in which it is possible for their domestic industries to take advantage of the 
structural changes that are occurring and to improve their global position. There will be 
winners and losers in this process. Certain middle income countries will emerge as major 
vehicle and component producers in the early years of the 21st century while others will 
face decline. In the following chapters we turn to a consideration of the South African 
industry and its growth potential. 
Chapter Two: The development of the South 
African industry 
1. Industry overview 
The production of motor vehicles and parts accounted for 5.9% of South African 
manufacturing value added over the period 1988—1990, a significant decline from its 8.0% 
share during the high growth phase 1980—1982 (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 
Percentage share in manufacturing. (Constant 1990 prices) 
1972—1974 1980—1982 1988—1990 
Demand 11,3 12,0 9,1 
Imports 19,7 19,0 14,9 
Exports 2,5 2,3 2,6 
Production (Ex-factory sales) 9,5 10,3 7,7 
Value added 7,7 8,0 5,9 
Employment 5,2 6,0 5,6 
Fixed capital stock (net) 4,2 2,9 3,5 
Source: IDC (1992:2) 
1.1 The domestic market 
The domestic market has traditionally been virtually the sole outlet for production and 
only in recent years have vehicle exports occasionally exceeded 5% of annual output. The 
South African market has been in a long term decline since the early 1980s (Figure 2.1). If 
the rapidly rising trend line that characterised the period from the late 1950s until the early 
1980s had been maintained until now, annual 1992 car sales would have been 
approximately 350 000 units instead of the actual figure of only 182 000. Based on the 
current proportion of commercial vehicles in total sales this would have produced a 
substantial total domestic market of close to 550 000 vehicles. 
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Actual sales of commercial vehicles have also declined during the 1980s but to a slightly 
lesser extent than is the case for passenger cars. Sales of commercial vehicles which 
accounted for 36% of industry sales in 1992 were 66% of the 1981 record level while car 
sales fell to only 61% of the 1981 peak. As a result of declining sales, the average age of 
the vehicle park increased from 7.2 years in 1981 to 10.9 years in 1991. 
A number of factors have led to the sharp decline in domestic demand. The most 
important is the state of the economy and declining real incomes. However, a number of 
additional factors have specifically impacted on sales of motor vehicles, especially cars. 
These include price increases above the inflation rate and the partial iniroduction of fringe 
benefits taxation which have combined to substantially raise hire purchase installment 
costs as a proportion of average monthly wages and salaries. 
Figure 2.1 
Quarterly passenger car sales 1958—1992 
Source: Old Mutual. 
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46 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
Measuring car prices is complicated by model changes over time but it is clear that they 
have increased ahead of the CPI. According to calculations by Econometrix, car price 
inflation outstripped the CPI by a significant margin from 1985 to 1992 (cited in Viljoen, 
1993). A number of factors have played a role here. The depreciation of the rand against 
the mark and yen is one factor. Industry sources also cite rising labour costs, 
underutilisation of capacity, price collusion among assemblers and high investment costs. 
A firther factor, subject to much dispute is the role of the Phase VI programme (see 
Section 2.2). 
The result of rising prices and declining real incomes is that new cars have become 
increasingly unaffordable. According to figures produced by Toyota, new car prices rose 
from 65% of annual average white incomes in 1981 to 96.5% in 1991. 
1.2 Exports and imports 
Although exports have risen sharply, they still account for less than 10% of output. The 
sector remains highly import intensive with imports in 1991 amounting to R6.4 billion. 
Appendix 3 indicates the low local content position if profit margins and overheads are 
excluded. As Figure 2.2 indicates imports are strongly correlated with domestic sales. 
Figure 2.2 
Total vehicle sales and total automotive imports 
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1.3 Structure of the industry 
Assembly 
There are seven assemblers producing passenger cars in South Africa. They all produce a 
wide range of passenger vehicles and most also produce commercial vehicles and trucks. 
Table 2.2 
Assembly firms operating in South Africa 
Passenger 
Vehicle 
Assembler Ownership Makes Market share % 
BMW SA BMW AG BMW 8.6 
Delta Local Opel 9.4 
Mercedes-Benz Daimler Benz AG Mercedes 10.0 
Honda 
Nissan Sankorp Nissan 14.3 
Fiat 
Samcor Anglo American Ford 15.6 
Mazda 
Toyota Local/J13 Toyota 24.0 
listed 
Volkswagen SA Volkswagen AG Volkswagen 18.1 
Audi 
Components production 
There are over 300 component producers in South Africa.1 Nearly all of the larger firms 
and those engaged primarily in components production are affiliated to the National 
Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM) which has 
155 members. The indusiry is however fairly concentrated with the 14 large 
firms/operating groups which employ over a 1000 workers accounting for nearly 50% of 
1. This is according to a broad definition and includes those companies not primarily engaged in component 
manufacture. 
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total employment and a greater proportion of output.2 More than 70% of these large firms 
are locally controlled. 
1.4 Employment 
Employment has been falling in all sectors of the industry, especially components (Table 
2.3). Employment in the peak year of 1982 was 50 000 in assembly alone. Further 
retrenchment has taken place since 1991 with the component sector particulaly hard hit. 
The moratorium on retrenchment negotiated by NUMSA for the assembly industry was 
able to limit retrenchment until it expired in 1992 and the assembly industry is threatened 
with major retrenchments such as the severe cuts recently proposed by Volkswagen.3 
Table 2.3 
Average monthly employment levels 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
Assembly Industry 35 301 37 434 37 845 36 895 
Component Industry 65 000 74000 69 000 65 000 
Motor Trade 159500 162000 160000 155000 
Source: NAAMSA 
1.5 Wages and productivity 
Productivity data in South African industry generally is of poor quality and subject to 
dispute. IDC data on the automotive industry (Figure 2.3) indicates a fall in productivity 
since the early 1980s resulting mainly from the sharp decline in the productivity of capital 
which is mainly the result of the underutilisation of capacity due to the decline in the 
market. 
Data on unit costs in the assembly industry supplied by NAAMSA (Figure 2.4) also need 
to be treated with caution. An important reason for the decline in vehicles produced per 
employee is as a result of falling output levels from the relatively high base in the early 
1980s. Nevertheless, they do point to high manning levels in the industry and the prospect 
of further retrenchments if output levels do not improve. 
2. This is at the level of the firm or operating group. Thus large groups such as T&N Holdings and its 
subsidiaries (Asseng, Ferodo, Silverton etc) are part of the same operating group. The level of 
concentration would be higher if control was taken up to the level of the final holding company 
(conglomerate! financial institution). 
3. 'VW retrenchment plan', Business Day, 31 March 1993. 
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As far as international competitiveness is concerned, the increase in dollar terms in hourly 
compensation costs for South African production workers has been one of the lowest of 
the producer countries listed in Appendix 1. While the rate of increase of South African 
hourly compensation costs have kept pace with those of the US, wages of all other 
countries in the sample have increased in relation to the US, with the exception-of Brazil 
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Figure 2.4 
Wages and output per worker in assembly 
2. The development of the industry under protection 
In order to understand the development of the South African automotive industry, it is 
necessary to examine the impact of protection and, in particular, the series of local content 
programmes that have been adopted. In most respects, South Africa followed a 
programme of import substitution similar to that adopted in other developing countries 
especially in Latin America. High tariffs were placed on CDUs, which when combined 
with a rapidly growing market, acted as a magnet to a large number of (initially foreign) 
companies which established assembly plants in the country. These operations, although 
in many cases highly profitable, were very small in international terms with 
correspondingly high unit costs. Production was aimed solely for the domestic market and 
the South African assembly plants were kept isolated from the global production networks 
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Ford and General Motors were the first to establish a production presence in South Africa. 
They were granted protection and established assembly plants in Port Elizabeth in the 
1920s. The domestic market expanded rapidly in the post-war period reaching 107 000 
vehicles in 1958 and a large number of assembly plants were established. The level of 
local content at this stage was only 20%. The adverse impact on the balance of payments 
led to increasing government support for greater usage of domestically produced 
components. As a result, the first in a series of local content programmes was introduced 
in 1961. Domestic sourcing of eleven peripheral items such as tyres, batteries and trim was 
required and higher local content levels rewarded with additional import permits (Duncan, 
1991). Although it was recognised that the desirable objective of increasing plant and 
model volumes could only be attained through rationalisation and a reduction in the 
number of assemblers, it was argued that this should be allowed to happen through normal 
market processes. 
Net local content rose rapidly, reaching approximately 52% by mass by 1971 which 
marked the end of Phase II of the programme. Contrary to government expectations, rising 
local content requirements did nothing to reduce the number of assembly operations. 
Apart from the producers which currently have assembly operations in South Africa, 
companies such as Leyland, Peugeot, Renault, Citroen, Chrysler and Daihatsu were all 
assembling vehicles in South Africa by the late 1960s (Duncan, 1991). There were also no 
less than eight engine plants in operation together with more than 200 component firms, 
most of which were producing solely for the local market. Rapid growth was thus 
accompanied by the proliferation of assemblers and also by the development of a low 
volume components industry oriented towards the production of heavier components such 
as body pressings (due to local content being measured on a mass basis). 
Under Phase III, local content (on a mass basis) was to reach 66 percent by 1977 in the 
case of 'manufactured' vehicles. Phase IV was a consolidation period with no additional 
requirements and Phase V, which was introduced in 1980, applied a local content 
requirement of 50% to light commercial vehicles rising to 66% in 1982. 
In all these developments, the main motivating factor for increasing local content 
remained the desire to save foreign exchange. A series of Board of Trade reports 
recognised the need to increase production volumes and the advantages of standardisation 
and frequently referred to the need for rationalisation. But at the same time it sought to 
maintain a choice of vehicles and therefore did not introduce very stringent local content 
requirements. There was a rather naive belief that market forces would bring about some 
rationalisation. Proponents of more interventionist polices to rationalise the industry by 
limiting the number of assemblers and pushing up local content to the 90% level did not 
prevail. Thus, high rates of protection were maintained on built up vehicles, no restrictions 
were placed on the number of assemblers entering the market and local content 
requirements were kept at fairly low levels. 
4. See Bell (1990) for an assessment of actual and potential local content levels in the South African 
industry. 
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2.1 Current protection measures 
The Phase VI program 
The problems inherent in the above approach to the promotion of local content had 
become obvious during the recessionary years of the 1970s. The situation was aggravated 
by the severe slump which followed the gold boom of the early 1980s. This sharp decline 
accompanied by disinvestment pressures did lead to some rationalisation. The assembly of 
Alfa Romeos and Renaults ceased. Amcar (assembling Mazdas) and Ford merged to form 
Samcor and General Motors sold out to local management leading to the establishment of 
Delta Motor Corporation. Thus by late 1986, there were seven assemblers producing over 
20 basic model variants for a market of 172 000 passenger cars. Even though this 
represented a considerable improvement on the situation in the 1970s when there were no 
less than 16 assemblers and 53 model lines (BTI, 1988:64), volumes were still very low 
and the industry remained uncompetitive. Exports were minimal (R105m in 1985) and 
with the increased introduction of highly sophisticated components, it had become 
increasingly easy to meet mass based local content requirements while increasing the 
value of imported componentry. Imports of vehicles and components amounted to 
R2059m during 1985, a year of weak demand. 
According to the BTI, the local content programme up to and including Phase V had two 
main deficiencies. It led to: 
"a tendency to produce low cost, low technology components which were unremunerative to 
export and were produced in uneconomic volumes so locking the industry into a low volume, 
high cost production structure; and 
a very high import bill as source companies tended to load the price of components they 
supplied to local producers. As they were supplying largely high technology components 
which the local industry did not produce, this too tended to raise prices as there was no 
incentive to produce low mass, high cost components locally" 
The new Phase VI local content programme, introduced in 1989, was supposed to meet the 
following objectives (BTI, 1989): 
— the promotion of investment, job creation and growth 
— satisfaction of the country's essential transport requirements 
— the improvement of productivity 
— minimising price increases 
— maintaining a high level of competition 
5. 'Phase VI local content programme for motor vehicles', Information Document, Department of Trade 
and Industry, 1992 
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Phase VI was a substantial change in direction. It marked the first attempt to seriously 
address the problems of an overly fragmented industry with low volume output and 
associated high unit costs. Local content was to be measured by value rather than mass. 
Most importantly, local content was to be measured not just by the value of domestically 
produced components fitted to locally assembled vehicles but on a net foreign exchange 
usage basis. In other words, exports by an assembler count as local content and enable it to 
reduce actual local content in domestically produced vehicles. 
The system operates through the imposition of an excise duty of 37.5% on all locally 
assembled vehicles. However, this duty is rebatable to the extent of 50% of the local 
content value so that if the local content target (75%) is achieved, no duty is payable.6 A 
minimum average level of 50% actual local content (ie. irrespective of exports) has to be 
maintained across the model range but local content is defined very broadly as the ex 
works price less forex used. It therefore includes profit margins and overheads. 
Phase VI was intended to encourage both local content and specialisation. However, it was 
introduced rapidly and with insufficient consideration of its likely impact. As a result there 
have been a number of unintended outcomes and the programme has come in for fierce 
criticism. Many changes have been introduced adding to the atmosphere of uncertainty 
and in late 1992 the Motor Industry Task Group was appointed to re-examine the 
programme and the whole future development of the industry. The impact of Phase VI is 
discussed in section 2.2. 
Tariff protection 
In addition to the protection provided by the local content programme, the industry also 
receives tariff protection on items which fall outside the ambit of Phase VI such as CBUs, 
spare parts and accessories. The duties which are applicable include customs duties (ad 
valorem, specific or formula duties) designed to protect domestic industry as well as an 
import surcharge which is applied mainly for fiscal purposes. 
There is high degree of variability between different tariff lines although ad valorem duties 
on the whole are not very high with 88% of tariff lines having a duty of less than 30% 
(IDC, 1993). In addition import surcharges (usually 5%) are levied on imports. Ninety 
percent of the 295 tariff lines in the motor vehicle and related industries category receive a 
5% import surcharge (IDC, 1993). 
CBUs receive tariff protection of 100 percent and are subject to a 15% surcharge. As a 
result, imports of CBUs have been minimal. 
6. There was also an non-rebatable fiscal excise duty of 2.5% per vehicle. 
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Comparison to protection in other sectors 
The motor industry is likely to retain its own sectoral trade regime for the forseeable 
future. Nevertheless, it is important that a gradual convergence of principles and 
protection levels with other sectors is achieved. 
Complexity and fluidity 
A recent World Bank review (Belli et al, 1993) of South Africa's overall trade policy 
(excluding Phase VI) found it to be highly complex compared to nearly all other 
countries and subject to frequent change. Phase VI introduces an even greater level of 
complexity into the trade regime for vehicles and components. It has also been highly 
subject to change with numerous important amendments being introduced since it was 
first implemented in 1989. It is now being investigated by a full scale official enquiry 
which is certain to result in substantial changes. 
• The level of protection compared to other sectors 
The automotive industry produces both intermediate goods (components) and 
consumer goods (cars). Average nominal rates of protection for consumer goods in 
South Africa are close to 50%, much lower than for motor vehicles while average 
protection of intermediate goods is 15—20%. Comparisions of protection of the 
component industry with intennediate goods in general are complicated by the fact 
that the OE sector of the component industry is protected by local content 
requirements rather than a specific tariff. 
In measuring comparable protection levels, it is also necessary to take into account 
the way in which prices are determined for foreign components. Imported components 
are mainly brought into the country in the form of CKD packs. If an OEM opts to use 
a local component this is removed from the CKD pack and an amount (called a 
deletion allowance) is subtracted from the cost of the pack by the foreign principal. 
Deletion allowances are widely held to be below competitive jnternational prices. The 
result is that a domestic component manufacturer is competing not with 'competitive' 
international prices, but with a lower deletion allowance. It is clear that while the 
component industry was excessively protected compared to other intermediate goods 
sectors under Phase V this situation has now changed dramatically although precise 
comparisons cannot be made. 
The real anomaly, however, is the prohibitive level of protection on CBUs. It is 
accepted on all sides that this should be reduced.7 Nominal protection of 115% (100% 
ad valorem plus 15% surcharge) is unusually high even by the protectionist standards 
of developing country producers, although new entrants such as Thailand and 
Malaysia apply even higher tariffs. 
7. South Africa's current GATF offer is for a reduction to a nominal tariff of 50% for vehicles and 30% for 
components by the year 2003. 
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New entrant producers such as Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan and Korea have lower cost 
industries and lower levels of protection although both Korea and Taiwan still apply 
partial bans on Japanese imports.8 The calculation of effective rates of protection on 
built up vehicles is complicated by local content arrangements but because of reduced 
protection on components, has increased sharply under Phase VI. 
The neutrality of the trade regime 
South Africa's trade regime is biased against exports due to the higher cost of 
protected inputs and higher prices in the protected domestic market (Belli et a!, 1993). 
This bias is compensated for by the GElS export incentive so that the overall trade 
regime is on average reasonably neutral. 
Exports under Phase VI receive a substantial effective subsidy in the form of a rebate 
of excise duty of 50 cents in the rand. All exports are channelled via OEMs and 
component exporters have to negotiate the extent of the subsidy that they receive. 
Component producers usually receive 60—70% of the rebate or 30—35 cents per rand 
of exports. However, there is pressure to reduce this as assemblers approach their 
required local content levels. This is a generally higher subsidy than would prevail 
under GElS but the latter Is tax free. Generally, the effective subsidy under Phase VI 
makes the overall trade regime for components reasonably neutral and may even bias 
it towards exports. 
2.2 Developments since the implementation of Phase VI 
Phase VI constitutes a structural adjustment programme for the motor industry and has 
impacted on the industry in a number of areas producing big winners and losers. As a 
result it has been extremely controversial coming under fire from large sections of the 
component industry. Pressure from the component producer federation (NAACAM) 
played a role in persuading government to establish the Motor Industry Task Group. 
Exports 
Exports have risen faster than expected and this is one area where most observers would 
agree that the programme has been successful, although factors besides Phase VI have also 
played an important role. The growth trend has been dramatic and exports have increased 
from negligible volumes in the mid-eighties to approximately R 1 .6bn in 1992 (Figure 2.5). 
While catalytic converters comprise an important part of this massive expansion, it is clear 
too that export growth is taking place in a wide variety of components. 
8. It is important to note, however, that certain new entrants, most importantly Korea, maintained 
prohibitive levels of protection until their industry was well developed. 
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Under Phase VI all exports (including components produced by independent suppliers) are 
channelled through the assemblers. Many component suppliers and all the assemblers have 
instituted significant export drives. The assemblers have developed international 
marketing channels frequently via their overseas principals and identified the types of 
components where local producers have a competitive advantage. 
Figure 2.5 
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Notes: The major component exports are catalytic converters which accounted for 
approximately R400 million in 1992 and will rise sharply during 1993. Other 
major exports (in excess of R50m per annum) include body pressings, 
automotive glass, steel and alloy wheels, radiators, engine parts and automotive 
leather. 
The data in this table are drawn from a number of sources (IDC, BTI, 
NAACAM and Customs. These various sources are not strictly comparable and 
the figures should therefore be treated with caution. Account also needs to be 
taken of fraudulent export claims (see Box 2.3). 
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In developing international networks and markets, the German based OEMs have the 
advantage of parent companies being keen to incorporate their South African subsidiaries 
into their global production system. BMW (SA)'s parent company in Munich has perhaps 
moved furthest to incorporate the South African plant as an integral part of a plan to 
internationalise production and component sourcing. For the locally owned companies 
such as Toyota and Nissan, this course of action is more problematic. 
There is a much lesser incentive for the Japanese parent companies, which have no equity 
stake in the South African firms, to source from South Africa. Nevertheless, Toyota 
(South Africa) has renegotiated the terms of its licence agreement with Toyota Motor Co. 
and is now permitted to export CBUs to sub-Saharan Africa. Nissan has set up an export 
company, Motorware, with offices in Europe and the Far East. Its main exports have been 
in three areas: 
• CBUs, mainly to sub-Saharan Africa but also to Taiwan 
• Original equipment such as castings and catalytic converters mainly to Nissan and 
Fiat 
• Components to the international aftermarket 
Volkswagen (South Africa)'s exports have risen from R30m in 1989 which consisted 
mainly of used tooling, to approximately R500m9 in 1992.10 Roughly half of this latter 
figure was accounted for by left hand drive Jettas exported to China. The other major 
export produced in-house is press parts, exported to YW plants in Europe. Other high 
volume exports include steel wheels and catalytic converters. A more significant long term 
proposition is that VWAG is considering using South Africa as a production base for right 
hand drive Audis or right hand drive components for the world market. 
For the components producers, foreign ownership or a joint venture arrangement with a 
foreign firm has conferred some advantages under this new scenario. Foreign owned finns 
have, in many cases, been quickly incorporated into the worldwide sourcing arrangements 
of the parent company. Most domestically owned firms are equally dependent on licence 
agreements with foreign principals but face the problem of restrictions on export in terms 
of these agreements. 
Rapid expansion is likely to take place over the next few years. A survey of 17 component 
firms11 conducted in the course of this study indicated that 16 were already involved in 
exporting and the remaining one was planning to move into export markets. 
9. This includes exports of components produced by independent suppliers and channelled through VW. 
10. Interview with D. Powell, Manager, New Business Development, VW(SA). 
11. This was not a representative sample and was biased towards big firms but is nevertheless indicative of 
the rapid export expansion that is occurring. 103 of the 155 firms which are members of NAACAM 
claim to have some export activity. 
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All firms anticipated expansion in exports which were seen by many to be the only growth 
area (Figure 2.6). Twelve of the 17 firms surveyed expect rapid growth of export turnover 
(at least 10% p.a. in real terms) during the next 3 years while 29% of the firms expected 
exports to expand by at least 30% per annum in real terms. 
Figure 2.6 
Anticipated real export growth by component firms 
The important question is the extent to which export growth is sustainable and the extent 
to which it is a function of the current generous incentives and of recession in the domestic 
market? As far as component firms are concerned, the most important factors motivating 
exports have been the Phase VI incentives, recession in the domestic market and the desire 
to increase the scale of production and improve product quality as indicated by the survey 
results in Table 2.4. 
It is difficult to gauge what would have happened to exports in the absence of Phase VI or 
what would happen if the incentives were withdrawn. It is clear, however, that they have 
been the most important factor promoting export expansion. The programme has led to 
some new investment and most firms do not expect this level of incentives to be 
maintained but are nevertheless planning export expansion. Some believe that they are 
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Table 2.4 
Factors motivating exports 
Increased availability of incentives 32 
To increase the scale of production 18 
To improve product quality 17 
Recession in the domestic market 12 
Expansion, diversification or specialisation 
in the product line 10 
A request from a client 8 
Ending of sanctions 7 
Depreciation of the rand 3 
Other 5 
Note: Firms were asked to rank the four major factors. The most important factor was 
allocated 4 points; the second most important 3 points, 3rd, 2 points, 4th, 1 
point. 
Source: Interviews 
Most of the firms that are now exporting were not doing so ten years ago and the 
incentives have played an important role in getting firms to consider exports as a growth 
area and to establish marketing and distribution channels. OEM and to a lesser extent 
aftermarket supply requires large investments of effort in attaining the necessary quality 
certification. Firms fully understand that one cannot move in and out of such markets 
according to the fluctuations of the South Mrican business cycle. While margins are 
generally lower in export markets, this is dependent on the type of product and high 
margins can be obtained in niche markets. 
The impact on investment and component sourcing 
Rapidly rising exports have given assemblers considerably greater flexibility in their 
sourcing arrangements. By the end of Phase V, local content in terms of mass (which was 
the measurement used) had reached 66 percent but was lower in value terms. This measure 
of local content included only components and tooling. Actual local content need now 
only be a minimum of 50% averaged across the model range as long as the rest of the total 
75% 'local content' requirement is made up through exports. Furthermore, actual local 
content is defined more broadly under Phase VI. It is clear, therefore, that with the growth 
in exports, OEMs have been able to drastically reduce the local content in domestically 
assembled vehicles. 
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Box21 
The catalytic converter controversy 
The biggest growth area in component exports has also been the most coniroversial. 
Catalytic converters are used to reduce exhaust emissions and are required equipment 
in most developed countries but are not yet used in South Africa. The converter 
consists of a stainless steel housing with a ceramic honeycomb core which is 
impregnated with a coating of platinum and rhodium. Since Phase VI was introduced, 
several catalytic converter plants have opened in South Africa, all with a tie up to an 
assembler. In 1992, they generated exports of approximately R400 million. The 
advantage for the OEMs is that they represent an easy way to achieve exports as the 
precious metal content makes the converter a high value product. Exporters receive a 
50c/rand rebate on exports of catalytic converters, the platinum part of which (just 
under 50% of the value) would have been exported anyway. The plants that have been 
established are highly capital intensive but generally operating at a scale below that 
required to be truly internationally competitive without the rebate. 
Traditional component producers are up in arms that large scale catalytic converter 
exports have allowed assemblers to increase foreign sourcing without undertaking 
exports of more traditional components. They want the converter exports to be 
classified under GElS. Sofar government has taken action to limit inclusion of catalytic 
converters to 50—75% local content and the issue will undoubtedly feature in the 
deliberations of the Motor Industry Task Group. In response to these pressures, the 
industry formed its own Catalytic Converter Industry Interest Group in mid-1992. 
Increased foreign sourcing was not the expected result of the programme. NAACAM 
initially welcomed Phase VI expecting a substantial increase in local content. Component 
producers received a large increase in requests for quotations but orders did not 
materialise. The Board of Trade also anticipated rapid growth in the component sector 
(BTI, 1989). 
The short term impact of Phase VI was felt in three main areas: 
• The switch from mass to value has had a highly differentiated effect on the 
components sector. OEMs began looking at ways of increasing local content by value 
rather than mass. Heavy components such as body pressings were no longer required 
and came under increasing pressure. Because of high tooling costs and short 
production runs, this was one of the most vulnerable sectors especially as it had 
enjoyed exceptionally high protection in terms of the mass based scheme. Pressing 
firms have been forced to rapidly restructure by specialising in fewer parts and 
establishing export markets in collaboration with original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs). There has also been a limited shift into the increasing use of domestically 
produced high value components such as electronics. Bosch, for example, established 
a high tech plant to produce electronic control units. 
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• Components which formed part of sub-assemblies were also at risk because it became 
easier and cheaper to import these in a semi-assembled form thus simplifying 
assembly and limiting the problems of local re-engineering, quality and supply 
complexities (Viljoen, 1993:111). 
• Components with high tooling costs especially in relation to the cost of the 
component were also vulnerable. Again, low volume production for the domestic 
market made these uneconomic. This was especially the case if the cost of the 
component was relatively cheap compared to the tooling such as in the case of plastic 
injection moulded components. 
However, for models introduced under Phase V, manufacturers tended to maintain their 
sourcing arrangements due to sunk investment in tooling and contractual obligations. 
Also, it took time to build up large export volumes. Thus the increased flexibility to source 
additional components abroad is most apparent with new model introductions and started 
to have a major impact during 1992. In the case of VW, for example, the impact on 
imported content is set out in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
New model introductions and changes in import content at VW(SA) 
Import Content % 
Phase V Citigolf 36 
Old Jetta 42 
Phase VI New Jetta 54 
Audi 82 
Source: Interviews. 
Many new models especially of lower volume vehicles are being imported virtually in 
SKD form with local content limited to peripheral items. Recent model introductions such 
as the Nissan Maxima and the Toyota Camry have very little local content. 
Where local components are still being used, margins have come under pressure. A survey 
conducted by NAACAM in the second quarter of 1992 revealed a significant drop in 
turnover of the components industry which they attribute to reduced local content as a 
result of new model introductions under Phase VI. Estimating the impact of Phase VI is 
complicated by the difficulties of disaggregating the impact of recession from reduced 
domestic sourcing. Also, reduced domestic sourcing has to some extent been compensated 
for by exports although much of this has been in 'non-traditional' components such as 
catalytic converters (see Box 2.1). There has, however, been a drastic fall in employment 
in the component industry of nearly 20 000 jobs between March 1989 (the introduction of 
Phase VI) and June 1992. 
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Box 2.2 
Automotive foundries — an industry under pressure 
Automotive castings such as engine parts and brake discs produced by the foundry industry are 
components which would appear to be particulaly well suited to production in South Africa as 
they are intensive in the use of our more abundant resources. Scrap metal accounts for 10% of 
the sales price (more in the case of aluminium castings) and energy accounts for a further 
8—11%. However, the industry faces serious difficulties in adapting to the sudden withdrawal of 
protection that has occurred under Phase VI. Producers of castings were major beneficiaries 
under previous weight based local content programmes and a large industry developed 
producing a wide range of components in low volumes with very limited exports. Under Phase 
VI, South Africa's engine producers can no longer compete and complete engines are being 
imported on a large scale duty free. Even efficient producers of engine components would find 
it diffcult to compete against the low deletion allowances and the assemblers preference for 
importing fully assembled engines. Nearly all the assemblers with the exception of VW have 
increasingly switched to imported engines on at least some of their models. 
Murray and Roberts Foundries is by far the largest producer of automotive castings in South 
Africa. Although it sees exports as its major growth area, they currently only account for 5% of 
output and the underutiisation of capacity adds further to costs. Figure 2.7 indicates the 
divergence between tonnage of castings sold and car and light commercial sales during the last 
two financial years as further inroads are made by imports. 
Figure 2.7 
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The impact on vehicle prices 
South African car prices are well above international prices. Differentials vary and are 
generally higher in the luxury end of the market. According to a recent study submitted to 
the Motor Industry Task Group, cutting tariffs to the still high nominal level of 60% would 
make imports cheaper in eight models.'2 
Box 2.3 
Administrative capability and complex industrial 
policies 
South Africa has an extremely complicated trade policy and sector specific 
programmes such as Phase VI add further complexity. The more complex the policy 
the more diffcult it is to administer and the greater the potential for abuse. A celebrated 
example is the fraud allegedly perpetrated by a firm called CET Trading which came to 
light early in 1992. CET exported nuts and bolts to companies within the same group in 
Europe. By massive overinvoicing it was able to claim sales of R55 1 million on goods 
worth around R150 million and thus claim rebates of R275.5 million (Sunday Times, 
12 July, 1992). As is the case with all Phase VI component exports, these were 
channelled through one of the assemblers (in this case Toyota) which received part of 
the rebate. Toyota verified that the nuts and bolts were genuine automotive components 
but was unaware of the overinvoicing (Finance Week, 19—25 March 1992). This 
relatively simple strategem, which could happen in any situation where exports are 
subsidised, points to the importance of a high level of competence in the institutions 
responsible for implementing and monitoring sophisticated industrial policies. 
Furthermore, prices have been rising at a higher rate than the CPI at least until 1993. Phase 
VI has been widely blamed in the media and by industry analysts as being a contributing 
factor. As one of the objectives of the programme was to reduce costs this claim needs to 
be investigated. 
As has been explained above, the growth in exports has greatly increased the flexibility of 
component sourcing allowing assemblers to take advantage of cheaper foreign 
components. This has led to a substantial reduction in costs, especially as new models are 
introduced. Component suppliers which were used to prices being determined on a cost 
plus' basis are being forced to become more efficient and reduce their margins as they 
face ultimatums to reduce prices in real terms or have the particular component placed 
back in the CKD pack. 
12. 'Import duty cut could put 8 SA cars oft' road', Sunday Times 14 March, 1993. 
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The complaints about price increases resulting from Phase VI relate to the incentive 
structure, specifically the fact that 'local content' includes profit margins. Thus if one 
assumes that a vehicle with an ex works price of R100 000 uses forex of R40 000, this 
gives a 'local content' level of 60%. Raising the vehicle's ex works price from R 100 000 
to R120 000 therefore increases local content to 66% allowing the manufacturer to claim a 
higher rebate. Thus a new element is introduced into the assembler's determination of the 
wholesale price. In a normal competitive situation, the assembler would have to weigh up 
the benefits of a larger price increase against the negative impact on demand and market 
share. This method of calculating local content clearly increases the benefit side of the 
equation. 
Proliferation of makes and models 
One of the problems of previous programmes was uneconomic volumes and the resulting 
high cost production structure. The support for exports combined with sharply reduced 
protection for imported components meant that this problem was partially addressed for 
the assembly sector. However, a major defect of the programme is that it did not address 
the major factor impacting on the scale of production in the components sector — 
proliferation of makes and models in the domestic market. In fact, the impact was rather 
the reverse. By increasing the flexibility of component sourcing (and hence reducing 
protection on components) but at the same time maintaining high nominal protection 
levels on CBUs, the effective rate of protection on CBUs has increased sharply under 
Phase VI. The predictable result has been an increase in the variety of models and makes 
being assembled locally in spite of the stagnant market (Table 2.6). 
Exports of CBUs could lead to greater specialisation and higher volumes but these have 
sofar been minimal and motivated by the incentive and underutiuised capacity rather than a 
drive to specialise in the production of one or two models for the world market. Some 
companies are considering specialisation but this will require substantial amendments to 
Phase VI. 
The major problem resulting from this is that component producers face increased import 
competition but their baseload in the domestic market has become increasingly varied. 
Thus low volume, high variety domestic component producers are being pitted against 
high volume, low variety international producers. Some can deal with this problem 
through niche market or high volume exports but as chapter three demonstrates, there are 
many component suppliers who face serious constraints in embarking on such a strategy. 
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Table 2.6 
Proliferation under various phases of the local content programme 
Phase No. of assemblers No. of models 
Phasel 8 24 
(1960) 
Phase II 16 43 
(1970) 
Phase III 13 39 
(1976) 
PhaseV 7 20 
(1987) 
Phase VI 7 34 
(1993) 
* Although the number of assemblers remained at the 1987 level, a number of new 
makes have been introduced since the advent of phase VI. Nissan has started 
assembling Fiat Unos and YW has begun assembly of the Audi. 
Source: Boxall (1989); Industry sales data 
3. Conclusion 
The series of local content programmes introduced in South Africa have been seriously 
flawed. They are directly responsible for the development of a fragmented and non- 
competitive industry. Phase VI was an attempt to address this situation. It has encouraged 
exports but at the same time drastically reduced protection of the components sector while 
doing nothing to reduce the proliferation of models being assembled domestically, which 
is one of the major reasons for the component sector being uncompetitive. A further 
problem is that Phase VI was introduced at a time of great political and economic 
uncertainty and a generalised lack of investor confidence. This has provided an 
inappropriate environment for a programme of structural adjustment, the success of which 
is always crucially dependent on a positive supply response. 
Chapter Three: Competitiveness in the South 
African automotive industry 
In 1984 MIT's International Motor Vehicle Programme published its first influential book 
on the future of the automobile. It had little to say on the South African industry and was 
negative on future prospects: 
Two countries outside the major auto-producing regions have had substantial auto industries 
for 30 years, fostered by a long history of government efforts to promote local manufacture. 
However neither Australia nor South Mrica has developed an export industry, and it is difficult 
to see any competitive superiority developing in these locales which share the disadvantages of 
relatively high wages rates, small domestic markets, long shipping distances to major markets 
and low labor productivity compared with Japan (Altshuler et al, 1984). 
This rather gloomy perspective on future prospects has a fair degree of acceptance among 
many of the players (companies, unions and relevant government agencies) in the South 
African industry who for quite understandable reasons find it difficult to envision rapid 
expansion in the near or medium term. It is widely agreed that the South African 
automotive industry is uncompetitive both in terms of components production and in 
assembly. South Aflican cars are priced well above world market levels and receive 100% 
nominal protection from CBU imports. The components sector also receives a high but 
declining level of protection via local content regulations. Exports are rising rapidly but 
are highly subsidised. 
But how uncompetitive is the industry and for what reasons? More importantly, are there 
areas of actual or potential competitive advantage? This chapter examines actual and 
potential competitiveness in the South African automotive industry. One central argument 
is that while the industry is currently uncompetitive in many areas, there are significant 
areas of strength as well as considerable scope to gain competitive advantage in other 
product lines. 
One important measure of competitiveness would be to conduct an international 
benchmarking exercise which could rate South African manufacturing capabilities in 
terms of best practice according to criteria such as direct labour hours per unit of output, 
quality, lead times etc. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this study but we have 
reported on an initial attempt to compare assembly plant productivity in South Africa with 
the results of the assembly plant survey undertaken during the course of MIT's 
International Motor Vehicle Program. 
The focus in this report has been on a micro-level study at the level of the finn in an effort 
to assess how firms are responding to greater international competition in domestic and 
foreign markets. This chapter examines technological capabilities, the cost disadvantages 
that South African firms face in terms of input costs and the cost raising impact of low 
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volume production. It also provides some impressionistic evidence of how South Africa 
rates in terms of emerging best practice in assembly and component manufacture 
commonly now termed lean production. Chapter Four goes on to provide a set of 
complementary case studies of how firms are responding to greater international 
integration. 
1. Technology transfer 
The South African automotive industry is highly dependent on foreign product and 
process technology. All vehicles are produced either by foreign firms or under licence 
with local design content confined to minor adaptations of locally specified components. 
The predominate form of technology transfer is through foreign investment (either wholly 
owned or on a joint venture basis) or through licencing. Producing under licence carries 
certain costs in terms of royalty payments and restrictions on exports. The latter is a 
serious problem in the South African automotive industry especially as firms seek to move 
into export markets under the pressures of the Phase VI programme. 
Table 3.1 indicates the results of the component firm survey regarding technology transfer 
in component firms. While the sample is small and not fully representative, it is indicative 
of a number of important features. Firstly, component firms are heavily dependent on 
foreign licences as a source of technology. Only three of the sixteen firms possessed their 
own proprietary technology. Six out of 16 firms were constrained in export markets by the 
terms of their licence agreements and four felt themselves seriously constrained. The four 
highly constrained firms all produce sophisticated major components and therefore have 
no prospect of developing their own proprietary technology. All these firms were locally 
owned and thus face the additional problem of having little prospect of being drawn into 
the international sourcing networks of a foreign parent. Indeed, one firm immediately lost 
its foreign markets when the parent company disinvested as a result of political pressures. 
Foreign owned firms are for obvious reasons much less likely to be constrained in export 
markets and many have been integrated into the global network of the parent company. 
Table 3.1 
Degree of export constraint imposed by foreign licensors on domestic component 
firms 
Degree of export Foreign owned Locally owned Total 
constraint firms firms 
Highly constrained 0 4 4 
Slightly constrained 1 1 2 
Not constrained 4 3 7 
Own Technology 0 3 3 
Source: Interviews 
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If firms are to export they have to either renegotiate licence agreements or develop their 
own proprietary technology. However, one problem is that many licence agreements were 
entered into when exports were not an issue. Finns now face the prospect of trying to 
renegotiate these. One clutch manufacturer had only been able to renegotiate one out of 
nine licence agreements and that after two years of acrimonious negotiation. An important 
issue for policy raised by these problems is that of govermnent supervision of licences and 
stricter control over limiting clauses. 
Developing their own technology is difficult for most component firms. In many cases, 
one is dealing with highly sophisticated components developed by the multinational 
principal which is spending tens of millions per year on R&D. This is not to say that South 
African component firms have no technological capacity although spending is limited. 
Among firms surveyed, the average of R&D spending was rather low at 3% of sales, with 
the dispersion ranging from negligible amounts to 8%. 
Finns were asked to rate their own technological capabilities on a scale ranging from very 
limited capacity (the ability to choose among alternative technologies) to the capacity to 
generate new products and processes (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 
Component firm technological capabilities 
Firm capability Responses 
Choose among alternative technologies 0 
Utilise to designed standards 0.5 
Extend beyond designed capability 1.0 
Adapt technologies 5.5 
Generate new products and processes 4.0 
Note: Some firms fell across two categories which accounts for the half scores. 
Source: Interviews 
Although firms spend relatively little on R&D and are generally highly dependent on 
foreign licences they are by no means totally lacking in technological capability. Most of 
the larger firms are able to adapt both product and process technology and even generate 
new products and processes. For the most part these are minor adaptations but in 
themselves are important in two ways. On the product side they illustrate the capacity for 
design even if only in a limited form. On the process side, the findings illustrate that firms 
are not only able to fully master the technologies they are working with but also to 
upgrade them by introducing adaptations. Experience in the NICs has indicated that 
incremental adaptations on the shop floor have been one of the major sources of 
productivity growth. 
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A significant number of firms were also able to generate new products and processes. All 
these finns were locally owned (2 were independent) and most devoted significant 
resources to R&D. Most were specialised in terms of their product and they were 
generally much more oriented to exports than the sample average. Two were involved in 
the production of wheels and had developed their own designs and brand names. While 
quality is extremely important, the manufacture of wheels is not as technologically 
sophisticated as, for example, gearbox assemblies and it is obviously a much easier 
industry to operate in without making use of licenced technology. Clearly this kind of 
opportunity is not open to South African producers of more sophisticated components. 
Some firms have been able to introduce innovations which are ahead of western 
competitors. One aluminium wheel producer, for instance, has introduced modifications to 
the die cooling system which reduced casting time to 180 seconds compared to 300 
seconds in Europe. 
A number of firms are engaged in attempting to make machinery more flexible (see also 
Gabriel case study in Chapter Four) and new equipment is chosen with this in mind. Some 
important innovations resulted from the experience of high variety, low volume 
production which characterises the South African components industry. 
So although firms for the most part are dependent on foreign licensors for new technology 
and spend little on R&D, there is a basic level of technological competence and clear 
capacity to introduce productivity raising technological adaptations. Furthermore, in some 
limited areas component producers are relatively advanced. 
2. Competitiveness in the assembly industry 
Built up vehicles are highly protected and South African new vehicle prices are well above 
world market prices, especially for luxury models. Nevertheless, CBU exports have risen 
sharply to a wide range of countries. Most of the multinational carmakers who are 
involved in South Africa view the country as the major source of supply to the Southern 
African region in the future. South Africa is relatively more competitive in Southern 
Africa not only due to its locational advantage but because South African vehicles are 
adapted to African conditions — higher specification radiators and trim to cope with high 
temperatures and strong sunlight, stronger suspension and superior dust proofing. Also, 
spare parts can more easily be supplied from South Africa. There have also been a series 
of large contracts such as rebadged Mazda vehicles to the UK and VWs much publicized 
exports to China. This latter contract, although significant in value terms, should not be 
seen as being indicative of South Africa being competitive. It took place primarily because 
VW(SA) has spare capacity in the old models and, of course, was assisted by the 
incentives. 
The major factors resulting in a lack of competitiveness in assembly are set out below. 
70 INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY PROJECT 
2.1 The cost of components 
Materials account for 70—80% of full manufacturing cost and competitive component 
supply is therefore critical to being competitive in vehicle production. Most components 
can be purchased more cheaply from foreign suppliers although price differentials vary 
widely according to the type of component. 
One manufacturer estimates locally produced components to be on average some 30% 
above world market prices (see Table 3.3). At the same time it should be noted that South 
African suppliers are competitive in a wide range of components (see section 3.4). 
Table 3.3 
Local and imported component prices 
Description Cost of Imported Component as 
a % of Domestically Produced 
Component 
Mercedes Benif Honda 
Flywheel Component 66 
Engine Harness 70 
Manual Aerial Kit 31 
Suspension Assembly 74 
Front Axle Strut 55 
Wheel Hub 70 
Tyre 195/65R15H 71 
Brake Caliper 80 
Brake Disc (Rear) 51 
Exhaust (Rear) 96 
Volkswagen 
Doorlock 65 
Starter Motor 78 
Pressing — cross carrier 68 




Fuel Tank 89 
Note: Import prices are landed prices. 
Source: Interviews 
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2.2 Economies of scale in assembly 
Minimum efficent scale in assembly is briefly discussed in Chapter One, section 3.4. It is 
clear that South Africa's motor industry suffers from an extreme degree of proliferation 
according to any measure. There are seven passenger vehicle manufacturers in South 
Africa producing no less than 11 different makes with over 30 different basic models.1 
Production in 1991 (domestic sales plus export) was approximately 198 000 units so that 
average production per model was approximately 6000. As Figure 3.1 indicates this is 
exceptionally low in international terms. The proliferation of makes and models raises 
costs in assembly both directly, and indirectly through its impact on component 
production costs. This latter issue is dealt with in section 3.2. 
Figure 3.1 
Average annual production per model by regional producers (passenger vehicles, 
1990) 
±i :( 
- 1 := L = _ ' J 
1. The number depends on definition. I have defined basic models as being for example the Toyota Corolla 
and Cressida or the BMW 3 Series and 5 Series. Each of these models has a number of different 
derivatives (engine size, number of doors etc.) 




Europe ___ ___ ___ ___ 
US 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 
(Thousand) 
Source: Womack et al, 1990; Automotive Industry Authority, 1992, NAAMSA. 
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Table 3.4 provides more detailed information on model proliferation by comparing South 
Africa with Australia which has had some success in reducing excessive model 
proliferation but is still a low volume, multiple model producer. Even by Australian 
standards, it is clear that the level of proliferation in South Africa is exceptional. 
Table 3.4 
Model proliferation — South Africa vs Australia 
Annual Sales No. of Models 
Volumes S.A.1991 Aust.1987 Aust.1991 
0—19 999 24 6 1 
20000—39999 1 5 4 
40000-i- 1 2 3 
Source: MA (1992), NAAMSA 
2.3 Low capacity utHisation 
Another reason for high manufacturing costs in South Africa is low capacity utilisation. 
\TW has capacity for 70 000 vehicles per year in one shift and 120—130 000 in two shifts. 
In 1992 it produced 50 000 vehicles. BMW, which is currently the most profitable of the 
South African manufacturers has capacity for 125 vehicles per day but in late 1992 was 
producing only 75. These kinds of figures are to be found at all South African assembly 
plants. This has been an additional factor which has pushed up prices of new cars during 
the recession. 
2.4 The organisation of production 
Most studies of shifts in competitiveness in the international auto industry cite production 
organisation as the cutting edge of competitive advantage. Thus 'lean production' (defined 
broadly to include not only production but also linkages to suppliers as well as the 
distribution system) is widely seen to be the primary reason for the rapid expansion of the 
Japanese industry as well as the success of Japanese transplants in the US and UK. This 
perspective has received its most influential support in the outcome of MIT's International 
Motor Vehicle Program (IMYP), 'The Machine that changed the World' •2 All the world's 
leading automakers and suppliers are being forced to respond to these developments. 
While I believe this view to be generally correct, if overstated in some accounts, it does 
not neccessarily follow that the lack of competitiveness of the South African automotive 
industry can be primarily accounted for by the fact that it has not yet adopted lean 
2. There are, however, no shortage of critics of this perspective. See, for example, (Williams et al, 1992). 
MOTOR VEHICLE SECTOR 73 
production practices. It has been argued above that the lack of competitiveness in the 
South African industry is primarily a more mundane story about the way protection was 
applied and low levels of inefficient investment. This remains the central structural 
problem but equally the adoption of lean production methods will greatly facilitate the 
overall restructuring process by upgrading plant level productivity and encouraging new 
investment. 
In this section, we present some limited and preliminary evidence as to how the South 
African industry stands with regard to lean production and the major constraints that it 
faces in this regard. Table 3.5 presents a preliminary attempt to compare South African 
assembly firms to a series of lean manufacturing benchmarks for producers in countries 
which were part of the IMVP study. While this data is preliminary and should be treated 
with caution, the basic findings have been generally supported by my own interviews. 
For the most part, South African management are fully aware of lean production, of its 
implications and of its potential. Many have seen it in action in Japan. Awareness does of 
course not mean commitment to its full implementation and most attempts to implement 
lean production have sought to introduce aspects of the system in an unintegrated and 
partial manner. As a result they have freqently been opposed or disregarded by workers. 
According to the benchmarking criteria used to measure plant level productivity, and the 
diffusion of lean production, South Africa shows up badly. South African assembly plants 
are unproductive in international terms. Low assembly plant productivity can be accounted 
for by relatively low levels of automation and training, the underutilisation of capacity and 
consequent overmanning as well as low plant volumes. The organisation of production 
also plays a major role with improvements hindered by adversarial relations on the shop 
floor. 
Quality 
South Africa rates badly in terms of quality according to the comparative data in Table 
3.5. On the other hand this is an area which is experiencing rapid improvement. Many 
firms emphasised the importance of quality if success was to achieved in foreign markets 
and there were many examples of rapid quality improvement among both assemblers and 
component firms. For example, BMW which is a firm more oriented to export than most 
others, reports significant improvements to a level which is approaching that achieved by 
the parent company.3 
Each type of defect is given a score (average 0.12) and both the parent company and the 
South African operation aim for a level not higher than 0.6 defects per vehicle. The parent 
company has attained a level of 0.8 while South Africa has achieved a level of 
approximately 1.2 a dramatic improvement form the level of 3—4 which prevailed 5 years 
ago. Nissan argue that a major improvement in quality achieved by effective shop floor 
3. Interview with Mike Parker, production manager, BMW(SA). 
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management is the major factor which has enabled them to dramatically improve 
passenger vehicle market share from the low of 6% in 1983 to 14% in 1992. 
The size of the repair or rework area indicates the approach to maintaining quality 
standards. The main Japanese innovation here has been the integration of quality control 
into the responsibilities of line workers thus limiting the need for expensive final checking 
and repair. This is indicated by very small repair areas compared to South African (and 
European) plants (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 
Assembly plant characteristics 
All South 
Japan Europe NIC Africa 
Performance: 
Productivity (hrs/vehicle) 16.8 36.2 41 50 
Quality (Assembly defects 
/100 vehicles) 60.0 97.0 72.3 194 
Layout: 
Size of Repair Area 
(% of assembly area) 4.1 14.4 15.1 
Inventory Days 
(8 sample parts) 0.2 2.0 11.6 
Automation: 
(% of direct steps) 
Welding 86.2 76.6 
Painting 54.6 38.2 
Assembly 1.7 3.1 
Work Force: 
% Work Force in Teams 69.3 0.6 2.5 
Job Rotation 
(0none, 4=frequent) 3.0 1.9 1.5 
Suggestions/Employee 61.6 0.4 0.09 
Number of Job Classes 11.9 14.8 32.0 
Training of New Production 
Workers (hours) 380.3 173.3 50.5 
Note: The South African data are based on a sample of 3 manufacturers and should be 
seen as preliminary. The South African quality data are based on 
manufacturer's own measurements rather than customer surveys in the case of 
Japan and Europe. 
Source: Faull and van der Riet (consultants), Womack et a!, 1990 
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Inventory levels and just-in-time (JIT) 
The just-in-time system is not well developed in South Africa as indicated by high 
inventory levels in Table 3.5. Many component firms report that uT is used by assemblers 
to get component producers to carry the cost of holding stock and that they have had to 
establish warehousing operations to deal with this. 
The benefits in terms of reduced inventory levels in the system are thus minimal and this 
may indicate that the inventory levels are effectively even higher than Table 3.5 indicates. 
Toyota is the leader in the implementation of uT in South Africa and has made an effort to 
reduce stock levels not only in its own warehouses but in those of its suppliers. It has also 
encouraged certain key suppliers to locate close to its Durban plant. Other manufacturers 
operate JIT systems with certain key components. For example, BMW and Nissan, both 
located in Rosslyn, near Pretoria draw on body parts and seats produced nearby by 
companies with which they either have close links or own. 
However, there are a number of serious drawbacks and constraints to the fuller 
implementation of the lIT system in South Africa: 
• High quality and reliable suppliers are vital to a proper JIT system and this represents 
the most important constraint in South Africa. Assemblers complain about the 
reliability of suppliers both in terms of delivery and to a lesser extent, in terms of 
quality. Thus the desire to eliminate buffer stocks is limited by the perceived high risk 
of work stoppages as well as the competence of suppliers. This is a problem not only 
for assemblers but also for component producers who cite problems with the supply 
of subcomponents and raw materials such as steel. 
• Assembler firm capacity to manage the high level of coordination required in a JIT 
system is lacking in many cases. 
• The high variability of production in the components sector makes JIT difficult as it 
would require even smaller runs. 
• Large distances between various production centres.4 There are four major areas of 
automotive production in South Africa. Samcor, BMW and Nissan are located in the 
Pretoria region, Toyota is in Durban, Mercedes-Benz in East London and VW and 
Delta in PE-Ultenhage. Port Elizabeth which was pre-eminent as a producing region 
is located at a substantial distance from the major producing areas of Durban and the 
PWV. The state owned diesel engine producer, Atlantis Diesel Engines, located in the 
Western Cape, has an even more adverse location both in terms of proximity to 
component suppliers and to the heavy vehicle assemblers. One advantage that South 
Africa does have is its advanced and relatively uncongested road system. Traffic 
4. See Bloch and Payne (1993) for a discussion of locational aspects of the automotive industry. 
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congestion is the major impediment to uT in Taiwan5 and imposes increasingly 
severe constraints in Japan and Europe. 
Large fluctuations in production levels add to the problems of operating a uT system. 
The limited development of JIT needs to be kept in perspective, however. Most 
component finns did not feel under particular pressure in this regard and one reported that 
it only applies to exports! It is also necessary to bear in mind that the CKD packs which 
comprise a large proportion of the parts are imported from Germany or Japan with lengthy 
shipping times. 
Automation 
Assembly is difficult to automate except for welding and painting. Even in the advanced 
countries, final assembly remains fairly labour intensive in most plants including some of 
the most productive. Levels of automation are clearly very low in South Africa but it 
would be inappropriate to compare them to the advanced countries which have far higher 
labour costs. In South African assembly plants, the major areas of automation are in 
welding, painting and certain areas of final assembly such as mechanical handling. But in 
most plants many of these functions are still performed manually. 
BOX 3.1 
Building the 'Mandelamobile' 
Productivity improvement on the shop floor under lean production depends essentially 
on workers being highly motivated. Thus innovations such as 'quality circles' and 
'green areas' which are aimed at fostering a team approach and utilising the detailed 
knowledge and experience of the workforce to improve productivity are unlikely to 
succeed when introduced into an antagonistic shop floor situation with a hierarchical 
employment structure as prevails in South African assembly plants. The impact of high 
levels of motivation on productivity was graphically illustrated when workers at 
Mercedes Benz decided to build a car for Nelson Mandela following his release in 
1990. This was negotiated with management and workers put in unpaid overtime to 
produce the top of the line Mercedes 500. This car was the best quality car ever made 
at MBSA. It came off the line (before rectification) with only 9 faults, a figure 
significantly lower than that achieved in Germany and a fraction of the MBSA average of 90 faults. The car was built without supervision and in record time with the normal 
28 days in the factory being reduced to eight. 
Interview with Ludwe Bakaco, Mercedes Benz shop steward. See also South African 
Labour Bulletin (Vol 15, No 4, 1990) interview with C. Kopke, MBSA chairman. 
5. Interview with Tseng Tsing-Tsai, director, San Yang Industry Company, Taiwan. 
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Production organisation 
The most striking set of differences which certainly impacts on shop floor productivity is 
around the organisation of production, training and job classification. A key area of 
Japanese success has been the involvement of the workforce in schemes to upgrade 
productivity and quality. These can be illustrated by the emphasis on a team approach and 
the utilisation of the accumulated skills and experience of the workforce in productivity 
improvement (illustrated by the enormous number of suggestions offered by the 
workforce). Another key innovation is the emphasis on flexibility and the capability of 
workers to perform a variety of tasks. 
There have a number of attempts to introduce such methods into South African automotive 
plants. On the whole they have not been very effective as evidenced by ongoing strike 
action and low levels of participation in management initiatives on productivity. Workers 
regard these schemes with suspicion and are reluctant to participate in productivity raising 
schemes which may help profitability but which will not benefit them directly. In many 
cases they are correctly perceived as attempts to sideline the union. 
Box 3.2 
Green areas at Nissan 
Nissan management argue that their experience with the genba kanri shop floor 
management system has been very successsful.6 Following the crisis they faced in the 
early 1980s, Nissan introduced a new form of shop floor management (genba kanri) 
with the assistance of the parent company. The genba kanri system is based on 
Japanese notions of teamwork (based around the green area concept), flexibility (the 
introduction of elements of multiskilling) and continuous improvement (kaizen). While 
the system is paternalistic and explicitly aimed at removing the need for workers to 
join the union, it has clearly been effective in establishing better communication 
between management and the shop floor. Management claim that it has achieved the 
following: 
— the lowest absenteeism and latecoming record in the industry. It is currently 3% and 
has been reduced from 25—30% in the early 1980s. 
— the lowest rate of turnover for operators in the industry (0.5% per month). This helps 
quality and the flexibility of the labour force increases. 
— a high safety rating. 
— relatively low rates of strike action. 
— involvement of the workforce in continuous improvement of quality and 
productivity via suggestion schemes etc. 
6. Interview with Bill Middleton, Genba Kanri shop floor manager, Nissan, 1992. 
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South Africa's current industrial environment is not the most receptive place for the 
introduction of forms of production organisation which are more cooperative and aim at 
harnessing the accumulated skills and experience of production workers. The high number 
of job classifications and low training levels are indicative of one aspect of the problem. 
Even more revealing would be comparable data on salary/wage differentials between 
management and production workers, career pathing etc. The point is that attempts to 
introduce lean production into the shop floor situation of the typical South African plant 
are bound to have limited success in situations of huge disparities in management and 
worker incomes, a hierarchical division of labour and racial divisions. 
Cooperation between and assemblers and their suppliers 
Japanese carmakers have pioneered a system of close cooperation between manufacturers 
and first tier suppliers which is now being emulated in Europe and the US. It involves 
assemblers assisting major component producers to upgrade themselves, cooperating on 
R&D and developing long term relationships whereby the benefits of technological and 
productivity advances are shared. 
The situation is very different in South Africa where there is little cooperation between 
component producers and suppliers except insofar as the industry is small and personal 
contacts play an important role. 
Most component producers do not receive significant assistance from assembler firms and 
do not see a significant trend towards closer cooperation. Many regard the assemblers as 
expedient and short-sighted for moving swiftly to use foreign components and 
endangering the long term viability of the components sector on which the assemblers 
ultimately depend. There is also little co-operation between the assemblers federation 
(NAAMSA) and the component producers federation (NAACAM). But in certain selected 
certain cases cooperation is occuring especially where the components firm has been 
drawn into Phase VI exports. 
3. Competitiveness of components production 
A modern motor vehicle consists of approximately 10 000 components. This provides the 
heart of the vehicle and final assembly accounts for only some 20 percent of total 
production costs. The South African components sector is widely regarded as being 
uncompetitive with prices above world market levels (see Table 3.3) and owing its 
existence mainly to protection and local content requirements. However, there are many 
areas where South African components are competitive not only in the domestic market 
but also in foreign markets. 
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3.1 Impact of the local content programme 
The development of components production was determined by the character of the local 
content programme and the protection afforded to CBUs. The proliferation of producers in 
a small market meant that component producers had to produce a wide variety of products 
with sub-optimal production runs. This was exacerbated by the fact that the local content 
programme was mass-based. This encouraged investment in heavier parts such as body 
pressings with high tooling costs which were totally uneconomic at low volumes. 
The transition to Phase VI was a turning point in that it involved a shift to a value based 
programme and local content could also be partly met by exports. Export success has 
allowed Phase VI OEMs to increasingly source components overseas. The problems of the 
component sector have been compounded by the fact that there has been no rationalisation 
of the number of makes and models, in fact rather the reverse, so that the problem of scale 
economies in the domestic market remains severe. Some firms have been hit hard by the 
new sourcing arrangements of OEMs and NAACAM, the component producers 
federation, has warned that there could be large scale bankruptcies. 
3.2 Economies of scale 
As indicated in Chapter One, economies of scale are more important in component 
manufacture than assembly. While flexible automation and production reorganisation have 
increased the variety of products that can be efficiently produced in a single plant, there is 
little evidence that they have significantly decreased optimal plant size. Flexible 
machinery gives flexibility but dedicated machinery remains quicker and cheaper for high 
volume production. Small scale production means that tooling costs have to be amortised 
over a smaller number of units, setting up times for new batches become a major cost 
factor and quality is more difficult to control. It also becomes more difficult to automate 
production. 
An obvious solution for some component firms is to develop themselves as world scale 
suppliers to foreign OEM markets. Some firms have taken this route in a small number of 
less significant components and aftermarket production serves as a possible entry route. 
Nevertheless there are substantial difficulties with such a course of action. 
Firstly, as has been mentioned above, most firms are not geared to large scale production. 
Secondly, remote location becomes a more severe disadvantage as uT supply is 
increasingly a requirement of foreign OEMs. This is not an overriding difficulty, however, 
and affects only certain types of components. 
Perhaps the most important constraint here is licencing. Virtually all South African 
components firms are dependent on foreign licensors and many of these agreements 
regulate exports. The problem is most severe in technologically sophisticated products and 
is exacerbated by the limited technological capabilities and low R&D spending of most 
South African component firms. Thus firms producing braking systems, airconditioners 
etc are more likely to face difficulties than those engaged in the manufacture of alloy 
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wheels. In many cases, it is locally owned firms which are most affected by this as the 
foreign licensor will be reluctant to face competition in his traditonal markets from a 
company which is not a subsidiary. 
Box 3.3 
Examples of the scale of production in South African 
components producers compared to international 
producers 
Body pressings — SA firm makes 1000 different components. Press shop in Japan 
would typically make 150 with much higher total volume. 
Alternators, starter motors, electronic control units — SA firm produces 300 000 
alternators per year. German parent company has just estalished new plant in Wales 
with a capacity of 8 million alternators per year. The new SA plant producing 
electronic control units is more suited to low volume production as it is organised on a 
cellular basis. A European plant would be similar but with a larger number of cells 
replicating a similar production process. 
Exhaust systems — largest SA plant is one third of group's largest European plant and 
makes a larger variety of products. 
Steering Wheels — SA plant has capacity of 300 000/year compared to 2 million in 
German plant which produces a smaller variety. 
Pistons — SA producer uses 5 lines to manufacture a wide range of pistons at a rate of 
60000 per month. Current batch size of 500 is being reduced to 200. A US based 
piston producer in the same worldwide group uses 7 highly automated lines to 
manufacture only 7 variants but has a capacity of 600 000/month. 
Shock Absorbers — South African subsidiary has a product range wider than any two 
companies in the US owned worldwide group which has subsidiaries in twelve 
countries. 
Various components — Major automotive holding company with several component 
subsidiaries have conducted a survey of parts produced which indicated that less than 5 
percent of the various parts produced were in volumes of more than 2000/month. 
Source: Interviews 
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3.3 Raw materials 
Raw materials used in the component industry include steel, aluminium, copper, rubber 
and plastics. The relatively high price of these materials is a major cost raising factor in 
the industry (Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 
Comparative raw material prices. SA price compared to international price (R/ton) 
SA Price Import price Premium 
(exci duty) 
Sheet Metal 2800 1980 41.4% 
Aluminium 5300 3491 58.4% 
Rubber 4750 3030 56.8% 
Source: Interviews 
In the case of one assembler the premium on aluminium alone raised car prices by an 
estimated 3.7%. For certain types of components, the impact is much more severe. For a 
major steel wheel producer which is moving into the export market, the cost of steel 
comprised no less than 65% of their manufacturing costs in the case of exports and 
50—55% in the case of production for the domestic market where margins are larger. 
3.4 Areas of competitive strength 
Automotive components are extremely diverse and really belong to a number of sectors 
(metal products, chemicals, rubber, electronics, textiles). They range from sophisticated 
subassemblies such as transmissions to peripheral components such as wing mirrors and 
even nuts and bolts. It has been estimated that by the year 2000 electronic items will 
comprise 20% of the value of a car. One of South Africa's most competitive 'automotive 
components' is leather seating material. There is, therefore, a wide range of processes 
ranging from labour-intensive to capital-intensive with a variety of skill and raw material 
requirements. Thus most countries have appropriate endowments for some kind of 
components production. 
Assembly is for the most part a fairly labour-intensive operation. With the exception of 
welding and painting, high levels of automation are technically difficult to achieve and 
exorbitantly expensive. The more highly automated plants such as VW's Golf assembly 
plant in Wolfsburg, encounter problems with high maintainence costs on sophisticated 
equipment and are extremely vulnerable to downturns in demand. 
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Flexibility and small batch production 
The typical South African components firm produces a wide range of compenents in 
relatively low volumes using dated equipment and a fairly labour intensive labour process 
although with areas of greater automation. 
Important capabilities have thus been developed in achieving the flexibility and the high 
degree of co-ordination required to produce a large variety of products. The result is that 
while the industry cannot compete with high volume European and Japanese producers 
who are the key suppliers to OEMs, it can compete effectively in foreign niche markets. 
This represents a significant area of competitive advantage. Thus many of the firms which 
are rapidly expanding exports are firms with a substantial base in the aftermarket and 
those which are targetting the aftermarket. Volumes are lower in the aftermarket, there is a 
requirement for a large variety and in many cases, South Africa still produces models 
which are no longer produced in the principle countries. Thus August Laepple is the 
leading world supplier of certain aftermarket bodyparts for the old 3 and 5 Series BMWs. 
Some of these niches are substantial in volume terms with relatively high margins so that 
firms can avoid the cut-throat price competition prevalent in high volume OEM supply. 
They also offer a way into export markets and high volume OEM sourcing arrangements. 
Some firms are well placed to take advantage of this market. One such group is T&N 
Holdings which is 51% held by the major UK based automotive, aerospace and electrical 
firm T&N plc. Ten percent of its 1991 turnover (R426m) was accounted for by exports, up 
from less than 3 percent in 1987. This proportion is expected to increase to 25 percent in 
the next 3—4 years. T&N Holdings has been integrated into the global strategy of T&N plc 
which is a major world player in components such as friction products, pistons, engine 
parts and gaskets. It is particulaly strong in the aftermarket and the South African 
subsidiary is increasingly specialising in producing small volumes for foreign niche 
markets. 
Mid-low tech items with high raw material content 
Many of the products being exported (steel and alloy wheels, catalytic converters, 
castings, jacks, body pressings, springs) are items where domestic producers are more able 
to develop their own design and technical competence and are therefore less subject to the 
limitations of dependence on foreign licensors. This is the main area where parts are being 
produced for foreign OEMs particulaly in Europe and to a lesser extent the US. There is 
also limited export to Asia, including Japan. 
Advanced components 
In a few limited areas, there are indications of substantial capabilities in high tech 
products. One example are the electronic control units produced by domestic firms which 
have developed expertise through their experience in the armaments industry. 
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Box 3.4 
Export to foreign niche markets 
An example of a niche marketing stategy which capitalised on expertise in small batch 
production originally developed to cope with South Africa's highly differentiated 
market is the successful entry of T&N Holdings subsidiary, Silverton Engineering into 
the US radiator aftermarket. This company was quick to take advantage of a substantial 
shift in the market for replacement radiators. It used to be normal practice to repair 
rather than replace radiators. This was possible because they were a highly 
standardised item and reconditioning could be handled in repair shops which numbered 
some 14 000 in the US alone. With the entry of foreign cars into the US market and the 
proliferation of model and hence radiator types, there has been a fundamental change 
in the market and broken radiators are now more frequently replaced rather than 
repaired. Thus the number of radiator repair shops in the US has declined to 9 000 
currently. This has been accompanied by a substantial expansion in the aftermarket for 
radiators which is estimated at 1.5 million units per year in the US for non-brand parts. 
By offering a substantial product range and targeting specialised niche markets, 
Silverton Engineering has been able to expand exports to the US at prices well above 
products from Taiwan and China which have been competing on the basis of low 
prices and high volumes. It has also established its own distribution partnership and is 
now the fourth largest distributor of radiators to the US aftermarket. In addition to its 
success in the traditional aftermarket, Silverton Engineering has recently solicited its 
first original equipment contract for parts and accessory servicing in the USA. The 
company is also active in the European aftermarket and is exploring opportunities in 
the Middle and Far East. A sister company exports aluminium radiators to OEMs in 
Germany. Together exports account for approx R80 million up from virtually zero 
three years ago. 
For a relatively low volume producer (1200—1 800 units per day), Silverton Engineering 
produces an enormous variety of products. It has the tooling to produce in excess of 
200 types of radiator and frequently produces in excess of 30 types per day. This is 
achieved through a highly flexible but labour intensive production process. 
South African firms produce a wide range of sophisticated tooling equipment with high 
local content in both design and manufacture. Many manufacturers regard local tooling as 
highly competitive. Tooling manufacturers also benefit under Phase Vi and exports are 
rising with at least one firm engaged in the supply and setting up of assembly lines in 
Europe. The reasons for strong capabilities in an area of capital goods production which 
requires high design and technological capabilities needs further research. One important 
factor may be the diversity of South Africa's own industry. The constant retooling that is 
required with so many different manufacturers appears to have created considerable 
capability in the tooling industry. 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the factors which explain the lack of competitveness in the 
South African automotive industry. It was argued that in most areas the industry is 
uncompetitive but that to a large extent the lack of competitiveness is due to industry 
structure rather than to notions such as South Africa not having a 'comparative advantage' 
in automotive production. Rather the conclusion that should be drawn is a far more 
optimistic one. The research conducted to date fully supports our basic hypothesis that 
South Africa could develop a substantial and internationally competitive auto industry. 
Policy needs to encourage a more rational industry structure but in so doing it needs to 
upgrade and develop rather than destroy the important areas of competitiveness and 
capability that have developed in spite of inappropriate policy. Flexibility and niche 
market capabilities represent not only an important area of competitve advantage but are 
also fairly labour intensive with important spinoffs in terms of technology and skills. 
While rationalisation is necessary, a radical restructuring programme aimed, for example, 
at establishing capital-intensive and large scale world class components manufacture could 
easily destroy important existing capabilities. It is important that policy programmes take 
note of this. 
Chapter Four: Case studies of firm level 
restructuring 
In devising broad ranging policies like trade liberalisation, policy makers all to frequently 
take insufficient account of the capacity within finns to adjust to such changes. Firms, 
after all constitute the actual operating units of the economy and any programme of 
adjustment can only succeed if there is a positive supply response to increasing foreign 
and domestic competitive pressure. This can take the form of investment to capitalise on 
new export opportunities resulting from a reduced bias against exports or to keep abreast 
of international best practice. It can also take the form of measures to improve productivity 
through plant reorganisation and the upgrading of finn level capabilities. But there is, of 
course, also a downside firms may seek to reduce costs by slashing employment and in 
the worst scenario, increasing competitive pressure can lead to gradual attrition as a 
downward cycle of reduced profitability and falling investment causes the firm to fall 
further and further behind. 
This chapter provides brief case studies which illustrate how three very different 
automotive companies are responding, not only to the pressures of growing international 
competition but also to the opportunities being opened up by greater integration into the 
global economy. 
While these companies are clearly unique, the problems and opportunities they face are 
similar to those faced by many other assemblers and component producers. They illustrate 
that South African automotive firms have considerable capacity to react dynamically to 
the pressures of international competition but that this adjustment process is also 
constrained in many cases by the particular history and circumstances of individual firms. 
Also, South Africa currently faces a situation where political and economic uncertainty 
has meant that there is very little new investment occurring. This tends to mute the supply 
response resulting from greater global integration. As a result, restructuring spurred by 
liberalisation has the potential for large scale retrenchment while offering few of the 
benefits in terms of new investments in export oriented production. This points to the need 
for trade liberalisation to proceed gradually and to be highly cognisant of the overall 
enviromnent for new investment. 
The first case study is of Gabriel (South Africa), a foreign owned producer of shock 
absorbers, which has reaped massive productivity gains from the introduction of Japanese 
style production reorganisation. Atlantis Diesel Engines, the subject of the second case 
study, is a state owned producer of diesel engines which was in the past widely regarded 
as a dinosaur from the days of the siege economy. From an extremely adverse position it 
has made great strides in overcoming its reliance on heavy protection and is moving 
increasingly into export markets. In an over fragmented industry, BMW is one of the most 
profitable assembly firms in South Africa. It is increasingly being integrated into BMW 
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AG's international network. If this process is successful it could play an important role in 
spurring the development of a world class assembly and component industry. 
1. Gabriel: productivity gains through reorganising 
production 
Gabriel is a a medium sized producer of shock absorbers, gas and coil springs and 
MacPherson struts for the domestic original equipment market and the aftermarket and 
also for the export aftermarket. Over the past four years, it has been engaged in a process 
of production reorganisation aimed at introducing Japanese style production techniques 
with a view to increasing productivity and thereby reducing manufacturing costs. As such 
it provides an interesting and useful case study of this process in the South African 
context. 
The firm is 86% owned by Maremont and in turn by Arvin Industries (both of the USA). 
Arvin Industries control twelve shock absorber plants around the world in developed and 
developing countries including the USA, Canada, India, France, Venezuela and Argentina. 
One of its largest and most recent investments is a joint venture with a Japanese producer 
in Spain. These plants, which to a certain extent have different capabilities, compete with 
each other for orders all over the world. The parent company has been aggressive in 
encouraging subsidiaries to reorganise production on a just-in-time basis and provides 
extensive support for this. 
Pressure for change has also come from within the company and management and 
engineering staff appear very committed to new production principles. They are fully 
aware of the need to become internationally competitive in the face of changing market 
conditions. Their share (there is one other major domestic competitor) in the stagnating 
domestic market is seen as optimal. Also, the company forsees that protection will be 
reduced and that some OEMs may have shock absorbers put back in the CKD packs which 
would reduce their traditional markets. Exports are therefore regarded as the only area of 
significant market growth. Unusually, the company does not object to reduced protection 
in the domestic market. 
The firm is therefore seeking to expand exports from the current level of 10—15% of 
turnover to as much as 50% although 30% is seen as a more realistic medium term 
objective. It is targeting the foreign aftermarket and its competitive strengths lie in the 
large range that the company can offer, high quality levels, acceptable prices and small 
niche market capabilities. Export growth depends on price, quality and delivery times and 
it is the latter, especially in terms of reliability which presents the main problem. Thus an 
important objective is to reduce lead times to six weeks in foreign markets and achieve 
100% ordertill reliability. 
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1.2 Production reorganisation 
The main innovations in production reorganisation have involved the introduction of JIT 
manufacturing with a cellular layout, the objective being to "supply only the necessary 
items at the right time and correct volume to the prescribed quality specifications" 
(Company manual). This was to be achieved by introducing the following changes: 
• A flow system to move away from large batch production and thereby reduce work in 
progress. 
• Quick change overs. This would allow for greater flexibility through frequent setting 
up and smaller lot sizes and can be achieved by training, adaptations to tooling and 
the elimination of set up by trial and error. 
• Small lot sizes of 250 to 500 units. Small lots are preferred over continuous runs even 
if a large quantity of one component is required. The objective is flexibility and better 
service to the end user. 
• Balanced workload with successive work station cycle times to within 5% of one 
another. 
• Effective layout to allow efficient flow of work and "U-shaped" lines to improve 
proximity of operators to a number of machines. 
• Built in quality and in-line checking. Inspection to be performed by operators at point 
of manufacture. Use of statistical process control (SPC). 
• Frequent parts supply with no interruptions. 
• Operators or cell leaders to be responsible for basic maintainence. 
• Simple visible planning and each cell to be provided with a daily timetable of units to 
be produced. 
• Continuous improvement achieved by the introduction of action teams (consisting of 
members of the cell, engineering, maintainence and toolroom personnel) and 
suggestion schemes. 
Implementation 
Implementation so far has been partial with greater success in some areas than in others. 
The main feature has been the gradual introduction and ongoing improvement of a number 
of JIT manufacturing cells. Gabriel were advised by a Japanese consultant to Maremont 
and the parent company's own JIT co-ordinator who visits Gabriel plants around the world 
to advise on implementation and to train personnel. in 1989 an implementation team was 
formed in Gabriel (SA) consisting of design engineers, toolmakers and maintainence 
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fitters. The first major project was a gas spring assembly cell followed by the 
establishment of a shock absorber assembly cell for which most of the machines were 
designed and built in-house. Further cells have since been established or are in the process 
of being set up and by February 1993 the company was at a halfway stage in its 
production reorganisation. A kanban system is being introduced to address the problem of 
lead times and levels of work in progress which remain fairly high. 
1.3 Results 
International competitiveness and productivity 
Table 4.1 
International productivity comparisons in the Gabriel group, 1992 
Units/person day Plant size and product variety 
(early 1992) compared to the SA plant 
India 24 slightly larger plant 
Mexico 27—28 slightly larger plant 
South Africa 30 largest variety of all plants 
Spain 200 large scale producer for OEMs, 
only 400 part numbers 
USA 110—180 larger plant, less variety 
Venezuela 41—42 same size plant, less variety 
Note: Inter-national differences can be accounted for by a number of factors only 
some of which are directly the result of firm level productivity (advanced 
production organisation, automation). Other factors such as product range 
which impacts negatively on productivity according to the above measure may 
result from a fragmented domestic market and/or the company targeting the 
aftermarket which requires greater variety but offers higher prices. Thus the 
Spanish plant is not directly comparable with the other plants as it produces for 
the original equipment market. But it also operates on a well developed JIT 
system and is highly automated. 
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Table 4.1 gives an indication of how productivity in the South African plant compared to 
other plants in the Gabriel group in early 1992, according to the measure of units produced 
per person/day. At this time the South African plant was not really competitive although 
its niche market capabilities meant that it did have some export capability. The South 
African plant had attained 45—50 units per person/day by early 1993 and expected to attain 
80 during 1994 at which point it will be extremely competitive given its relatively low 
labour costs. Another measure used is cost of employment as a percentage of sales, which 
was at 19% (with a target of 15%) compared to the 28% achieved in the US. 
The substantial productivity improvements achieved so far have resulted mainly in 
retrenchments rather than a large increase in output or exports. The company currently 
employs 340 people, down from 540 a year ago and 640 four years ago. This has included 
cutting salaried staff from 130 to 70. During this period, output has increased. 
Productivity gains are very apparent in some of the new cells. For example, the new gas 
spring cell has increased production and flexibility but with a substantially reduced labour 
force (Table 4.2). Fifty percent of production from this cell is now being exported as a 
direct result of productivity improvements. In the new strut cell, five workers (previously 
nine) have maintained production at 1000+ units per shift. 
Table 4.2 
Productivity improvement in the new gas spring cell 
Old assembly line New JIT cell 
No. of workers 8 3 
Output per shift** 500—1000 units 1000—1500 units 
No. of machine changeovers 
per shift 3-4 7—8 
** Shifts were longer on the old assembly line 
Source of productivity increases 
• Machine set up times 
This has been a major area of improvement and was the initial focus of the team 
established to introduce JIT. Set up times used to range from 30—120 minutes. This 
has been reduced to 2—10 minutes in most cases. World class cell performance 
requires that all machines can be changed within 5 minutes. Under the old system, 
downtime resulting from lengthy set up times meant that 50—70% of potential 
production was lost. Reduction in set up times has been achieved in a number of 
ways. Machine setting was previously performed by a special category of setters 
while this task is now performed by the operators themselves. Large numbers of 
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adaptations to machinery have been introduced to reduce set up times. Some of these 
are extremely minor but have nevertheless been effective e.g. fitting clips to 
machinery which means that alien keys or spanners are no longer necessary to change 
settings. 
To assist in this process, the company has established a number of small toolmaking 
companies (consisting of ex-employees) who specialise in making machines more 
flexible. Most of their work is for Gabriel but they also work for other finns. 
• Batch size 
Batch sizes have been reduced but this has proved more difficult than reducing set up 
times. Average batch sizes are now 200—300. At one point, there was an attempt to 
bring them down to 100 but this proved premature as it was found that too much time 
was being wasted on setting up. 
There are other constraints as well. Gabriel's original equipment markets are located 
at some distance from its Cape plant and it only ships once a week. It therefore makes 
sense to produce a particular part once a week. 
• Stock levels 
Prior to the reorganisation, the company used to have eight weeks of finished stock. 
This has been reduced to under three weeks and the aim is seven days. 
Stock turns are at the satisfactory level of 20 per year. However, with reduced stock 
levels the orderfihl rate (percentage of orders fulfilled on time) has come under 
pressure. 
Economies of scale and flexible specialisation 
Most component firms consider that wide variety and low volumes place them at a 
considerable disadvantage both in export markets and competing with imports in the 
domestic market. In only a few areas have firms been able to establish world scale 
facilities with relatively high degrees of automation. Thus there is a strongly held view 
that rationalisation of the number of models and makes would result in greatly improved 
competitiveness. At the same time it has been argued by some of the more vocal 
champions of lean production that Japanese style production allows for the efficient 
production of a large variety of products and reduces minimum efficient scale. 
The experience of Gabriel provides some support for both views. Gabriel is a low volume, 
high variety producer. Production reorganisation has centred around productivity 
improvement while maintaining this flexible capacity and even making a virtue of it. 
However, even for a firm which has gone a long way towards implementing lean 
production methods, the fragmentation of the South African market remains a problem. 
The firm produces in excess of 700 part numbers and has a product range which is higher 
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than any other two companies in the Gabriel group combined. It has to deal, for example, 
with 17 diameters of piston rod while the maximum in other companies is 7—8. As an 
extreme contrast, the Spanish plant which operates on a JIT basis has achieved high 
productivity on the basis of dedicated automation. A Gabriel production manager who 
visited the Spanish plant reported that one of its automated shock absorber lines had been 
producing 6000 units per day of the same part number for the past 4 months. The South 
African operation produces a total of 6500 units per day including struts and gas springs in 
a large range of types. 
Thus in spite of the strides they have made in flexibility, management believe that 
significant gains could be made by standardising various components and reducing overall 
variety. 
Process of change and reaction of the union1 
Workers have reluctantly accepted the changes at Gabriel. While they are fully aware of 
the need for productivity improvement to maintain the viability of the plant in the face of 
international competition, the main impact of restructuring has been retrenchment. While 
the company claims that this is necessary to create the basis for future expansion, the 
benefits (in terms of new employment) have still to materialise although current jobs 
appear secure. 
As has been the case in other situations in South Africa and elsewhere the union finds it 
difficult to respond to the negative aspects (retrenchment) resulting from restructuring. 
With some success they have tried to ensure that greater efficiencies and cost-cutting also 
took place in other parts of the firm. Thus the layers of management have been 
substantially reduced and the number of salaried staff have been cut back in roughly equal 
proportion to hourly paid workers. The union also fought for and were successful in 
achieving a reduction in management perks such as company cars. 
Workers complain that the intensity of work has increased under the cellular system and 
coupled with excessive overtime being worked is an important reason for the growth of 
absenteeism even though a bonus system has been introduced in an effort to limit this. 
While they accept that training has increased they argue that muttiskilling has resulted 'in 
people working harder, not smarter'. They have not opposed the introduction of 'green 
areas' which have been seen in some firms as an attempt to undercut the union. Instead 
they are seen to have some advantages and clearly serve as a place where union 
organisational work can also be conducted. 
1. This section is based on an interview with members of the shopstewards committee. 
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1.4 Implications for policy 
Gabriel is in many ways a typical South African component company. It produces a vast 
range of products and historically this has raised costs and limited the scope for further 
automation. This is a situation faced by many South African component firms. There are 
two alternative routes available to such companies. One would be to increase 
specialisation and thereby generate greater economies of scale. This would involve 
transforming themselves into high volume suppliers with foreign OEMs probably 
comprising a significant part of their market and would require greater levels of 
automation. The alternative is the direction that Gabriel has pursued — making a virtue of 
product variety and increasing its efficiency in flexible production. 
The latter course offers a number of advantages from the perspective of the national 
economy: 
— it illustrates the gains that can be made through re-organisation on the shop floor. 
— it economises on capital. There has not been a major emphasis on introducing new 
automation. Investments in capital equipment have primarily been low cost 
incremental innovations designed to improve the functioning and flexibility of 
existing machinery rather than adding new equipment. 
— it has generated substantial opportunities for learning and indigenous technological 
adaptation. The company has developed significant toolmaking and machine building 
capabilities and is thus able to modify its capital equipment and in some cases even 
build its own machines. 
— this form of restructuring may generate significant possibilities for small firms. 
Gabriel has assisted in establishing small toolmaking firms on a subcontracting basis. 
This cluster of small finns are engaged mainly in modifying machinery to make it 
more flexible. This kind of expertise clearly has significant external benefits. 
— in an ideal situation, restructuring would enable productivity improvement to be 
immediately translated into higher total output with unchanged (or even increased) 
employment levels. This is why the process is always more difficult when markets are 
stagnating and little new investment is taking place. Under these circumstances it is 
difficult to generate worker support for these programmes — the more likely scenario 
being resigned compliance in the face of the alternative being even worse. At the 
broader industry level, therefore, account needs to be taken of the state of the overall 
economy in the timing of liberalisation measures which would tend to accelerate the 
process of plant level restructuring. Phase VI was introduced at the worst possible 
time in this respect. Attention also needs to be directed to the problem of encouraging 
new investment into the industry. 
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2. Restructuring at Atlantis Diesel Engines2 
Atlantis Diesel Engines (ADE) is a large state owned (Industrial Development 
Corporation, 87.5%; Mercedes Benz AG, 12.5%) producer of diesel engines and 
components. It was established as a strategic industry in 1981 to ensure that the country 
was self-sufficient in diesel engines as political isolation deepened. Its location in Atlantis, 
north of Cape Town (also for political reasons) is far from both supply networks and 
domestic markets although it does have the advantage of being close to a port. In many 
ways it encapsulates the problems of the South African component industry albeit in a 
more extreme form. From the start it has been highly protected, the priority being to 
establish productive capacity in a wide range of engines with cost being a lesser 
consideration. Thus the plant was designed with an annual capacity of 45 000 engines 
(two shifts) divided into two engine makes (Perkins and Mercedes Benz) and the 
capability to produce a wide model range. World scale diesel plants produce in excess of 
100 000 engines per year of one engine make with a smaller model range. 
Engine sales accounted for 68% of 1992 turnover of R440 million with the remainder 
consisting of parts and exported components. ADE's share of the domestic truck and 
tractor engine markets has fallen slightly but remains high (97% in the case of heavy truck 
engines). High market share results from the plant being established as a protected 
strategic industry to the extent of locally built engines virtually being required equipment3 
on heavy trucks and gaining large market share for tractors and medium sized trucks even 
though prices were well above international levels. The main problem has been severe 
recession in these markets and total engine sales have slumped from a high of 22 955 in 
1984 to an average of 10900 for the years 1990—1992. 
Heavy vehicle assemblers were initially opposed to fitting the ADE engine because of the 
cost impact and concerns over quality. ADE has, however, attained high quality levels and 
gained an Iso 9001 rating at its first attempt. Price premiums over imported engines were 
high during the 1980s, but prices have been reduced by approximately 20% in real terms 
over the period 199 1/92. 
Standardisation of a major component in a market characterised by a similar proliferation 
of assemblers as prevails in the assembly of passenger cars has two major advantages. 
Firstly, it makes domestic production potentially viable (if the demand for engines had 
been stronger, production costs would have been substantially lower). Secondly, because 
the majority of tractors, heavy and medium commercial vehicles in use in South Africa are 
now powered by ADE engines, standardisation has rationalised servicing and spare parts 
supply in Southern Mrica. 
2. This section draws on a series of interviews with management and shopstewards at ADE as well as media 
reports. 
3. When APE was established an excise duty of 30% was applied to trucks but was fully rebatable if ADE 
engines were fitted. Under Phase VI, an ADE engine is deemed to be 40% local content to which is 
added actual local content (65%) to give a local content 'value' of 105%. 
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2.1 Problems facing the firm 
Capacity utilisation 
The plant has never operated at full capacity and the underutilisation of capacity is the 
most serious problem facing ADE. In early 1993 the plant was operating at 50—60 percent 
capacity on one shift while ideally it should be operating two shifts with each running at 
70%. 
Product variety and economies of scale 
There are three major stages (casting, machining of components and assembly) in the 
production of engines, all of which are performed at ADE. There are large economies of 
scale in casting and machining and high rates of capacity utilisation are important in these 
capital intensive processes. In the foundry, the amortisation of tooling is the major factor 
impacting on economies of scale. For example, the tooling costs for a cylinder block are 
approximately R3m. The result is that at volumes of 5 000 units per annum, a truck engine 
cylinder block casting can be produced at a price of R3 10 while if volumes were to rise to 
30 000 the price could be reduced to R250 per unit. A typical European foundry would 
have a capacity four times larger than ADE and produce six major components (compared 
to 20 at ADE). 
Machining is a capital intensive process and at high volumes dedicated lines are quicker 
and cheaper. Increasing flexibility is usually limited to producing components from the 
same 'family' on one line. For example, a recently introduced flexible cylinder block line 
could produce a maximum of four different types of cylinder block all within the same 
'family'. Engine assembly is more labour intensive and lends itself to flexible working 
practices. Minimum efficient scale is therefore lower than in casting or machining and one 
plant can more easily handle a variety of products. 
2.2 Restructuring 
With a history of accumulated losses and the expectation of reduced protection under 
Phase VI, the company embarked on a major restructuring programme in late 1990. 
Cost cutting through retrenchment 
There have been drastic retrenchments in employment over the past few years and 
employment in early 1993 stood at 1700 compared to a peak of nearly 3 000 in 1989. 
Retrenchment has been across the board and the number of salaried staff has been reduced 
by 47% between late 1990 and early 1993 with further reductions planned. 
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Reducing supply costs 
Local content in ADE engines is around 60—65% by value. The company has in the past 
had to deal with two poor sources of supply, one in the form of overpriced CKD packs and 
the other being high priced domestic subcomponents, which were nevertheless 
competitive because of inflated import prices. ADE has managed to win substantial 
discounts from foreign suppliers of CKD packs in turn putting domestic subcomponent 
producers under pressure. 
Increasing capacity utilisation 
ADE has sought to increase capacity utilisation through exports and diversification into 
related fields. 
• Exports 
Exports outside of southern Africa have increased from R15.8 million in 1989/90 to 
R40 million in 1992/3 and this is seen to be a major growth area. In 1989/90 the only 
non-African destination was the UK but ADE is now also exporting to Germany, 
Brazil, France and Argentina, its strength being in fairly small volume, niche markets. 
In terms of its licensing agreements with MBAG and Perkins, ADE is constrained in 
export markets to a certain extent. For example, engines cannot be exported outside 
the Southern African Customs Union unless fitted to a vehicle or as part of a power 
pack etc. A company seeking to expand exports into the global networks of its 
licensor is at a disadvantage if the licensor holds only a small equity stake.4 It can 
mean that ADE becomes a 'saw tooth' supplier, restricted to supplying niches in the 
global networks at times of high demand with markets difficult to come by during 
recession as the licensor strives to make maximum use of its own capacity. 
• Diversification 
ADE has diversified into areas such as tractor assembly and diesel engines for power 
packs. It is also experimenting with diesel engines for minibus taxis. Diversification is 
seen as a future growth area but one obvious problem is that it adds to the already 
wide range of products being produced. 
Productivity 
The company is involved in a major drive to improve productivity through implementing 
lean production methods with enhanced flexibility the major objective. According to the 
technical director, "variety used to be a dirty word — we see it as an opportunity". 
4. One licensor (MBAG) holds only 12.5% of ADE while the other (Perkins) has no equity stake. 
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• Reducing the cost of quality 
Quality standards are high. The objective is to reduce the cost of achieving this by 
introducing operator self control and quality circles. One indication is the significant 
reduction in scrap levels that have been achieved. 
• Training 
Training emphasises multiskilling and a team approach. The number of grades has 
been sharply reduced and the ratio of indirect:direct workers has fallen from 1.6:1 to 
1.2:1 (still a high level). 
• Logistics 
ADE is trying to reduce work in progress and finished stock levels by 50% over the 
next couple of years from the currently high level of R40 million. 
23 Union responses 
The dominant experience of restructuring at ADE has been the drastic retrenchments that 
have occurred over the past few years. Unions have opposed these arguing for training and 
retraining and for sacrifices to be made at management levels as well. At the same time 
workers, recognise the serious structural problems that the company faces being far from 
its markets and suppliers and dependent on foreign technology. Workers are extremely 
concerned about the future of the company and are fully aware of the need to improve 
productivity in the face of increasing international competition. 
The need for improved work organisation is accepted and it is also recognised that positive 
measures have been introduced such as the reduction in wage grades from 11 to 5 which is 
currently being negotiated. But workers clearly see work reorganisation from a different 
perspective to management. It has to be established on a sound basis the main elements of 
which are: 
— genuine participation in the restructuring process by the workforce. It was strongly 
felt that there is a lack of consultation and a lack of information on the restructuring 
process, which because it involved workers being moved to new work areas and jobs 
had caused confusion and discontent on the shop floor. 
— a major emphasis on training and accreditation of operating skills not just formal 
certification. This is a major point of contention especially with regard to new forms 
of production organisation such as multiskilling. Multiskilling is supported as long as 
workers are recognised for new capabilities. For example, general operators (Grade 
DDD) now rotate to different assembly areas and also take greater responsibility for 
quality control but feel that they have not received recognition for these new skills. 
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— development of a proper career pathing system for all employees. Workers feel 
discriminated against on racial grounds as well as having limited opportunities to 
advance into salaried positions. 
— the principle that motivating shop floor workers in difficult times has to involve 
sacrifices across the board. 
— above all, workers emphasised the need to establish a relationship of trust with 
management. Although the company has stated that there will be no further 
retrenchment, talk of restructuring generates great concern. For quite valid reasons, 
workers have a strong perception that productivity improvement leads to retrenchment 
and this clearly impedes the introduction of productivity enhancing innovations in 
work organisation. 
2.4 Implications 
Atlantis Diesel Engines illustrates a number of the issues and problems being faced by 
other component producers who need to restructure in the face of increasing international 
competition: 
• Before Phase VI, the firm faced little competition and produced a high priced, 
uncompetitive product. 
• The company was established with the purpose of maximising local content and self 
sufficiency. It produces an excessive variety of products and the nature of its 
international linkages make the creation of large volumes through export difficult. 
• Standardisation has been a major plus factor but even where government has taken 
firm action to promote this as in the case of ADE, it is only a partial solution because 
the South African market is so small. The same limitations would apply if 
standardisation of car engines was introduced. 
• Productivity gains in the midst of severe recession are bound to lead to retrenchment. 
Under these circumstances, it will obviously not be possible to gain the support of the 
workforce who at best will reluctantly accept new forms of work organisation as 
being necessary to prevent a worse situation arising. 
• Having created the current structure of the industry, trends in government policy look 
set to undermine the gains of improved productivity and competitiveness that have 
been achieved at enormous cost in terms of retrenchment. These gains are being 
undermined by the entry of a wide range of foreign trucks (and engines) into the 
South African market. Most of these are coming in as SKD packs with only the most 
minor assembly being carried out locally. 
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All the above have implications for the component industry as a whole. They point to the 
need for policy to: 
— reduce protection gradually seeking to spur productivity gains but mindful of the 
capacity of firms to respond especially during recession. 
— gains can be made through standardisation and reducing numbers of models but this 
course of action offers only a partial solution. 
— South African component suppliers, characterised by low volume, highly variable 
production can improve productivity enormously by introducing innovations which 
improve flexibility. But the right 'environment' in terms of involvement by the 
workforce has to be created if these innovations are to be successful. 
3. Is South Africa a high cost location for assembly? 
— the case of BMW 
South Africa currently has many disadvantages as a site for the assembly of vehicles for 
export and locally produced vehicles are priced well above world market levels. 
Component supply is well below world standards and the country is also far from major 
international markets. Recent media reports that BMW plan to produce right hand drive 
vehicles at volumes of around 100 000 per annum for the world market have thus caused 
some surprise. Closer investigation has revealed that these figures are exaggerated but that 
small scale export (approximately 4 000 vehicles) will begin in 1994 and exports of 
50 000 vehicles per annum by the end of the decade is seen to be a realistic target. The 
objective is to specialise in one or two models in the South African plant, thereby 
obtaining economies of scale and bringing down unit costs.5 
3.1 Why a South African location may suit BMW. 
BMW's global strategy 
BMW AG is a highly successful specialist producer of motor vehicles. In 1991, it 
achieved record sales of 550 000 cars worldwide almost all of which were produced in 
Germany. Its only other plant until very recently has been the small South African 
assembly operation which produced less than 16 000 vehicles in 1992. When the 
international economy revives the company will need new capacity and is building a small 
plant in the US with a capacity of 70 000 per year. Further capacity is unlikely to be 
installed in Germany which is regarded as a high cost location. The possibility is, 
therefore, for South Africa to be developed as a much more significant part of its 
expanding global production network. 
5. Much of the information in this section is drawn from an interview with Erich Papke, Corporate planning 
manager, BMW(SA). 
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BMW currently services its international markets from its production base in Germany. 
Outside of Europe its main markets are the US and Japan. The South African market itself 
is not insignificant. In 1992, South Africa was the seventh largest market for BMWs world 
wide and the company attained a higher market share (8.6%) than in any other country, 
including Germany. 
Labour and other costs 
Germany has become a high cost location for automobile production. Its wage costs 
(including social security payments) are the highest in the world. BMW have calculated 
that if wages, social security payments, length of the working week and length of holidays 
and sick leave are taken into account, the cost of labour in Germany is DM64/hour 
compared to DM9/hour in South Africa. Even with considerably lower productivity, South 
Africa is still potentially highly competitive (see Table 4.3) and labour costs in assembly 
amount to only 2—3% of full manufacturing cost compared to 6—8% in Germany. The 
differential in labour hours to produce a vehicle is expected to narrow with productivity in 
the South African plant reaching 90% of the German level in the next few years as a result 
of new capital expenditure, training and increased volumes. Lower levels of automation 
especially in the body shop will account for the remaining differential. The productivity of 
capital is much higher in South Africa because of lower levels of expensive automation. 
Table 4.3 
Comparative labour costs in BMW assembly plants 
German plant SA plant 
Hourly compensation cost DM64 DM9 
Direct labour brs/vehicle 29.1 46.6 
Labour costlvehicle DM1862 DM419 
SA plant labour cost advantage DM1443 
Source: Data supplied by BMW 
Overhead costs such as infrastructure, staffing and management costs are also 
considerably lower in South Africa which has the advantage of low energy costs and less 
stringent environmental regulations. 
An existing facility 
The existing assembly facility gives South Africa a major advantage over other locations. 
BMW say that in South Africa they "have the swimming pool even if it does not have any 
water in it". The basic plant (which has a replacement value of R600m), management 
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structure and a trained workforce is in place and would be extremely expensive to create 
in another new location. 
Raw material advantage 
The fact that South Africa is a major producer of many of the raw materials such as steel 
and aluminium used for cannaking is seen as a further potential area of strength although 
current pricing policies impose a disadvantage on users of these materials. 
Component supply 
Component supply represents the major problem for using South Africa as a production 
base. BMW would require free importation of components and initially local content 
would be lower (1/3 of material use) than current levels. They have grouped existing 
component suppliers into three roughly equal categories. Group A comprises those which 
are already economically viable. These include components which are already exported to 
BMW in Germany such as automotive leather, radiators and aluminium wheels. The 
leather plant which exports on a JIT basis to Europe has been rated as the third best out of 
900 suppliers to the German plant. Areas of competitive strength include more labour 
intensive and raw material intensive items and, interestingly, certain highly sophisticated 
components such as electronic control units where advanced R&D capabilities have been 
acquired by domestic firms such as Altech partly through involvement in the defence 
industry. 
Category B comprises a group of component suppliers which would be economically 
viable if certain structural problems were addressed. These structural problems include 
raw material prices, the constraints imposed by short production runs and the need for 
increased international competition which would force firms to improve quality, delivery 
and other standards as well as reduce their profit margins. Group C comprise component 
firms with little scope to become internationally competitive. Many are restricted by 
licence agreements and large royalty payments of approximately five percent of the sales 
price and have little scope to build up volumes to become internationally competitive. 
These include many of the more sophisticated and major components. 
One third of components currently used are in category A or can easily reach this level. 
BMW estimate that this could almost double within 3 to 4 years. 
3.2 Significance 
Plans to more than double production volumes are, in themselves, significant but would 
also boost the component industry. Local content would be at much lower levels initially 
but such a scheme offers major advantages to sections of the domestic components 
industry. Components produced for BMWs assembled in South Africa for export could 
also be exported to the German assembly plants. Thus this opens up significant 
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opportunities for large scale production in an expanding range of components subject, of 
course, to exacting performance and quality standards. The same problems such as high 
labour costs that impact on German assemblers affect component suppliers6 and BMW, 
along with other German firms, expect that sourcing from outside Germany will increase 
over the next several years. If this project goes ahead successfully it could have a 
substantial demonstration effect on the rest of the industry by illustrating that South Africa 
can be a viable location for automotive manufacture thereby encouraging investment in 
world scale plant. 
Potential problems with the above scenario 
There are, of course, question marks over whether BMW will need additional capacity 
even when the recession ends. The American plant will add to worldwide capacity from 
1994. Also BMW AG, which has been very successful over the last decade (car sales rose 
each year from 1982 to 1991), will face increasing competitive pressure in its core 
European market from Japanese luxury cars such as the Lexus and Infiniti. So the use 
made of the South African plant will depend not only on the efficiency of the plant and its 
domestic supplier network but on international trading conditions. 
Greater integration into the global industry carries certain risks for the branch plant 
location. With its role and strategy determined by the foreign parent, it could face the 
prospect of being a 'saw tooth' supplier with capacity being used in periods of peak 
demand and falling sharply during downturns to maintain capacity utilisation in the more 
automated home country plants. 
Some traditional component suppliers (those in category C) would lose heavily under this 
strategy because BMW would require free access to imported components at least for the 
exported vehicles. Import content in these vehicles would initially be high. Many 
traditional suppliers would not be able to achieve the world class standards in terms of 
quality and price that would be required under this scenario. However, the macro impact 
on the component sector would be positive in terms of total output generated. 
6. BMW AG's expenditure on materials as a percentage of the total value of production has increased 
steadily from 53.3% in 1982 to 61.3% in 1991 (Annual Report, 1991). 
Chapter Five: Which way forward for the South 
African motor industry? 
The central objective of this study has been to develop a broad policy programme for the 
future development of the automotive industry.1 This chapter begins with a broad 
statement of objectives and a discussion of the overarching areas of strength in South 
Africa's industrial economy and then moves to a more focused discussion of potential 
growth paths for the industry and the principles on which trade policies, rationalisation 
measures etc. need to be based. For the most part a detailed elaboration of a specific policy 
programme (such as precise levels of protection) is avoided. 
Past policy has suffered from a number of defects: 
• The main instrument of policy has been the high rates of protection on built up 
vehicles and a series of local content requirements supplemented (under Phase VI) by 
a form of foreign exchange balancing. There has been little attempt to go beyond 
protection and export incentives and develop a set of enabling policies aimed at 
upgrading the capabilities of the industry. Partly as a result of excessive protection the 
industry has not kept up with global developments in areas such as organisational 
change and automation. 
• The trade regime itself has lacked long term direction and has been subject to frequent 
changes. Companies in the auto industry need a coherent set of rules which provide 
long term direction in order to facilitate planning. 
• Protection has been indiscriminate. For example, it is predictable that high rates of 
protection on CBUs will attract a proliferation of manufacturers content to establish 
small scale assembly plants. If protection was to be applied, policy should have gone 
a step further and restricted new entrants into the industry and perhaps introduced 
other rules to prevent excessive proliferation. 
• The change of direction under Phase VI, while introducing important improvements, 
has taken little account of the capacity of the component sector to adapt to rapid 
change. Before the fragmented industry is exposed to a sudden reduction in protection 
it needed to be given an opportunity to specialise and expand volumes in order to be 
able to better cope with global integration. 
1. This chapter draws on discussions with Alec Erwin, formerly NUMSA education officer, in his capacity 
as chairperson of the Research Committee of the MITG Long Term Working Group. The important 
related questions of environmental and transportation policy are not discussed here. Some brief 
comments are contained in Appendix 4. 
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• High rates of protection have until now been maintained on CBUs and this has 
encouraged greater proliferation. It is, however, essential that steps are taken to 
encourage rationalisation in the assembly industry before protection is significantly 
reduced. 
1. Statement of objectives and long term strategic 
considerations 
The starting point has to be a conception of what the automotive industry should look like 
in 10 or 20 years time. Objectives have to be set and a very clear decision has to be taken 
that the industry has a long term future and is worth developing. To date the industry has 
imposed large costs on the economy. Localisation has taken place onLy behind the 
protective wall created by local content requirements, resulting in consumers paying high 
prices for new vehicles. Exports have been highly subsidised. So one possibility would be 
trade liberalisation leading to an industry with very little, if any, assembly activity and, at 
best, a few specialised component suppliers which are heavily integrated into global 
markets. 
The discussion in this chapter makes a starting assumption that the industry must be 
developed and indeed has considerable potential. We argue that it is quite possible to 
realistically envisage by the year 2005 a large and dynamic industry which is: 
— supplying affordable vehicles to a substantial and growing domestic market and also 
exporting vehicles and components on a significant scale to an emerging African 
market as well as to other countries. 
— generating an expansion in quality employment as well as small business 
opportunities in the production of subcomponents. 
— operating close to the international cutting edge of technological development and 
having developed significant technological capability in certain areas of product and 
process technology. 
— characterised by world class production organisation. 
— characterised by very high local content in some vehicles although much lower in 
others. More importantly, although imports will have expanded rapidly, the rapid 
growth in exports will mean that the industry has come close to achieving a balance in 
trade. 
— attracting significant new domestic and foreign investment. Some South African 
components firms will have emerged as world class producers with significant R&D 
capability and be exporting to OEMs worldwide. 
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2. Our long term competitive advantage 
The starting point for a policy oriented analysis of the restructuring that is required to 
achieve the above scenario is an identification of some of the basic, underlying sources of 
growth and potential competitive advantage. In deliberations on competitive advantage 
and the determination of long term policies, it would appear logical that these factors 
should carry at least as much weight as current car making capabilites. After all, if Korea 
had determined its shipbuilding policy on the basis of its capabilities at that time, it would 
never have become the world's biggest shipbuilding nation for the simple reason that at 
the time the decision was taken to develop this sector, Korea had no shipbuilding industry! 
2.1 The domestic market 
The industry is located in an economy characterised by low growth, fairly low average 
incomes and a very unequal income distribution. As a result, not only is the market static 
but market penetration in the sense of vehicles per head of population is low (see Table 
1.1). The potential market measured by population is, however, very large and could grow 
quickly. This is especially the case if the regional market is included. 
In determining long term policy direction, this fundamental fact must be taken into 
consideration. Our starting point is, for example, very different to that of Australia which 
has been through an extensive restructuring exercise since 1985. Australia is a developed 
country with a high average income and relatively egalitarian income distribution but a 
relatively small population. In 1990, there were 1.7 persons per vehicle in Australia 
(compared to 7 persons per vehicle in South Africa). Future growth prospects in Australia 
will be primarily limited to replacement demand and furthermore, the growth prospects in 
such an economy probably lie in the more advanced areas of manufacturing and in the 
service sector. These factors place certain constraints on the expansion possibilities of the 
Australian industry. 
Demand for vehicles is very income elastic and South Africa faces a different set of 
opportunities and constraints resulting from its low average per capita income and the 
prospect of redistribution over the next decade. This is illustrated conceptually in Figure 
5.1. Average per capita income currently stands at $2700 well below the $4000 level 
which, according to some studies,2 is the threshold for car buying. It is clear from Figure 
5.1 (diagram i) that as incomes rise, the percentage of the population with incomes above 
the $4000 threshold rises far more rapidly. This is what is currently happening in some of 
the rapidly growing East Asian countries such as Malaysia which are experiencing rapid 
growth in demand for new vehicles.3 
2. See 'Chinese consumers: next in line', Economist, 23 January 1993. 
3. Average per capita incomes in Malaysia rose by 40% between 1987 and 1991; car sales by 290%. 
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Figure 5.1 








Note: The normal distributions in the diagrams above are purely for illustrative 
purposes and are not meant to represent actual income distribution in South 
Africa. 
SITUATION AT CURRENT PER CAPITA AVERAGE INCOMES ($2700) 
Redistxibution at same per 
Capita Average Income level 
A 
$2700 $4000 INCOME FEE HEAD 
SITUATION AS AVERAGE INCOMES RISE TO $3500 UNDER 
THE TWO DISTRIBUTION SCENARIOS 
A 
$2700 $3500 $4000 
INCOME PER HEAD 
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Redistribution at current average income levels would probably depress demand for new 
vehicles as illustrated by the current income distribution curve (A) lying above the 
redistribution curve (B) at the $4000 level in diagram (i). However, if incomes rise and 
redistribution takes place one will soon reach the point where the growth in new buyers 
(though not yet the total car market) is higher under the redistribution scenario curve (B) 
in diagram (ii). This occurs at point Z, the point at which more people are moving into the 
$4000 threshold under the redistribution scenario (B) than under the existing income 
distribution (A). 
To summarise, therefore: 
— if growth occurs, the car market will expand very rapidly (at a rate well above the 
overall growth rate) given our current level of per capita income. 
— redistribution at current levels of real per capita income would probably depress 
vehicle demand. 
— redistribution with growing incomes will soon lead to very rapid growth of new 
buyers of basic vehicles (as one moves towards a mass market situation). 
The implications of growth accompanied by redistribution occurring are that: 
— growth would be fastest at the lower end pointing to a need for cheap, basic vehicles. 
— it must be remembered that in the current situation (existing local content levels), a 
growing market will lead to massive growth in imports and balance of payments 
problems. 
— one therefore must avoid policies which artificially pump up domestic demand. 
Successful Asian producers such as Japan and Korea used heavy taxes on cars in the 
domestic market and export subsidies in the early stage of development. 
— it is therefore absolutely essential that the industry be expanded in terms of local 
content but also export capabilities. 
2.2 The advantages of being an intermediate economy 
The major centres of automotive production worldwide are in the rich advanced countries 
— Europe (especially Germany), the United States and Japan. We demonstrated in Chapter 
One that important shifts are taking place with producer countries such as Germany 
coming under competitive pressure. With the strong yen, even Japanese made vehicles are 
finding it more difficult to compete internationally. The most rapidly growing industries 
are in certain middle income countries and this trend is likely to become more evident for 
three reasons: 
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— their markets are growing rapidly. 
— they have the potential to make cars at productivity levels which approach world best 
practice. 
— wage rates and some overhead costs are lower. 
An intermediate economy faces major challenges in world markets. However, unlike 
underdeveloped economies, it has the technological, industrial and human resource 
capacity to enter world automotive markets for vehicles and for a wide range of 
components. South Africa is a middle income country. In this important respect it has the 
potential to take advantage of emerging opportunities. 
2.3 Natural resources 
South Africa has an abundance of the major materials such as steel and aluminium used in 
automotive production. Currently this is a disadvantage rather than an advantage because 
of domestic pricing policies where products such as steel are exported at lower prices than 
they are available on the domestic market. With the construction of the new Alusaf 
smelter, there will also now be a larger capacity in aluminium, which due to its weight 
advantage and recyclability is expanding rapidly as a material in automotive manufacture. 
Ways need to be found of reducing costs to domestic consumers to the extent that this 
becomes a source of advantage over international competitors. 
2.4 Infrastructure 
As is clear from international trends, effective infrastructure is vital to lean production 
techniques and market competitiveness. South Africa's highly developed but underutilised 
infrastructure is a major area of potential competitive strength. The comparison with the 
East Asian NICs is relevant. Rapid growth in countries like Taiwan has stretched their 
physical infrastructure beyond the limit to the extent that traffic congestion is the major 
constraint on a more developed JIT system, and power rationing takes place at peak times. 
2.5 Human resources 
South Africa has a long history of automotive production and considerable capabilities 
have been established at operator, artisan, technical and managerial levels. Although there 
are substantial deficiencies and backlogs in certain skill categories and levels of training, 
overall human resource capabilities exceed those of recent new entrant countries. On the 
other hand, in spite of the extremely wide differentials between operator and managerial 
salary levels that prevail in South Africa, the cost of all categories of personnel (including 
management) is significantly lower than is the case in the advanced country industries. 
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2.6 Tripartite policy making 
As we enter a new democratic phase, tripartite and multilateral forums are emerging to 
deal with key restructuring issues. If a new strategic direction for the industry is developed 
in such a forum, it will enjoy wide support and is therefore likely to be more stable. The 
potential exists therefore, not only for more stable industrial relations but for organised 
labour becoming a major proponent of the transformation of the industrial structure. 
2.7 Current areas of competitive strength 
The boom in exports since the implementation of Phase VI has shown that the industry is 
highly responsive to incentives and can react dynamically to export opportunities. Exports 
include a wide range of components as well as CBUs. This makes categorisation difficult 
but a number of areas of competitive strength can be determined. 
Niche market capabilities 
Most South African component firms produce a wide range of components in low volume. 
This makes it difficult for them to compete agalnst high volume producers but their 
flexibility gives them a strong edge in niche markets. One important niche market is the 
foreign aftermarket where there is a substantial demand for a wide variety of replacement 
parts, frequently of older models. This is also a market where many of the new entrant 
Asian producers are not particularly strong as they are generally geared for high volume 
production. 
Raw material based mid to low tech products 
Many of our exports fall into this category. They include catalytic converters, steel and 
alloy wheels, castings etc. Many of these are products where the raw material component 
and/or energy cost is a significant percentage of total cost and where producers are not 
excessively constralned by technology licensing agreements. The potential in this area is 
currently limited by the inflated prices component producers have to pay for raw materials 
Certain types of sophisticated components 
South Africa has capabilities in a small range of high tech components. These include 
electronic control units produced by domestic firms using capabilities developed in the 
annaments industry. Another area is tooling equipment where there are a number of highly 
competitive domestic firms. Both Anglo American and Eskom have developed advanced 
batteries which have potential as power units for electric cars. 
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2.8 Future areas of competitive strength 
All the above areas can be developed and extended and with appropriate policy, new areas 
of competitive slrength could emerge. 
• Flexible Japanese style production methods have huge potential for raising both 
capital and labour productivity in the niche market area. Because production is so 
varied in most South African plants the productivity gains from improved efficiencies 
in flexible manufacturing are almost certainly greater than would be possible in high 
volume, dedicated plants. 
• World scale investments and attention to the raw material cost problem as well as 
increased capacity in the production of low cost aluminium will improve 
competitiveness in the mid to lowtech product category. 
• It is difficult to forecast future areas of strength in sophisticated components but they 
would be major beneficiaries of new investment into the industry and a generalised 
increase in R&D. 
• There is also scope for gaining future competitive advantage in assembly which is 
generally more labour intensive than components production. Assembly is currently 
inefficient, the main problems being low volumes (and low capacity utilisation), poor 
component supply, very low levels of automation and outdated working practices. 
There is considerable capacity for productivity increases in all these areas. 
• One of the weakest areas currently is in major components for which high volumes 
plus technological sophistication is important. Larger volumes and growing 
indigenous R&D capacity is the key to expansion in this area. 
3. The growth model 
The South African industry is locked into a vicious circle. The domestic market is 
stagnating and the production structure is highly fragmented with output levels well below 
minimum efficient scale. As a result the industry is uncompetitive internationally and high 
costs have put cars increasingly beyond the reach of local consumers. These factors also 
make it unattractive as a site for new investment. To add to these problems, the industry is 
faced with a number of serious weaknesses. It is far from major markets, skill levels are 
limited, the components sector is fragmented and non-competitive and labour relations 
highly adversarial. The result is that South Africa has become increasingly marginalised as 
a centre for production. 
Is a re-entry strategy possible? Some potential growth paths are discussed below.4 
4. This categorisation draws on Womack (1989). 
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31 Rapid liberalisation 
This strategy would involve: 
— elimination of local content requirements 
— elimination (or substantial reduction) of tariffs on imports of fully built up vehicles 
The motive for rapid liberalisation is that it would lead to lower costs in the domestic 
market and theoretically by reducing component costs could attract investment in world 
scale assembly plants which would in turn provide a market for increased production of 
components also at world scale. However, there would be severe adjustment problems and 
it is by no means certain that a successful industry would emerge at the end of this 
process. It is more likely that the chain of events would be similar to what occurred in 
Argentina where rapid liberalisation was followed by the virtual collapse of the motor 
industry as imports flooded into the market. This in turn was a factor leading to balance of 
payments problems and the re-imposition of protection (Cardozo, 1989). This strategy has 
little to recommend it. Even the argument that consumers would have access to cheap 
(imported) cars is exaggerated as the balance of payments problems resulting from the 
flood of imports could lead to devaluation (and higher prices). 
3.2 The promotion of further import substitution 
Elements could include: 
— higher local content requirements 
— government action to reduce the number of producers and limit proliferation of 
models 
— state supported 'people's car' initiative 
— state supported plan to boost local demand 
The people's car option would consist of a cheap, basic car appropriate for Southern 
African conditions which would have a very high level of local content. It could consist of 
a local design (probably with a foreign partner) or a rehabilitated existing model. Mexico 
has adopted this strategy with some success in the form of a \'W Beetle with no frills and 
only one windscreen wiper! This car has been a leading seller and has a very high level of 
local content. Malaysia has developed the Proton which ran into problems of incomes 
rising too fast and consumers wanting something more sophisticated. ' 
5. It has, however, had some success as a low cost car in the European market. 
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Less ambitious policies in this vein include measures to reduce the number of models 
being produced domestically, skipping models, commomsation of components and local 
adaptations. All these can reduce costs, increase economies of scale and at the same time 
provide scope for higher local design content. Taiwan, which also has an overcrowded 
assembly industry has recently initiated a 'common engine' programme whereby local 
manufacturers and government agencies will cooperate to develop three standard auto 
engines. It is estimated that this will cut production costs by as much as 30%. South Africa 
already has experience of commonisation of engine production in the case of diesel 
engines for heavy vehicles produced by Atlantis Diesel Engines. 
These types of strategies have the advantage of potentially achieving higher volumes and 
lower costs through standardisation. This in turn could allow for higher levels of local 
content including full manufacture of sophisticated components with important technology 
spin-offs. 
There are also potential benefits arising out of a more rational structure. For example, a 
common engine programme can lead to cheaper parts and servicing. These strategies have 
the support of some component producers. 
However, there are also a number of disadvantages: 
• Such a programme could raise costs at least initially. 
• The more extreme options such as a 'people's car' would probably require initial 
subsidisation which is difficult to justify given that even a basic vehicle would not be 
affordable to low income earners. 
• Strategies which seek to stimulate the industry through artificially boosting domestic 
demand (through tax benefits, for example) are generally inappropriate in a middle 
income country because of their negative macroeconomic implications (greater 
imports of components, loss to the fiscus) and regressive impact on income 
distribution (subsidy to relatively affluent car buyers). 
• The assemblers are generally opposed to significant standardisation of components 
and would need to be pressured into accepting this. 
• To gain significant benefits through economies of scale in South Mrica' s small 
market, would require drastic rationalisation including assembly plant closures. This 
would result in limited choice and competition in the domestic market and pressure 
for imports. 
• Standardisation and the skipping of models would lead to divergence from 
international model introductions and world levels of technology. This can make 
exports even more difficult as has been the case in Brazil. 
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3.3 Guided integration into the world market 
The objective of this strategy is to encourage specialisation and investment in world scale 
component manufacture and assembly. Success will depend in large measure on the costs 
of the adjustment process. 
The strategy assumes a reduction in the number of local assemblers and in the number of 
models being locally produced. A few component firms would become international 
players with significant R&D capability supplying OEMs all over the world. Exports and 
imports would become much more significant. 
An example of this strategy has been the Australian automotive plan (for further detail see 
Chapter One, section 2.3) which has received much attention in the South African policy 
debate and at the end of 1993 was the framework around which the new South African 
strategy was being developed by the MITG. It is generally regarded as having been 
successful in the Australian context by reducing the price of cars and making the industry 
more competitive and sustainable. At the same time, however, employment has fallen 
sharply and imports of vehicles have risen to nearly 50% of the total market. While the 
strategy has much merit, it requires considerable modification in the South African 
context. Australia is a mature economy with high rates of car ownership. Car production is 
unlikely to be a major growth area as the economy becomes increasingly service oriented. 
South Africa's position is very different With a population that will be close to 50 million 
by the year 2000, low rates of car ownership and a potentially large regional market, it 
needs to position itself to become a significant producer in the first decade of the 21St 
century. This means that in the short term, less priority should be placed on bringing 
prices down to international levels if the cost is massive import penetration. Equally the 
scope for expanded production both for the domestic market and export means that it 
would be inappropriate to attempt to reduce the number of models and plants to the extent 
that has occurred in Australia. 
The most successful developing country example of a guided integration strategy is 
probably Mexico, whose industry is already highly integrated into that of the US and will 
become more so under the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
This strategy would require more developed linkages with the world market and, in 
particular, a greater commitment by MNCs and domestic firms to upgrade their 
investments. The difficulty would be to encourage investment especially in world scale 
assembly because of the lack of obviously apparent markets. 
It would be necessary to gradually reduce protection for fully built up vehicles coupled 
with some form of foreign exchange balancing arrangement to encourage investment in 
local capacity. 
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Advantages of guided integration 
Integration into the world market and export expansion is important in order to: 
— specialise production thus raising volumes and generating economies of scale. This 
would make more efficient use of scarce investment resources, for instance by 
allowing tooling costs to be amortised over a larger number of units of output. 
— generate rapid learning and technological improvements. 
— create pressure to upgrade quality and production efficiency in accordance with 
international best practice. 
— at the macro level this strategy can reduce net imports in the auto industry. 
If the above occur they can create a virtuous circle of expansion, productivity 
improvement and new investment. 
Disadvantages of guided integration 
• The industry could become specialised in only a few minor components (a peripheral 
producer). There would be a need to retain domestic capacity with some form of forex 
balancing, limitations on CBU imports etc. 
• There are many potential casualties to this approach such as component firms who 
cannot generate higher volumes through exports for various reasons (eg. licence 
restrictions, lack of access to overseas networks). Therefore, there is a need to 
maintain some protection for the local component sector in the short to medium term. 
It is also necessary for government to facilitate the process, for instance, by measures 
to reduce the model range which would lead to higher volumes in locally produced 
models. 
• A rapid increase in imported CBUs may reduce the market for local assemblers to the 
extent that local assembly and component volumes don't really increase. This may 
require limiting the import of CBUs. 
• The pace of expansion could be vulnerable to the decisions of foreign firms as to the 
extent to which they choose to integrate South African production into their global 
sourcing networks. Many South African firms could become 'saw tooth' suppliers 
which are used to supplement the output of the automated parent plant during periods 
of high demand. Thus the industry may fail to attract foreign or domestic investment. 
To some extent this is what has happened under Phase VI partly as a result of a 
generalised lack of investment. This points to the need for liberalisation measures to 
be cognisant of the prevailing investment environment as well as the importance of 
measures (such as support for R&D) to upgrade supply side capabilities. 
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Both guided integration and import substitution have advantages and disadvantages. 
Policy obviously needs to maximise the advantages and minimise disadvantages. The 
appropriate policy would be one which aims at guided integration into the world economy 
but includes a measure of selective import substitution through measures which encourage 
the commomsation of certain components. 
4. Specific areas for policy reform 
As we have indicated above, South Africa, in terms of its level of development, its 
existing capabilities and resources and the potential of its domestic and regional markets is 
potentially extremely well placed to emerge as a significant vehicle producer within the 
next decade. This will depend on the introduction of appropriate policies underpinned by a 
set of 'enabling mechanisms' to upgrade productivity and encourage new investment. 
4.1 Creating appropriate incentives — the trade regime 
• While trade policy is an important part of the overall growth model, it should be 
recognised that a fault with past policy has been an over reliance on the trade regime 
(in the form of indiscriminate protection followed by rapid liberalisation of imported 
components) as an instrument of policy. For any trade regime to be successful, it is 
necessary that it is complemented by policies designed to create an efficient industrial 
structure and upgrade supply side capabilities. 
• Policy must set clear long term objectives and substantive changes to policy should be 
avoided once the policy is in place. 
• If liberalisation is to be pursued, the objectives need to be clear. For example, if a 
priority objective is low prices in the domestic market, the approach to liberalisation 
will be different to an approach which is concerned with the longer term development 
of the industry. In South Africa, the latter is the prime objective with affordability a 
means to this end. Thus the objectives of (gradual) liberalisation should be to: 
— put pressure on industry to upgrade 
— reduce input costs both into assembly and into components production so that 
exports can compete 
— encourage specialisation to attain higher volumes and economies of scale 
• Liberalisation should be premised on equal pain for assemblers and component 
producers. Under Phase VI the success of exports has meant that component 
producers have borne the brunt of liberalisation. Effective rates of protection on 
CBUs have increased encouraging further proliferation and increased variety in 
component requirements. 
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• Trade policy should focus on providing some ongoing protection for the domestic 
market (but at a gradually reducing rate). 
• Structural changes and encouragement of exports must happen before the domestic 
market is liberalised as far as is possible. 
• In any programme of trade liberalisation, cognisance needs to be taken of factors 
impinging on investor confidence. In a climate of political uncertainty and resulting 
lack of investment as currently prevails in South Africa, the supply response to new 
opportunities opened up by liberalisation is going to very limited. Great caution must 
be exercised in reducing trade barriers. Phase VI was particularly badly timed in this 
respect. 
• However a phasing down of tariffs on CBUs should begin immediately with a 
reduction to a rate of 60% over five years a reasonable target. Small volumes of CBU 
imports should be allowed but may need to be limited to say 10% of the domestic 
market with special additional allowances for assemblers exporting in high volume. 
4.2 Establishing an efficient structure — rationalisation of the industry 
As has been discussed in the main body of this report, the structure of the industry in terms 
of the proliferation of models and makes in the small domestic market raises costs in 
assembly and especially in component production. This is a direct result of heavy 
protection on CBUs and the failure to limit the entry of assemblers into the market. 
But policy needs to take account of existing capabilities. For instance a programme which 
aims at developing rationalised world class component suppliers such as have emerged in 
Australia, may be inappropriate for South Africa given that many local component 
suppliers have developed low volume capabilities as a competitive strength and this is 
potentially skill — as well as labour-intensive. 
The problem of proliferation should be dealt with by a combination of the following four 
strategies: 
A reduction of models and makes being produced in South Africa to be 
achieved by: 
— a prohibition on new assembly plants being established by new companies coming 
into the market. The exception would be if the intention was to establish a world class 
plant which would need to be exporting on a large scale. New manufacturers entering 
the market would therefore be required to export over half their production within say 
three years 
— a prohibition on new makes being introduced into the market by existing assemblers 
unless the above condition is met. 
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— reduced protection for CBUs subject to the limits on the number of imports (eg. not to 
exceed 10% of the market initially). 
— the introduction of a system of penalties and incentives to encourage volume 
production and a reduction in the number of models being assembled domestically. 
One possibility would be to make part of the excise duty currently payable under 
Phase VI dependent on the number of models produced. The objective would be to 
reduce the number of models being assembled domestically by at least a third over 5 
years. 
However, the rationalisation process outlined above should be pursued more gradually 
than was the case in Australia and would have somewhat different objectives for the 
following reasons: 
— the need to take account of market growth (it may be possible to some extent for 
the overly fragmented industry to 'grow into' an expanding market thereby 
realising larger volumes and limiting major closures). 
— the need to avoid the prospect of market niches vacated by local producers being 
taken up by large scale imports as has happened in Australia. 
— the obvious socio-economic and political difficulties of forcing plant closures. 
Assembly plant closures may occur but should not be a requirement as was the 
case in Australia. 
This course of action would result in a reduced choice of domestically produced vehicles 
in the domestic market and also in less competition, although to some extent this would be 
countered by a small increase in imports. If limited competition led to excessive collusion 
and overpricing it may nevertheless be necessary to impose ceilings on car prices through 
limiting the premium which may be charged over international prices. This would be 
justified on the basis that new entrants are being restricted in an effort to generate higher 
volumes. 
Standardisation 
Ways need to be sought to encourage standardisation of components. This could involve 
major or minor components and would be one way in which to encourage local production 
of major components such as gearboxes. The problem is that standardisation is generally 
opposed by the assemblers. It would, therefore, require government action in the form of 
incentives/penalties. 
Specialisation and the expansion of exports 
One obvious route to higher volumes is through expanding exports. This could take 
various forms and can be encouraged by some form of foreign exchange balancing 
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requirement. Phase VI has already signalled a shift in this direction in the sense that it has 
encouraged component exports which in turn has allowed assemblers to reduce local 
content in certain models. The main problem has been that the way it was structured has 
led to an increase rather than a reduction in the number of makes makes and models being 
locally assembled. 
Greater flexibility in South African firms 
Rationalisation as outlined above will go some way to reducing the negative impact on 
production costs resulting from proliferation but is only a partial solution because average 
volumes will remain fairly small. South African firms need to make a virtue out of what 
most currently perceive to be a problem and improve efficiencies and flexibility in low 
volume, high variety production. There is substantial domestic and international evidence 
to indicate that large gains can be made in this direction. Many have already developed 
significant capability in low volume niche market type production and as new methods of 
work organisation are introduced, there is great scope for productivity improvement 
without massively raising volumes. 
4.3 Enhancing capabilities 
Any programme of restructuring which is based in part on greater integration into the 
world market carries risks as well as opportunities. It is absolutely essential for the success 
of such programmes, that there is a positive supply response by the industry as a whole. 
For example, if a programme of import liberalisation aimed at reducing input costs does 
not lead to greater exports, it is bound to fail. It is important that firms are able to upgrade 
themselves to enter export markets. There is, therefore, an important role for 'enabling 
policies' which encourage this upgrading process. These are important in five areas: 
Technology 
There are a number of weaknesses in the technological capacity of the industry and the 
mechanisms by which it is transferred from foreign firms. 
• Overall spending on R&D is low especially when compared to the East Asian new 
entrants such as Taiwan. 
• There is an excessive dependence on foreign licensors. This is both costly in terms of 
royalties paid and restrictive especially of exports. 
• Links to governmental and other research institutions such as the CSIR are poorly 
developed in most cases. 
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These all require action in the form of: 
— incentives for R&D spending. 
— closer supervision of licensing agreements and perhaps state involvement to secure 
more favourable terms which should preferably include a training commitment by the 
licensor. 
— a closer integration of governmental and other research institutions with industry 
through directing funding towards applied commercial applications. 
Training 
The current lack of trained person-power in the industry is a weakness but is not an 
overriding constraint. Problems include: 
— poor levels of school education leading to low levels of literacy and numeracy 
— a poorly structured system of overall industrial training. It is excessively rigid in terms 
of demarcating artisanal categories and does not give full accreditation to people with 
existing skills. 
These problems need to be addressed across the educational and training system as a 
whole. 
• In the automotive industry, there are probably sufficient training facilities within 
companies and the public sector except in specialised areas such as robotics. 
• The availability of qualified trainers is also not a binding constraint. 
• Initiatives in the sphere of training need to be centred around improved access to 
training and creating broad areas of industrial competence rather than narrowly 
defined areas of skill. 
Work organisation 
Most studies of shifts in competitiveness in the international auto industry cite work 
organisation as the cutting edge of competitive advantage. Thus 'lean production' defined 
broadly to include not only production but also linkages to suppliers as well as the 
distribution system is widely seen to be the major reason for the competitive success of 
Japanese auto firms. While South African management are generally fully aware of the 
potential of lean production, attempts to implement it have frequently been on a piecemeal 
basis and lacked support of the workforce. 
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Implementation of these initiatives needs to take account of problems which are especially 
acute on the shop floor of the average South African auto plant and which are primary 
obstacles to a fuller mobilisation of the experience and capabilities of production workers 
in achieving productivity improvements. These are the hierarchical employment structure 
of South African firms with large pay differentials between management and production 
workers and between different skill grades which are accentuated by racial divisions and 
continuing discriminatory practices. Japanese style innovations which do not address these 
issues are likely to be partially successful at best. 
NUMSA has been pro-active in introducing work organisation, training and grading as 
central issues for collective bargaining. A framework which links work organisation to 
issues of training, grading and wage levels provides a sounder basis for implementing lean 
production than the piecemeal Introduction of Japanese style innovations. 
The IMVP is currently engaged in a comprehensive study which will compare South 
African with foreign producers in terms of lean manufacturing benchmarks. This will 
indicate very clearly the weaknesses (as well as strengths) of the local industry and 
generate greater awareness of the importance of improving this area of production. A case 
in point is the galvanising impact that the international assembly plant survey conducted in 
the course of the International Motor Vehicle Programme has had on the American and 
European industries. 
Investment 
There is little basis for special tax concessions or other incentives for the motor industry 
and it is unlikely that an upsurge of investment in this sector could take place in isolation 
from a more broadhased increase in investment. However, given the advantages that 
would accrue from a world scale plant producing vehicles or major components, there may 
be a role for direct state involvement in negotiating directly with a foreign company to 
undertake such an investment preferably in partnership with a local firm or even with the 
state as a shareholder (for example, through the IDC). The point is that an investment on 
this scale would have a number of positive external benefits. It would have a significant 
demonstration effect on the rest of the industry, it could encourage the more widespread 
adoption of Japanese style work organisation and also attract investments by suppliers of 
components and subcomponents. The impact that Japanese investment in assembly plants 
in the UK has had on upgrading both the domestic assembly and component producer 
industries is a case in point. 
The institutional structure 
The institutional structure supporting the industry needs to be improved. It currently has a 
number of weaknesses. 
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• The data available on the industry is extremely limited and of poor quality 
• The ability to monitor the impact of policy or to predict its effect is limited. An 
example is the unintended consequences of the Phase VI programme. A model of the 
industry needs to be developed to make more accurate assessments of the impact of 
policy measures. 
• Governmental support for productivity improvement is very limited or non-existent in 
areas such as research and development, the implementation of new forms of work 
organisation and training. 
• The assembly and component industries and their respective federations are primarily 
concerned with promoting policies favourable to their particular industry. This 
frequently takes the form of attacks on each other or lobbying government. While this 
is understandable, there needs to be far greater cooperation between the two major 
sectors of the industry and a greater emphasis at the industry level on ways to upgrade 
productivity, encourage research and development etc. 
• At the regional level there may also be scope for improved cooperation between 
component suppliers and assemblers. 
Appendix One: Wage data index 
Hourly compensation costs for production workers: index U.S =100. 
Motor vehicles and equipment manufacturing (US SIC 371). 
1975 and 1981—1991 
1975 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
United States 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
68 69 69 66 67 71 79 83 86 86 
14 10 8 8 — — — — — — 
55 52 53 43 44 48 55 57 58 — 
40 43 42 41 59 68 79 73 70 75 
8 9 9 9 9 10 15 22 26 26 
10 9 11 9 11 14 17 19 21 22 
57 55 51 50 68 83 84 78 92 — 
46 43 39 38 53 69 70 64 75 — 
49 48 43 42 55 63 65 61 71 65 
72 72 63 61 84 105 111 104 121 115 
37 35 31 32 42 53 59 53 63 — 
42 43 40 40 52 64 66 67 77 75 
52 49 43 42 55 67 69 64 73 — 
— 16 15 14 12 11 15 18 19 — — — 
57 50 51 51 63 76 82 83 94 91 
42 39 35 35 42 50 56 55 63 62 
15 16 13 9 10 13 15 15 17 17 
(1) Industry notes: Australia, transportation equipment. Japan, including motorcycle 
manufacturing. Spain, transportation equipment. 
(2) South African data supplied by NAAMSA. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, April, 1992, NAAMSA. 
Canada 76 68 
Brazil 14 15 
Australia(1) 60 56 
Japan (1) 37 45 
Korea(1) 5 8 









Ireland 39 39 
Italy 54 45 
Netherlands 70 56 
Portugal 
Spain (1) 
Sweden 78 70 
United Kingdom 42 46 
South Africa (2) — 16 
Appendix Two: Wage data 
Hourly compensation costs for production workers in U.S dollars. 
Motor vehicles and equipment manufacturing (US SIC 371) 
1975 and 1981—1991 
1975 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
United States 
9.6 17.0 18.1 18.3 19.0 19.7 20.1 20.4 20.8 21.4 22.4 24.3 
Canada 
7.3 11.6 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.0 13.4 14.5 16.5 17.9 19.2 20.9 
Brazil 
1.3 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 — — — — — — 
Australia (1) 
5.8 9.5 9.9 9.5 10,1 8.4 8.8 9.7 11.4 12.3 13.0 — 
Japan (1) 
3.6 7.6 7.2 7.8 7.9 8.1 11.8 13.8 16.4 15.7 15.8 18.2 
Korea (1) 
0.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.1 3.2 4.7 5.7 6.4 
Taiwan 
- 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.8 5.4 
Belgium 
7.2 12.3 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.9 13.6 17.0 17.4 16.8 20.7 — 
Denmark 
5.8 8.7 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.5 10.6 14.0 14.5 13.6 16.9 — 
France 
5.1 9.1 8.9 8.8 8.2 8.3 11.1 12.9 13.5 13.1 15.9 15.9 
Germany 
7.9 13.3 13.0 13.2 11.9 12.1 17.0 21.5 23.1 22.4 27.1 28.1 
Ireland 
3.7 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.0 6.3 8.5 10.7 12.2 11.3 14.1 — 
Italy 
5.2 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.8 10.5 13.0 13.7 14.3 17.2 18.3 
Netherlands 
6.7 9.5 9.3 9.00 8.1 8.2 11.0 13.7 14.4 13.6 16.4 — 
Portugal 
— 2,8 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.7 3.9 — — — 
Spain (1) 
— 7.0 6.7 5.7 5.4 5.5 7.7 9.5 10.9 — — — 
Sweden 
7.4 12.0 10.4 9.2 9.6 10.1 12.8 15.4 17.1 17.8 21.1 22.2 
United Kingdom 
4.0 7.9 7.6 7.1 6.7 7.0 8.5 10.3 11.7 11.8 14.1 15.1 
(1) Industry notes: Australia, transportation equipment. Japan, including motorcycle 
manufacturing. Spain, transportation equipment 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labour/Statistics, April, 1992 
Appendix Three: Motor industry - total trade 
turnover 
FPflRT 
NMCAM eel. at 
f.o.b. value RI .4 
NMMSA eat. at 
LocolContent 
Value R 1.1 
9.2% of vehicle 
soles turnover 
New Vehicle Sales 
1990 — 334 779 
1991 — 308 075 
Note: R=Billion 
Phase VI measurement: turnover minus nell forex divided by turnover multiplied by 
100 




Material anly 36.7% 
Profit Margins and Overheads: 26.7% 
Local Material plus overheads: 63.3% 
Appendix Four: Transport policy and 
environmental considerations 
This report has been concerned with vehicle production and industrial policy rather than 
with the issue of transport policy. It has also said very little about environmental issues 
which have become a central concern in the international automotive industry. As a 
response to the environmental impact of vehicle use, new product technology is leading to: 
— lighter more fuel efficient vehicles. 
— reduced emissions and zero emission vehicles (battery powered). 
— increased recyclability of materials used in vehicle production. 
As is the case in other areas of automotive technology, South Africa is some years behind 
in introducing such products. It is, however, very important to distinguish between 
policies which impact on the production of vehicles and policies which impact on 
domestic demand for vehicles. This report has suggested a range of possibilities for 
expanding production in an industry which is seen to have very considerable growth 
prospects. Automotive production is a relatively clean industry in terms of waste and 
energy intensity. According to the Environmental Monitoring Group (1993), the 
automobile sector is, with the exception of electronics, the cleanest in terms of waste 
output and energy consumption per unit value of output of the industrial sectors for which 
data are given.1 Subsectors such as the foundries are more problematic but they need to be 
seen in perspective. Automotive foundries in Europe and Japan are under increasing 
pressure for environmental reasons and South Africa could benefit as an exporter of 
automotive castings. At first glance this may sound like importing dirty industries. 
Actually, it would be the opposite as by further processing the products of the (energy and 
waste intensive) metallurgical sector which are currently exported in raw form, it would 
actually reduce the energy and waste intensity of overall manufacturing output. 
The more serious environmental issues facing South Africa are in the area of vehicle usage 
and the impact in terms of emissions, traffic congestion, road accidents etc. This points to 
the overriding environmental issue being the need for a coherent long term transport 
policy to develop efficient forms of public transportation even as private vehicle 
ownership becomes increasingly affordable. While vehicle ownership will grow rapidly as 
incomes rise, we have argued in this report against artificial measures2 to stimulate 
demand which would, of course, be to the short term advantage of the industry but would 
impact negatively not only on the environment but on the macro economy (rising imports) 
as well as constituting a subsidy to a relatively affluent section of the population. 
1. These sectors are chemicals, metallurgical, fabricated metals, automobile, electronics, pulp and paper, 
textiles, food processing and building materials. 
2. Most typically tax benefits, but such measures could also include artificially low fuel prices and over- 
investment in roads/under-investment in public transport. 
Appendix Five: List of companies and 
organisations interviewed 
Assembler firms 
BMW (South Africa) 
Nissan (South Africa) 
Volkswagen (South Africa) 
Volkswagen AG 





Atlantis Diesel Engines 
Autoplastic 
Bosal 





Murray and Roberts Foundries 
National Spring 






National Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM) 
National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of South Africa (NAAMSA) 
The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Limited (UK) 
Verband der Automobilindustrie (Germany) 
Consultants 
Associated Information Technologists 
Econometrix 
Faull and van der Riet 
Trade unions 
National Union of Metaiworkers of South Africa 
IG Metall (Germany) 
Research institutions 
Cenire for Automotive Industry Research, Cardiff Business School 
CSIR 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex 
Institute for New Technologies (INTECH), Netherlands 
Industrial Technology and Research Institute (ITRI), Taiwan 
Investment Research Department, Old Mutual 
Labour Research Service, Cape Town 
MERIT, Netherlands 
School of Management, University of Bath 
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex 
Government agencies 
Board on Tariffs and Trade 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Industrial Development Corporation 
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